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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the vernacular place name Hou Shan as an orientalist production. The 
term refers to the area now also known as Eastern Taiwan, a region relatively marginalized 
in the development of Taiwan as a modern space. The paper focuses particularly on how 
maps both produced and reinforced the image of Eastern Taiwan as a dangerous, 
uncivilized, and peripheral space. Maps from Qing Chinese and Japanese colonizing 
periods receive particular attention. The article  argues for the suitability of the concepts of 
orientalism and especially internal orientalism in illuminating the political and cultural issues 
at stake. 
 
Introduction 
 
台灣物產饒沃，久為彼族垂涎…中亙叢山，山之西…統呼為山前，早歸漢地，由官
主之，山之東…統呼為山後，原屬番地，由番主之…名曰開山，不過鳥道一線，防
不勝防…名曰撫番，不過招番領賞，濫賞何益…兼以山後陰凝成瘴，防墾兵民，類
多中傷，以致開撫踵事虛糜…前有請罷山後之議，未免因噎廢食，我棄人取，勢所
必至。 
劉璈《巡台退思錄》光緒七年至十年 (1881-1884)  
 
‘Taiwan is rich in natural resources and has long been the envy of its neighbors’, 
reported Qing official Liu Ao upon a visit to the island in 1881. ‘In central Taiwan 
lie massive mountains. The area to the west of the mountain is called Mountain 
Front, which has long been a Han colony, controlled by government officials. The 
area to the east is Mountain Back, which is a barbaric land controlled by 
barbarians’. Liu went on to discuss the backwardness of the region behind the 
mountains and the difficulty of dealing with the peoples native to that area. In 
doing so, he participated in the construction of a durable expression of social 
power, one that persists even today. 
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Research Focus, Sources, and Methods 
 
Social power comes in many forms. Critical scholarship insists that power is not 
confined to expressions of formal politics but can be enacted even in the most 
mundane acts of daily life. The topic of power thereby crosses the boundaries of 
and intertwines with most academic disciplines. This paper highlights an 
expression of geographical power that is embodied in a relatively common place 
name and represented through a seemingly mundane representational technology. 
It describes, illustrates, and analyses the notion of Hou Shan (後山) on maps of 
Taiwan. Hou Shan, a phrase that still resonates in contemporary Taiwanese 
society as a social-spatial stereotype of Eastern Taiwan’s area and peoples, has a 
long history in Chinese thought and cartography. It also finds expression in 
Japanese and European sources. We argue that this persistent geographical 
imagination constitutes a discourse of orientalism, a fixing of geographical and 
social meaning within and about Taiwan. This paper first briefly describes the 
object, methods, and sources of our analysis. It next draws on the literature of 
critical human geography to lay out a case for maps and place names as 
expressions of power. The article then takes up the main task of describing, 
illustrating, and analyzing the origins of Hou Shan in the Taiwanese context, 
showing the continuity between historical cartographic expressions and more 
recent imaginings, and making a case for orientalism as an appropriate label for 
the discourse. 
   Within Taiwan, many kinds of place names exist. Some studies about Taiwan’s 
place names have been published, particularly those utilizing historical 
perspectives. In addition to official names, some colloquial place names in Taiwan 
also carry special meanings. This study analyzes one such colloquial name: Hou 
Shan, which literally means ‘behind the mountains’. It usually refers to Eastern 
Taiwan, located on the other side of the Central Mountain Range from the island’s 
main population centers on the western plains. It especially connotes Eastern 
Taiwan’s major cities of Taitung and Hualien. At the same time, the term makes 
reference to more than objective geographical space. Within Taiwan Hou Shan 
conjures an image of remote geographical space, far away from the center of the 
action in Taiwan. Identification of these meanings stems from analysis of various 
types of historical and contemporary sources. It draws on and goes beyond 
research in earlier work (Hsia 1996). Sources include official archival documents, 
gazetteers, and travel writings. We have used historical, content, and textual 
analysis to examine these data. While we focus on maps in this article, we of 
course do not mean to imply that the creation of meaning and usage for the term 
Hou Shan is rooted only in maps. The term also appears in travel writings, official 
documents, oral usage in everyday life, paintings and pictures, historical stories, 
legends, and so on. The space offered by an article does not, of course, allow for 
comprehensive discussion of each source consulted. In order to move the 
discussion forward, and as an initial effort to analyze the term, this article focuses 
on maps that have helped to produce and demonstrate the meanings of Hou 
Shan. The maps we analyze here are from early-modern (about 1600-1895), 
Japanese-colonial (1895-1945), and contemporary periods (post-1945), the three 
major periods of Chinese and other colonial contact with Taiwan.  
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The Power of Maps and Names 
 
Maps are a vitally important medium through which geographical power is 
expressed. In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars began enunciating a critical 
perspective toward cartography. Represented most prominently by Brian Harley, 
this perspective held that a map was not a politically and ideologically neutral 
medium through which to convey geographical facts. The study of cartography 
had hitherto been concerned to trace technical and aesthetic advances in 
representation and to warn against faulty maps. Now the critical perspective 
insisted that many other issues were important. Maps could now be read as 
expressions of culture and ideology (Harley 1992). The meanings that maps 
convey are at least as important as the technical expertise they embody. Perhaps 
the critical perspective’s most significant insight was the close relationship 
between cartography and manifestations of (especially state) power. Mapping, 
critical cartography argued, was essential to the extension of state power both 
internally and externally. Maps express and reify particular social categories and 
spatial relationships. They also invaluably aid the expression and maintenance of 
both bureaucratic efficiency and controlled violence (Yee 1994a). By charting and 
hypostatizing social and physical phenomena, states have more easily brought 
(often messy or fluid) social conditions under control. Cartography, this 
perspective argues, often served as a handmaiden to empire (Short 2001; Edney 
1997). 
   Creating a map involves a multitude of choices. Many of these are seemingly 
technical or conventional (scale, perspective, projection, representational symbols, 
etc.). But other choices more clearly relate to social questions – and even 
technical and conventional choices have been shown to be thoroughly bound up 
with social questions (Wood 1992). What social elements are visually and 
textually foregrounded? What elements recede to the background or fail to appear 
altogether? As one example, Jeremy Black (1997: 17) notes the statist bias of 
most maps. Most maps show the world divided into the social categories and 
spaces that the state has constructed, or would like to construct. Few maps 
convey alternative visions and divisions of space. In this sense, Black argues, 
mapping ‘is an educational process with a clear message about the natural way in 
which to order space’ (see also Brückner 1999). Through such ordering of social 
space, maps have the potential to create and affirm stereotypical understandings 
of groups. Maps always come from a particular viewpoint, and this viewpoint often 
reveals deeply rooted ideas about selves, others, and their relationships. This 
concern over relationships between self and others, or similarly between center 
and margins, has been a key preoccupation of the Chinese cartographic tradition 
(Smith 1996). And while Susan Schulten (2001) writes specifically of the American 
mapping tradition, her argument is more broadly valid: maps not only tell us about 
relations between self and others; they also allow us to think about what is 
possible in those relationships. 
   This point about the power to create stereotypical imaginings also emphasizes 
the idea that maps are not to be read in isolation. John Pickles (1992), for 
example, writes of three layers of textuality within maps that must be attended to: 
the map itself, the map’s immediate context, and its wider (including social-cultural) 
context. Space considerations preclude us from analyzing in close detail each 
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layer for each of the maps we present below, though we try to hint at the 
complexity of the issues. The larger point, however, is that mapping’s stereotyping 
must be seen in relation to other notions of social space current within society. 
Here the focus is one such carrier of spatial meaning – Hou Shan. Cartographic 
representations and the place name Hou Shan worked hand-in-hand, as will be 
described below, to create a social-spatial stereotype of Eastern Taiwan. 
   Places, like persons and groups, typically have identifying names. Place names, 
however, are not only signs that identify or differentiate. Specific cultural and 
historical contexts also lie behind them. In addition, and with perhaps more 
frequency than with people or groups, place names may be changed to better fit 
social situations. In order to understand a place name, therefore, we need to 
clarify the context of naming, the meaning of the place name, and the 
images/symbolism the name evokes. Henri Lefebvre (1991: 193) has written, 
‘Every social space…once duly demarcated and oriented, implies a 
superimposition of certain relations upon networks of named places…’. Names 
can tell us as much about relationships across space as about characteristics 
within space. Names are one of the mutually interacting elements that constitute 
places. To Robert Sack, ‘any place draws together nature, meaning, and social 
relations. The character of that place depends on this mix, which is always in 
contention and changing’ (Sack 1997: 73). 
 
Hou Shan: Origin of the Term’s Meaning 
 
Geographers suggest that the apparently banal truism that people make and 
invent places deserves analytical attention (Valentine 1999). Throughout our 
everyday lives, even in the ways we utilize our bodies or make use of food, for 
example, we constantly negotiate space. We position ourselves physically, 
socially, morally, politically, and metaphorically in relation to others. The term Hou 
Shan refers to a type of spatial/historical experience in various subjective senses. 
   Hou Shan derives from the history of governance in Taiwan. Various regimes 
have governed Taiwan, of course, with many different modes of governmentality 
within and among those regimes. Generally speaking, however, maps 
themselves, mapping, and cartographers were all strictly controlled by the 
governments relevant to this study – the Qing (Hsia 1996), Japanese, and KMT. 
Governments managed the maps, they initiated mapping projects, and they hired 
cartographers as government officials. The maps, mapping skills, and level of 
detail the state utilized to take and maintain control changed through the historical 
phases, but the fundamental use the state made of maps to control space and 
their relative monopoly over those maps persisted. 
   Hou Shan was used first in Taiwan by the early Qing, when Chinese migrants 
who settled on the western Taiwan plain referred to the land to the east, a space 
interrupted by an intervening mountain barrier. Hou Shan referred to the many 
mountainous areas, from the perspective of early Qing settlement in Taiwan. 
During this period, Hou Shan and Shan Hou were usually equivalent terms, with 
the same meaning in both oral and written contexts. Until the late Qing era, Hou 
Shan was the official name for the Eastern Taiwan area. During more than 200 
years of the Qing Dynasty, Hou Shan referred not only to a geographical location, 
but also carried additional meanings. First, Hou Shan meant the place not yet 
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governed or militarily controlled by the Qing. Second, it implied places that were 
difficult to reach. Third, Hou Shan connoted a place that was occupied by many 
aboriginals, who reputedly hunted the heads of those who invaded their territory. 
Hou Shan to Qing Chinese was thus an uncivilized space beyond imperial control, 
one marked by mysterious phenomena (Kang 2004). 
   This geographical imagination was particularly prominent in gazetteers. For 
example, the Gavalan County gazetteer (噶瑪蘭廳志) mentioned Hou Shan in 
1831: 
 
In Taiwan, Gavalan is just one of the parts of the wilderness that contain many 
aboriginal tribes. Holland did not touch it, Guo-Xin-Yeh also did not govern it. 
During the Qing dynasty, after 160 years of Sinicization, Hou Shan finally 
belonged to the Qing’s territory. 
 
David Sibley (1995) argues that dominant groups often create imaginary 
geographies that locate ‘elsewhere’ those who are thought to threaten the 
dominant group, clearly identifying the boundaries of society, both geographically 
and socially. Rooted in categorical distinctions between self and other, 
geographical divisions and moral judgments support one another (see also 
Yorgason 2003). When, as is often the case, spatial division no longer adequately 
separates the dominant from minority groups, Sibley suggests, strategies of 
intensive control by the dominant over ‘unruly’ space often result. 
   After the 1871 Mudanshe Incident (牡丹社事件), during which China became 
acutely aware of the threat of other powers with interest in colonizing Taiwan, the 
Qing court instituted a policy of Opening the Mountains and Pacifying the 
Savages (開山撫蕃). For the new policy to be implemented, it was necessary to 
bring Hou Shan onto the map, building roads across the mountains to the eastern 
coast, extending the reach of civil and military administrations, and recruiting 
Chinese immigrants to settle the land and establish villages. From that time forth, 
Hou Shan meant something slightly different. It now referred to a new territory that 
depended on Western Taiwan and whose social circumstances often made 
governing difficult. 
 
Hou Shan in Maps 
 
Maps provide a good index or evidence for understanding the geographical 
knowledge and imagination held by the Qing administration. Cardell D. K. Yee 
(1994a) suggests that perhaps even more than Western maps, Chinese maps 
traditionally were explicitly expected to have a didactic function in society: 
‘[G]eographic knowledge was part of the necessary equipment of the ruler, and 
maps could be used to transmit cultural values’ (Yee 1994a: 86). Even during the 
Qing era, in the midst of what he describes as selective Westernization of 
mapping technologies, traditional ways of making and deriving meaning from 
maps remained strong (Yee 1994b; see also Smith 1996). These traditional 
sensibilities included the expectation that maps would serve roles beyond 
mathematical realism, as understood in the Western tradition. Although Chinese 
cartographers strove for representational accuracy, ‘[g]eometic and mathematical 
fidelity to observed reality was not an overarching aim…’ (Yee 1994c: 128). 
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Variable perspective and scale on a single map, for example, was commonly 
accepted practice. More than mathematical precision, Chinese cartographers 
attempted to convey the vitality and essence of places. ‘[A]dherence to the 
physical world took no precedence over the subjective…Representation of 
physical appearance was a means of understanding underlying realities, the 
innerness of both object and artist’ (Yee 1994c: 154, 158). 
   During the more than 200 years of Qing control, several types of cartographical 
system represented Taiwan. The first important one was traditional shanshuihua (
山水畫法 mountain-water painting) mapping, a bird’s-eye view aesthetically 
inspired by Chinese landscape painting. Most shanshuihua maps in early Qing 
Taiwan, including many excellent court maps and gazetteer maps, showed the 
island from the perspective of immigrants leaving South China to travel to Taiwan. 
Because of this perspective, the shanshuihua maps always presented the island 
with a horizontal axis (the length of the island – the north-south axis – was drawn 
horizontally). 
 
 
 
Fig.1: Kangxi Fujian Tongzhi Taiwan Futu (detail) © 
 
   Fig. 1 shows detail from Kangxi Fujian Tongzhi Taiwan Futu (康熙福建通志台灣
府圖).This was the earliest of the Qing’s Taiwan maps, produced in 1684 and 
included in a Fujian province gazetteer (福建通志). It was seemingly mapped 
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rather hurriedly, only a relatively few days after the Qing navy had conquered and 
claimed Taiwan. Thus the map shows only a very limited number of basic features 
of the island. This traditional shanshuihua map portrays different places on the 
map at different scales. The political center is shown with the greatest detail and 
at the largest scale within the map. Nothing is drawn beyond the mountains; the 
few words of notation say that ‘nobody came here’, which meant of course that ‘no 
Chinese came here’. In such a manner, the geographical landmass of Taiwan 
could fit easily onto maps. First to appear visually was Taiwan’s coast and the 
plain. Then came the foothills and the large central mountain range, which 
presented an imposing physical presence. The unseen space beyond the bird’s-
eye perspective was an indication of mystical space – Hou Shan. Thus the 
shanshuihua maps not only presented geographical ‘knowledge’ but also 
geographical ‘imaginations’ of the island from the point of view of governors and 
immigrants in early Qing Taiwan. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Qianlong Taiwan Yutu (detail) © 
 
   Fig. 2 shows detail from Qianlong Taiwan Yutu (乾隆台灣輿圖 ), a huge, 
traditional shanshuihua scroll map in color, 675×46cm, surveyed and produced 
between 1757-1759. It contains nearly a thousand place names and notes. Of all 
the Qing’s maps of Taiwan, it contains the best quality and fullest content. Like 
Fig. 1, this map orients the island of Taiwan horizontally, with a bird’s-eye view 
from the Western Sea (Taiwan Strait) looking toward the mountains in the east. 
This perspective shows the geography of Western Taiwan in great detail. The size 
and shape of this horizontal-axis map make it impossible to show the whole map 
in discernable detail. The part of the map shown here displays the Tainan area 
and its vicinity. Beyond the large central mountains, Hou Shan, or the eastern part 
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of the island, does not appear. This representation implies that Hou Shan is 
ungoverned and uncivilized, a place uninteresting to Qing governors and subjects, 
just like any other place outside of the Qing realm more generally. Some notes on 
the map, usually near the mountains, state: ‘few bodies here’, a phrase that 
unambiguously meant: ‘few Chinese here’. 
   Simultaneously during the Qing Dynasty, with the Emperor Kangxi’s support, 
Jesuit missionaries went to Taiwan to survey and map the island through Western 
cartographic techniques. As already indicated, Western methods were only 
selectively and incompletely taken on by Chinese map makers and readers. 
Nevertheless, Yee (1994b) argues, they did hold some importance in Chinese 
society. As a general rule, he suggests, maps made by Westerners were more 
important to higher levels of government than to lower. But overall, though 
Western-style maps had influence among some elites, they did not supplant 
traditional maps in either cultural or functional significance until at least the end of 
the Opium War (1839-1842). Jesuit maps showed Taiwan with a vertical north-
south axis, with north at the top of the map, and with a carefully measured and 
recorded island outline. These maps were more accurate in outline, but contained 
more simplistic content than did shanshuihua maps. 
   Kangxi Tushu Jichen Taiwan Futu (康熙圖書集成台灣府圖) is the earliest Jesuit 
map of Taiwan (Fig. 3). It appears in the Kangxi-Jesuit Atlas and is based on the 
cartographic survey of Taiwan undertaken by missionaries in 1714. This map was 
the first to orient Taiwan vertically. The map shows the outline of island in precise 
detail for the west coast, but the east coast is empty, with nothing drawn. Thus 
even the early use of modern scientific methods did not immediately bring Hou 
Shan or eastern Taiwan onto the island’s maps. From the viewpoint of the Qing 
government, Hou Shan was still beyond the horizon. 
   Fig. 4 also shows a Jesuit map, Qianlong Yitong Yutu Taiwan Tu (乾隆一統輿圖
台灣圖). This particular map resulted from a remapping of the island in 1789. The 
west coast of the island is drawn on this map similarly to Kangxi Tushu Jichen 
Taiwan Futu. But there are two kinds of grid system on this map. Chinese 
cartography during the Qing Dynasty often sought to supplement Chinese 
mapping technology with Western mapping technology rather than replace the 
former with the latter. One result was superimposition of the Western latitude-
longitude graticule (based on a spherical earth) upon the more traditional Chinese 
distance grid (based on a flat earth) (Yee 1994d). This later Jesuit map also 
shows more detail in place names. This map was the first map on which the 
outline of the east coast of Taiwan was recorded. Yet, the east coast is quite 
roughly and incorrectly portrayed. Nevertheless two bays and some rivers along 
the east coast appear. Though eastern Taiwan still appears relatively empty, this 
was one of the first maps to display Taiwan as a singular island entity. 
   Two very different mapping paradigms existed in early Qing Taiwan – 
shanshuihua cartography and Jesuit cartography. Hou Shan or Eastern Taiwan 
was almost completely absent from both. The Qing court’s philosophy was that if 
a place was governed, it would literally be brought onto the map. An area that was 
not yet governed, which usually meant an ‘uncivilized’ place, should not be part of 
the map (Hsia 1996). To that point in time, then, the fact that almost all of the 
Qing’s maps did not present the whole outline of Taiwan seems reasonable. The 
situation changed by the late nineteenth century. 
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   Guangxu Yutu Bingshou Quantai Qian Houshan Zhongtu (光緒輿圖並說全臺前後
山總圖) is one of the most excellent and important maps of Taiwan produced 
during the Qing Dynasty (Fig. 5). This map was finished in 1879 and published in 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Kangxi Tushu Jichen Taiwan Futu © 
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Fig. 4: Qianlong Yitong Yutu Taiwan Tu © 
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Fig. 5: Guangxu Yutu Bingshou Quantai Qian Houshan Zhongtu © 
 
1880, with a vertical axis orienting the island. There is a grid system on the map 
marking two meridians, measured in relation to a base in Beijing, and four lines of 
latitude, relying on a polar base. There are signs and notes about scale and a 
legend as well. The outline of the island is fairly accurate, better than most Qing 
maps. Place names are plentiful. Thus the map provides a rather comprehensive 
image of the landscape in late Qing Taiwan. After the 1871 Mudanshe Incident, 
the Qing court decided it needed to claim all of Taiwan to prevent other imperial 
powers from claiming the island. The best atlas of Qing Taiwan to that time was 
completed in 1880 – 光緒輿圖並說 (Guang Xu Atlas). This map is the first in the 
atlas. Hou Shan, or the eastern part of Taiwan, is mapped with similar 
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geographical precision as Western Taiwan. The number of place names is also 
similar to the west. The atlas, incidentally, contains another map focusing on Hou 
Shan. It is the best and most important map produced on eastern Taiwan during 
the Qing era. For this and some of the other maps shown in this article, other 
place names exist in the area of Hou Shan. Most of such place names were 
translated into Chinese from aboriginal languages. The practice of translation 
seems to focus the user’s attention to the apparent lack of Chinese civilization in 
the Hou Shan area. 
   In traditional China, mapping was almost the exclusive prerogative of the state 
or court. They used maps primarily for governing and military affairs purposes. 
The state carefully managed the availability and distribution of maps. Thus 
officials and elites were almost exclusively the only people who could read maps 
in traditional Chinese society. They were the ones who had the ability, position, 
and motivation to govern, travel, write, and describe the different places they 
visited or learned about from literature and maps. We can therefore argue that 
other than more vernacular imaginings, there tended to be a rather singular 
geographical imagination and discourse about places in Chinese society. This 
discourse would have been extremely difficult for any other social group to 
challenge except perhaps at the most informal, local level. 
 
From Hou Shan to Eastern Taiwan: Change and Continuity 
 
Similar characteristics applied to Japanese mapping. During the Japanese 
colonization of Taiwan, maps were one of the most important tools of domination. 
The Japanese took the scientific study of Taiwan to a new level, as they used 
such instruments as land surveys and censuses to gain more intimate knowledge 
and control of not only the spaces of Taiwan, but also the people who belonged to 
those spaces (Yao 2006). Nevertheless the Japanese colonial state, like the Qing, 
still used and controlled cartography for purposes of governance. But, with the 
different political situation, some cartographers began to change the orientation of 
maps. Taiwan began facing north, toward Japan as the motherland. Nevertheless, 
this shifted orientation did not change the geographical imagination about Hou 
Shan within Taiwan itself. 
   In the fifty years during which the Japanese colonized Taiwan, the Japanese 
government used the term Eastern Taiwan, instead of retaining Hou Shan from 
the Qing period. This change was partly due to the different historical and 
geographical experiences of the Japanese colonizers. When they sailed south 
from Japan to Taiwan, the island could be imagined as divided into two parts: the 
right part and the left part, or west/east from the point of view of the sailors. This 
more equal east/west division of the island was more important to the Japanese 
than it had been to the earlier Qing. To the Japanese Eastern Taiwan held little of 
the Chinese sense of being beyond/behind the mountains. This geographic 
structure became an important factor in the creation of the Japanizing Eastern 
Taiwan Policy (內地化東台 ) in the early Japanese colonial period. Another 
important factor was the uneven development between eastern and western parts 
of Taiwan, particularly as it was accompanied by racial discrimination toward the 
majority population in Hou Shan, aboriginals who were considered much less 
civilized than the Han people in Western Taiwan. Eastern Taiwan or Hualien 
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Harbor were the official place names; these came to signify a new region for 
settling. Hou Shan instead started to be used in a colloquial and informal manner 
by the Chinese people in Taiwan. 
   Many types of early scientific cartography existed during the Japanese colonial 
period. As support for colonial modernity on Taiwan, including the needs of 
administration, military, planning, policing, and so on, the Japanese undertook 
many types of land surveys and produced many excellent maps of Taiwan. Bird’s-
eye maps were the most popular during the middle of the colonial period. Due to 
the topography of Taiwan, these maps utilized a sea-to-land perspective. They 
usefully promoted geographical knowledge of Taiwan within Taiwanese society. 
Not unlike traditional Chinese maps, different places tended to be drawn at 
different scales. Of course, Eastern Taiwan, including Hualien and Taitung, 
appeared on maps in this sea-to-land perspective. These maps clearly indicate a 
different attitude from the Japanese colonial government toward Eastern Taiwan 
from that held by Qing officials. 
   Fig. 6 shows a series of postcards that uses four individual cards to create a 
whole map of Taiwan (Taiwan Quandao Niaokantu – 台灣全島鳥瞰圖). This 
popular map was produced during the 1930s by a Japanese painter, Hatsuzaburo 
Yoshida (吉田初三郎), using bird’s-eye perspective. The map views the island 
from over the sea looking toward the land. Unlike the Qing maps, this map uses 
an east-to-west view to portray the island’s landscape. It also represents different 
places on the map at different scales; the major cities are shown at a larger scale 
and with greater detail. Like most of the bird’s-eye maps in Taiwan’s middle-
Japanese period, this map tries to connect Taiwan to Japan. The right postcard 
shows Japanese place names and Mount Fuji (富士山) toward the remote margin 
of the map. (In the process it greatly distorts cardinal directions. Japan and Korea 
appear to be the only lands on the horizon west – rather than north – of Taipei. 
China, physically much closer to both the north and northwest of Taipei, is 
absent). The map clearly signals that all of Taiwan should face toward and belong 
to Japan. For this purpose Yoshida drew a sea route from Korea and Japan to 
northern Taiwan. In this map Eastern Taiwan receives the same weight as other 
places in Taiwan. It does, however, still appear to be (quite inaccurately in a 
technical sense) the back of the island vis-à-vis Japan. 
   Da Taluko Jiaotong Niaokantu (大太魯閣交通鳥瞰圖 ) was another popular 
bird’s-eye-view map during the middle of the Japanese colonial period (Fig. 7). It 
was drawn in 1935 by Yoshida to show a important new road system established 
by the colonial government. The road connected Northern and Eastern Taiwan 
through the famous high cliff coast and also linked eastern and central Taiwan 
across the Central Mountain Range. In this map two main east coast harbor cities, 
Hualien (in reality a bit north of center on the east coast of Taiwan) and Suao 
(further north, nearly halfway between Haulien and Taiwan’s northern tip), are 
portrayed much larger and with much greater detail than other places on the map. 
The rest of the east coast, as well as the northern coast, are severely shortened. 
The eastern half of Taiwan, which in reality features a more-or-less straight 
coastline for most of its length, appears harshly indented and convex. The 
mountain area the road system covered is given the main position on the map and 
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Fig 6 (left): Taiwan Quandao Niaokantu and Fig. 7 (right): Da Taluko Jiaotong Niaokantu 
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is also exaggerated. Like many other maps of this kind, Japanese lands and place 
names are portrayed in the right-top corner of map, with a sea-route linking 
Taiwan and Japan. 
 
The Return to Hou Shan: New Meanings, But Outside Cartography 
 
After World War II many Taiwanese migrated from Western to Eastern Taiwan in 
search of the economic positions the Japanese withdrawal had left vacant. At that 
time the Kuomintang government came to Taiwan, repeating the geographic 
direction of movement the Qing-era Chinese had used, from south China to 
Taiwan. The usage and social significance of the Hou Shan discourse have 
therefore risen again in Taiwan. But Hou Shan gathered additional meanings in 
the process. These include: a lack of resources and materials for a quality life, an 
underdeveloped region in Taiwan, and a place to punish prisoners and wayward 
officials. In analyzing post-World War II cartography, when most of the maps or 
atlases of Taiwan were based on the American army system, we no longer find 
differences in portrayals between ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ Taiwan. Hou Shan, as a 
special colloquial place name, did not appear on official maps, publications, or 
documents. Its existence was instead perpetuated orally in everyday life 
situations. 
   After the 1990s, with the rise of Taiwanese identity, many social movements 
sprang up around the island. In this context many residents of Eastern Taiwan 
gave Hou Shan a more positive interpretation. They pointed toward the spirit of 
pioneering and confronting challenges. For example, a local group in Taitung, 
organized by a writer, tried to promote a new sense of Hou Shan identity: 
 
When ‘Hou Shan culture’ begins to appear with the image of tenderness and 
sincerity, penetrating every corner of Taitung, we have reason to believe that the 
ideology of the ‘Hou Shan people’ can emerge out of the shadow of obscurity 
and seclusion to see clearly the cultural countenance of itself. (Lin 1993: 7-8) 
 
   Simultaneously, Taiwan’s nation-building efforts have emphasized Eastern 
Taiwan as a particular site of multi-ethnic culture. This movement has also 
promoted Eastern Taiwan as Taiwan’s last allegedly ‘pure’ environment. 
Furthermore, for purposes of de-Sinicization, many in Taiwan have tried to create 
and stir Pacific imaginations by relating Taiwan’s aboriginal peoples, a substantial 
proportion of whom live in eastern Taiwan, to other Austronesians. As natural 
purity and new ethnic linkages became part of the Hou Shan discourse, the term 
Hou Shan began to change somewhat within Taiwan from a negative stereotype 
to an image with some positive connotations. 
 
Interpreting Hou Shan: Orientalism in Cultural Representation 
 
Despite the more positive tone in recent years, we suggest that Hou Shan 
discourse constitutes a type of Orientalism, and even at certain times internal 
orientalism. Orientalism has of course been a popular concept for scholars since 
Edward Said’s (1978) book of that title. It commonly refers to a particular type of 
othering process toward people, lands, and social systems. Orientalism produces 
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representations of exoticism, timelessness, danger, barbarity, backwardness, and 
sensuousness. Our use of the term draws on these well-known arguments by 
Said and others who have both extended his research agenda and critiqued 
aspects of his original formulation. 
   Said’s Orientalism was his most important contribution to post-colonial theory – 
indeed, it was one of the founding texts of the field. Through this book Said 
argues that ‘the Orient’ is a construction – one produced within a frame of power, 
knowledge and geography (see also Gregory 2000: 556-567). Said regards 
Orientalism as both a discursive formation and material practice for the production 
and domination of ‘the Orient’ by ‘the West’: ‘[W]hat gave the Oriental’s world its 
intelligibility and identity was not the result of his own efforts but rather the whole 
complex series of knowledgeable manipulations by which the Orient was identified 
by the West’, (Said 1978: 40). From teaching to publication, conferences to 
media, etc., Orientalism constituted knowledge, aesthetics, and imagination of the 
East within the West. Above all else, the discourse of Orientalism made ‘the 
Orient’ appear as an essentially backward realm, originally outside of and 
untouched by the West. 
   As a type of geographical imagination, Orientalism specifies an asymmetrical 
position between self and other. Basically, the discourse of Orientalism presumes 
a set of positive characteristics that typify the West along with corresponding 
absences for the East: positive/negative, presence/absence, masculine/feminine, 
rational/irrational, democratic/despotic, and progressive/timeless. Through these 
binary oppositions, the West asserted for itself a position of primary significance 
and relegated the Eastern world to a secondary position, one that was only known 
through the stereotyping that accompanies othering. 
   Said’s formulation of Orientalism has not gone uncriticized, of course. Derek 
Gregory, in Geographical Imaginations (1994) notes, as have many other critics, 
that Said’s Orientalism was a product of its times, the late seventies. He points to 
Orientalism’s homogenization of the West’s orientalizing discourses, the passivity 
with which those orientalized are implied to have accepted the process, and 
Said’s failure to analyze critically the gender content of Orientalist discourse 
(Gregory 1994: 169-183; see also Lowe 1991). Others dispute the extent to which 
Orientalism’s essentializing tendencies were unique to the colonizing West (van 
der Veer 1993: 23-24). Yao (2006) usefully questions the purported links between 
a rather unified discourse and highly varied colonial experiences. 
   Most discussions of imperialism and Orientalism indeed focus on ‘the West’s’ 
actions toward the places where it asserted colonial or imperial control. Some 
scholars have even gone so far as to argue that the only true imperialism was that 
undertaken by the West. Against such claims, Emma Jinhua Teng (2004) has 
strongly argued that scholars ought to regard the geographically expansive 
actions of the Chinese state and Chinese people during the Qing Dynasty as 
‘imperialism’. Chinese expansion during this period carries a strong resemblance 
to western imperialism both in social relationships and in cultural constructions: 
 
Chinese representations of the frontiers as exotic, uncivilized, and barbarous 
bear fundamental similarities to European Orientalism. If European culture, as 
Said argued, derived its sense of identity and strength by setting itself off against 
the Orient, Chinese civilization gained its sense of identity as ‘the Middle 
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Kingdom’ (Zhongguo) in opposition to the ‘barbarians of the four directions’ (siyi). 
Both traditions attempted to establish their own civilization as the normative ideal 
and to project ‘over there’ qualities and traits (lasciviousness and indolence, for 
example) that they sought to repress in their own societies. Painted in the 
broadest strokes, European Orientalism and Chinese discourse on barbarians 
can be regarded as comparable. Indeed, the similarities are striking and point to 
the existence of shared, cross cultural modes of constructing foreign ‘others’. 
(Teng 2004: 12) 
 
   Teng argues that through various discourses and to multiple effects, Chinese 
settlers and Qing officials set themselves apart from the indigenous peoples of 
Taiwan. In doing so, they figured the land of Taiwan to reflect the differences they 
claimed the indigenous people represented. The Chinese increasingly throughout 
the eighteenth century associated the basic racial/ethnic markers of ‘cooked’ and 
‘raw’ savages, for example, with territorial delimitations (Teng 2004: 131-145). 
The former term represented those aborigines who could presumably be civilized 
and perhaps even Han-icized, while the latter represented peoples who could not 
be brought into the orbit of Chinese civilization. A persistent marker of most 
fundamental otherness was the term Hou Shan, which referred to areas of raw 
wildness – both human and natural – of and beyond the Central Range on 
Taiwan. This naming of a place, even as something beyond the known civilized 
world, set colonization and dispossession in motion, as Paul Carter, Derek 
Gregory, and others have noted in different contexts, making the place 
simultaneously familiar to colonizers and alien to native inhabitants (Carter 1987; 
Gregory 1994: 171-172). Maps portraying Eastern Taiwan as empty or otherwise 
apart from Taiwan’s social processes reinforced this otherness. Many of Said’s 
arguments thus work quite well in analyzing Hou Shan. 
   Nevertheless, there are some points of difference between Said’s argument and 
the Taiwan case. First, unlike most of the West’s far-flung colonialisms, Taiwan 
was eventually marked by an integrative politics. The Chinese state governed all 
of the island, including even the eastern half, from the late Qing Dynasty. After 
World War II, the institutions were almost one and the same between Western 
and Eastern Taiwan. Second, the size or scale of Taiwan is smaller than the 
Western domination of the Middle East on which Said focuses. This means that 
the physical boundaries were more easily crossed within Taiwan. It was easier to 
migrate, travel, and maintain contact between the two parts of Taiwan. Third, 
unlike most cases of Orientalism where clear ethnic divides exist, the same social 
group eventually dominated in population and in politics/culture on both eastern 
and western parts of island – the Han, sometimes further differentiated as the 
Hoklo/Taiwanese people. The aboriginal peoples have not effectively challenged 
this situation since the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan. 
   In part to analyze situations similar to Taiwan’s, some scholars have built upon 
Said’s arguments by suggesting that ‘internal Orientalism’ is a significant 
phenomenon in its own right (Breckenridge and van de Veer 1993). Most 
discussions of orientalism focus on geographical othering that crosses boundaries 
of nation-states. But, some scholars argue, there is no necessary reason to think 
that Orientalism’s exotification, essentialization, and defining of self through 
negative reference to the Other must take place outside a country’s borders. 
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Louisa Schein (1997) helped initiate the discussion, especially in the Chinese 
context, by arguing that minority ethnicities in the contemporary People’s Republic 
of China are subject to the same types of othering processes at the hands of Han 
Chinese that Said identifies (for a case in India, see Jewitt 1995). David Jansson 
(2003: 296) extended the idea geographically. ‘Internal orientalism represents a 
discourse that operates within the boundaries of a state, a discourse that involves 
the othering of a (relatively) weak region by a more powerful region (or regions) 
within the state’. And, in a manner that resonates with the eventual more positive, 
self-produced visions of Hou Shan, Jansson further claims that internal 
Orientalism differs from Orientalism. Residence within the same nation-state 
makes it more likely that ‘negative representations of the othered region will be 
complemented by positive representations’, perhaps from voices within the 
othered region (Jansson 2005: 267). 
   In Taiwan, Hou Shan as a geographical space did not exist naturally or 
essentially. The social meaning of Hou Shan started to emerge within Western 
Taiwan and for Western Taiwan. Knowledge about Hou Shan was not the result of 
that region’s own efforts, but rather of the production and manipulation of knowledge 
and domination by Western Taiwan society. Hou Shan as a geobody was identified 
from research, publication, teaching, media, writing, etc., in ways that disciplined the 
knowledge, culture, and imagination about it by Western Taiwan. The discourse of 
Hou Shan has utilized a series of binary, essentializing elements –
 developed/underdeveloped, core/peripheral, advanced/primitive, modern/mystical, 
priority/secondary position – that are rooted in Chinese-centrism. The discourse of 
Hou Shan is an expression of social power. It is a discourse about otherness, an 
otherness that helped sustain a sense of normality and centeredness, initially for 
Han Chinese ethnically, and later for Western Taiwan in a more social-spatial 
sense. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we use the discourse of Orientalism to argue that Hou Shan is a 
kind of Orientalist geographical imagination and discourse of otherness in Taiwan. 
We have been particularly concerned to illustrate the role of maps in the 
discourse’s origin. While this focus has precluded attention to the full variety of 
ways in which Hou Shan discourse functions as a type of internal Orientalism, it 
illuminates ways in which geographical imaginations make significant 
contributions to relations of power within Taiwan. 
   Orientalism generally, and internal Orientalism in particular, are not relationships 
of inevitable eternal duration, of course. For example, Europe’s emerging identity, 
an expanding European Union, as well as Europe’s high levels of immigration 
have recently produced rapid changes in the ways self and other are defined both 
ethnically and geographically. Old internal others are becoming part of the 
mainstream, and new groups and areas are taking on the role they vacated 
(Haldrup et al. 2006). Nevertheless, Orientalism is often quite persistent. During 
recent years – when nation-building efforts centering around Taiwan identity have 
become prominent – Hou Shan has been given additional meaning related to a 
pristine ecological environment and a multi-ethnic culture. But while new elements 
have accrued to the discourse, the notion of Hou Shan representing a 
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secondary/other position remains strong. Though space does not allow us to 
pursue this argument here, we suggest that eastern Taiwan retains in both 
informal and formal ways a backward position within Taiwan’s geographical 
imagination. A few positive representations have not eliminated Orientalist habits 
and categories. Eastern Taiwan is still behind the mountains. 
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Abstract 
 
This article explores the relationship between governmental politics and architectural 
practices in physical and ideological post-war reconstruction of Taiwan, which reclaimed 
political sovereignty from the Japanese colonial government in 1945 and soon turned into a 
quasi-country in 1949 as a result of the Chinese Civil War. Through a historical reading of 
the two precincts of power of the nationalist government in Taiwan – Jhong-Sing New 
Village (JSNV) and Taipei – the article illustrates how shifts in political orientation were 
reflected in spatial facts and how modernism and urbanism were politicized as exemplary 
representations of modernity. 
 
Introduction 
 
Politics is prone to be disguised within architecture just as architecture tends to 
insinuate itself into politics. From the distant past to the present day, the built 
environment has been an effective propaganda vehicle for the demonstration of 
power and the formation of identity. Particularly for newly established political 
regimes, architecture and urban planning have often played a constructive role in 
the legitimization of new authority, be it theocracy, monarchy or republic, and 
regardless of their variation in preferred materials and styles. Moving into the 
twentieth century, doubt arose over the role of modern architecture in forging 
national identity by visual and spatial means. Hilde Heynen questioned whether 
architectural monuments built in the last century, compared with the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth, could effectively perform as a ‘power-radiating’ or 
‘image-generating’ device to represent the modern states (Heynen 1999a: 369; 
Heynen 1999b). Opposed to her view, this article explores the relationship 
between governmental politics and architectural practices in the physical and 
ideological construction of post-war Taiwan. Beginning with an overview of the 
post-war conditions of Taiwan, the article gives a historical account of the role of 
architectural practices in Taiwan in the visualization and concretization of identity 
of the Chinese Nationalist Party (also known as the Kuomintang, KMT, 國民黨), 
which established the Republic of China on the island after its crushing defeat by 
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the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. It reviews the two precincts of power 
where the nationalist government shifted between two contradictory forms of 
symbolism in order to establish the legitimacy of the new Republic – the provincial 
government seat Jhong-Sing New Village (中興新村, JSNV) in the 1950s and the 
national capital Taipei in the 1960s. These two cases, contradictory in nature, 
vividly illustrate how the shift in political orientation was reflected in spatial facts 
and how modernism and urbanism were politicized as exemplary representations 
of modernity. This essay – exploring the broad theme of the architecture-politics 
relationship through examining case studies in depth – is not exhaustive, yet it 
seeks to develop a new insight into architectural politics in post-war Taiwan. 
 
Post-1949 Taiwan: The One-Province Nation-State 
 
As a newly formed quasi-nation seeking a new republican identity to mark itself off 
from the colonial past, as a capitalist society performing some socialist practices 
and as an allegedly democratic polity under military dictatorship, post-1949 
Taiwan is chosen here to exemplify the inter-dependent relationship between 
politics and architecture in the state-driven project of nation-building. As an 
offshore island of China, Taiwan used to be a very sparsely inhabited land. It was 
not until the Chinese imperial government claimed it from Dutch and Spanish 
colonial rule in the seventeenth century that more and more Chinese emigrated 
from the mainland. In the late nineteenth century, the Chinese Qing government 
finally realized the strategic importance of the island’s location for maritine trade 
and then, in 1886, lifted its status to a province and established the Taipei 
Prefecture in the new capital, Taipei. This official political bond between China 
and the island, however, did not last long. Less than a decade later, in 1895, the 
island was ceded to the Japanese Empire and remained under colonial rule until 
the end of World War II. The cross-strait cultural ties and communications were 
thereafter more or less cut for five decades. After the war, the so-called 
retrocession of Taiwan to the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1945 and, most 
importantly, the nationalist government’s relocation of the Republic of China 
(ROC) to the island in 1949, essentially transformed this former colony into a 
republican nation. 
   As part of the post-war aftermath and the Cold War conflict, the island and the 
mainland seemingly shared the fate of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, where the 
Great Powers imposed separation upon a united entity and created two rival 
states in order to resolve irreconcilable conflict and establish temporary peace – 
by dividing Germany into the communist East and the capitalist West in 1949, and 
splitting both Korea and Vietnam into the communist North and capitalist South 
respectively in 1953 and 1954. The separation of Taiwan from China took place 
around the same time. However, unlike the three cases cited above, Taiwan, the 
previous colony of Japan, was not ‘part of China’ in the interwar period nor in the 
pre-war years. Instead of dividing an existing single territorial nation into two 
states as a result of World War II, the Great Powers restored Taiwan to China – 
the island and the mainland were ‘reunited’ in 1945 (C.H. Wang 2005). 
   The reunification, such as it was, did not last long. Taiwan and China soon met 
the same fate as the three divided countries. In 1949, the Chinese Communist 
Party defeated the Chinese Nationalist Party in the Civil War and, as a result, the 
TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE   23 
 
communists took control over, and established the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) on the mainland. On the other hand, the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-
Shek withdrew the troops from the mainland and relocated the Republic of China 
(ROC) to Taiwan. With the arrival of the nationalist government, Taiwan for the 
very first time achieved its political independence and absolute sovereignty and 
became a quasi-country – as ‘this time a nation per se resided in the island’ (Lo 
1996: 66). 
   This event not only marked a turning point in the history of Taiwan but also 
shuffled the centre-periphery status of the island in the perceptions of different 
subjects. For four centuries, Taiwan had been a marginal island either unclaimed 
or governed by an ‘absentee government’ that resided distantly on the ‘mainland’ 
– of the Chinese Continent or the Japanese Archipelago (Lo 1996: 139). After the 
nationalist government fled to Taiwan, the relativity of centre and periphery, 
intriguingly, was diametrically opposite vis-à-vis the different standpoints – of the 
nationalist government or Taiwan natives. 
 
The dialectic of centre-periphery was complicated. For the Nationalists the centre 
was exiled to the periphery, but for the Taiwanese the peripheral island now was 
centralized as a nation…And it was an instant nation. (Lo 1996: 65-66) 
 
When the nationalist government was marginalized to the island, the immediate 
situation it found itself in was the dis-identification of Taiwanese and its status of 
being a minority regime. Early on, the Taiwan natives – descendants of 
immigrants from the seventeenth century onwards and other non-Han minorities – 
confronted difficulty in identifying themselves with the new immigrants (so-called 
‘mainlanders’) and regarded the new authority from the mainland as an invader, 
albeit with some shared cultural roots. For the natives, their identity as Chinese 
had become too vague to recall, since their familial and cultural ties with the 
motherland had been suspended by the Japanese government for half a century. 
Furthermore, in the last decade of colonial rule, the Taiwanese were the objects in 
the Japanese colonist moral crusade, Kōminka, which aimed to ‘civilize’ and 
systematically transform Taiwanese into loyal ‘imperial subjects of the Japanese 
empire’. During World War II while the Japanese government invaded China with 
the intention of extending its control over East Asia, many Taiwanese were 
recruited to serve (in) the Japanese Imperial Army and fight against the Chinese. 
Given the past five decades, being Chinese had become a rather abstract 
concept for many Taiwanese (Lo 1996; Brown 2004). This dis-identification was 
further worsened by a series of far-reaching destructive effects of the nationalist 
government’s move to Taiwan: inflation, corruption, large-scale immigration and 
unexpectedly sharp differences in culture and language between Taiwanese and 
mainlanders. In fact, at that time the mainlanders made up only one quarter of the 
overall population of the island and a third in the capital, Taipei. Accordingly, the 
nationalist government was regarded as an alien ‘minority regime’ and faced 
peculiar ‘ethnic conflicts’. However, with its nation-scale military might – consisting 
of 600,000 soldiers and including the army, navy, and air force – and in declaring 
martial law, suspending democratic elections, executing rebels and suppressing 
uprisings, it eventually secured its ruling status and stabilized domestic unrest 
(Dai 1985; Brown 2004). 
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   Ironically, although the autonomous status of nation had been afforded to 
Taiwan, temporarily residing the ‘nation-state’ – the ROC – on the island, the 
nationalist government maintained their claim on China. Taiwan was consequently 
charged with being the ‘defensive stronghold’ and ‘the base from which to 
reconquer the mainland’. Just as the Nationalist leader Chiang’s naming of 
‘Taiwan as “province”, “base”, and “model” and [the] identification of Chinese on 
the mainland as “our compatriots”’, the new authority constantly ‘constituted the 
people of Taiwan as sojourners on an island whose sole purpose was to be 
developed well enough so that the ROC military would be able to retake the 
mainland at some point in the future’ (Benda 2001). 
   Considering that the nationalist government used to preside over 35 provinces 
yet now was trapped in one covering only 1/300 of the total area of China, its 
ambivalence toward Taiwan was perfectly understandable. Intriguingly, while its 
power was not even remotely comparable to its zenith in the 1920s and 1930s, 
the fabrication that it remained sovereign over the mainland and represented ‘the 
whole of China’ was forcefully defended and campaigned to the degree that fiction 
was taken as truth (C.H. Wang 2005; Chang 2007). In the mass media of the 
1950s, the image of the ROC was intentionally distinguished from that of Taiwan 
Province. Chang Bi-Yu (2007) has examined the maps in elementary geography 
textbooks in early post-war Taiwan and points out the marginal, subsidiary status 
of Taiwan in the mind of the Nationalists. She writes: 
 
The peripheral image of Taiwan was reinforced in the ROC Map, dangling on the 
right-hand bottom corner, marginalised like a fragment dripping from the great 
fertile land. The great land of China was the centre of the map. The gaze of map-
users was drawn…towards ‘our Homeland’ – the true China. (Chang 2007: 4) 
 
She concludes that the nationalist government wittingly constructed its own 
version of ‘homeland’ in post-war education. Indeed, for the nationalist 
government, the ‘imagined community’ of the ROC amounted to one billion people 
inhabiting both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The ‘imagined homeland’ – the fictional 
version of ‘the territories of the ROC’ that the national government deliberately 
sustained – was equivalent to those of the Qing Dynasty before it had been 
overthrown by the Republic in 1912. The territories claimed by the nationalist 
government were massively out of proportion to its de facto territories. 
   To keep up this fiction, the island was governed in accordance with the 1947 
constitution, written before the nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. Among 
all the paradoxical consequences this fiction caused, the ambiguity between the 
central and provincial governments in the government structure perhaps was the 
most illogical, or even preposterous. In 1949, all the institutions and the entire 
system of the Republic were transferred to the island and continued to function as 
‘normally’ as before. The National Assembly retained the seats of the 
representatives for all the mainland provinces that were, in point of fact, under 
communist rule. What is more absurd is the four-level government structure – the 
central, provincial, county/city and village/township – was also deliberately 
retained, despite the fact Taiwan was the only province actually under the 
jurisdiction of the ROC. The subsequent contradiction involved extensive overlap 
between the highest office of local government, the Taiwan Provincial 
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Government (TPG), and the highest executive branch of the nation, the Executive 
Yuan (P.H. Wang 1989). Pinning all their hopes on regaining control of the 
mainland, and as part of the claim that it was the sole legitimate representative of 
China, the nationalist government was loathe to streamline the ‘province’-level 
governments. The existence of the ‘provinces’, on the contrary, was recognized to 
be of great necessity and was emphasized, because it symbolized the validity of 
the ‘imagined homeland’, which served as a constant reminder to the people on 
the island of the mission to retake the mainland (Y.W. Wang 2003). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Territories occupied and claimed by the nationalist government. The royal blue 
colour represents the de facto territories while the rest mostly are claimed. 
© Pryaltonian, 2006. 
 
Model Province, Modern Provincial Government Seat 
 
Residing on the island permanently was one of the scenarios that the nationalist 
government least wanted to see. Paradoxically, this sojourner government could 
only count on the ‘defensive stronghold’ Taiwan to launch attacks on the 
communists and recover the lost ‘homeland’ China. To raise morale and solidarity 
to fight against communist China, it prioritized two main tasks: first, the 
reconstruction and enhancement of basic infrastructure and, second, the 
acceleration of local identification with the ROC. The ambiguity of its thought-to-
be-short stay in Taiwan eventually came to be the catalyst for the modernization 
of the island in the 1950s. Arguably, the most prominent example of the ROC’s 
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ambivalence about Taiwan was the building of the new administrative centre of 
the Taiwan Provincial Government (TPG) – Jhong-Sing New Village (中興新村, 
JSNV; historically transliterated as Chung-Hsing New Village). 
 
Since…the Taiwan Provincial Government has decided to relocate to Central 
Taiwan, the local populace of the cities and counties in the Taichung Region (台
中地區 ) has been thrilled at the prospect of rapid development in the near 
future…Public attention is focused particularly on two small towns, Wufeng (霧峰) 
and Caotun (草屯). These two outlying areas, away from the main [North-South] 
railway route, are going to be the provincial government seat – the political centre 
of Taiwan Province…There is no doubt that the residing here of the provincial 
government will stimulate tremendous growth in the economy of the Taichung 
Region. (The China Daily News 1956; translated by the authors) 
 
   It was the largest construction and probably the greatest historical event in 
1950s Taiwan. Since its establishment in 1945 the TPG had been situated in the 
age-old political centre of the island, Taipei City, which had been the seat of the 
Taipei Prefecture of the Qing Dynasty in the late nineteenth century and also the 
capital of the Japanese colonial Government in the first half of the twentieth 
century (1895-1945). After the Nationalists relocated the Central Government of 
the ROC to Taipei, the city was then given a dual identity – being the provincial 
capital and the national ‘provisional’ capital of the government in exile. The move 
of the TPG seat was fairly controversial at the time, since the provincial 
government played the major role in dealing with ‘affairs of state’. 
   In the 1950s, to reinforce the fictional vision of the vast ‘imagined homeland’ and 
to dilute the paradoxical ambiguity between the central and provincial 
governments in the four-level hierarchy of the administrative system, the 
nationalist government delegated considerable power to the TPG and empowered 
it to the extent that it was virtually in charge of ‘national’ affairs. The provincial 
government, performing as the leading governing body, dealt with a wide range of 
‘nation-wide’ matters, ranging from education to economics, except defence and 
foreign affairs. A common refrain among former employees of the TPG is ‘[t]he 
provincial government was supreme!’ (Y.W. Wang 2003: 36). Various instances 
indeed indicate that the TPG occupied the role of supreme authority: the official 
currency of the ROC (New Taiwan Dollar) was issued by the province-operated 
Bank of Taiwan; several types of goods and supplies of services, such as 
tobacco, liquor, salt, sugar, electricity, water, gas, and telecommunication, were 
all monopolized by either province-operated or provincial cooperative enterprises. 
Of significance, however, was that all the public institutional buildings and large-
scaled constructions launched in the 1950s – from museums, schools, hospitals 
to the building of the road network – were carried out by the TPG and the word 
‘Provincial’ appeared in the naming of all the buildings. Given the fact that more 
than 99 per cent of the territory of the country was governed by the provincial 
government, it can be argued that the construction of JSNV was the making of a 
quasi national capital of the one-province state. (Y.W. Wang 2003).  
   The authority justified the decision on relocation – wherever it was explained in 
press releases, the government reports or the replies to the Taiwan Provincial 
Assembly’s questions – by referring to ‘wartime preparation’, and a ‘long-term 
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evacuation’ of the provincial government when the country was preparing for a 
counter-attack against the communists (Taiwan Shin Sheng [Daily News] 1955; 
Secretariat of Taiwan Provincial Assembly 1959; Construction Department, 1960). 
In the end, the new government seat was situated at the foot of a mountain in 
Nantou (南投), the only landlocked county on the island, and far away from the 
western coastal plain where the majority of the population lived. To a certain 
extent, the designated site – alongside a mountain range and nearly at the 
geographical centre of the island – seemed to be a well thought-out decision, 
based on air-defence considerations and the geographical advantages of 
administering the island from the centre. Nonetheless, it was an outlying area 
away from existing urban areas and transport infrastructures and certainly not 
easily accessible (Y.W. Wang 2003). 
   Within a year, the new government seat built from scratch had the embryonic 
form of a self-contained settlement, despite the difficulty in developing a tract of 
virgin land and carrying out construction at a previously uninhabited site. The 
initial construction was completed in 1957, covered an area of 105 hectares and 
consisted of an office building district, a community centre district and two 
neighbourhood units laid out with single-storey semi-detached and terraced 
houses with a population of 1,000 dwelling units and a density of 100 people per 
hectare. 
   With 4,500 government employees and dependants moving in and the 
provincial agencies beginning working on the new site on 1 July, the JSNV was 
officially declared as the pivotal locus of administration of the Taiwan Province. 
Afterwards, the second-phase construction in the 1960s extended an area of 74 
hectares to the south of the site, including an office building district and a 
neighbourhood unit – with 720 dwelling units in two-storey houses and a density 
of 125 people per hectare, adding a population of 3,600 people to the total. The 
two-phase construction constituted the major area that has been generally 
perceived as the JSNV. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: First Phrase Construction in 1957. Source: Construction Department (1960) © 
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Fig. 3: The neighbourhood unit © Chinese Taipei Film Archive. The image is taken from 
news footage, ‘The Prosperous JSNV’ (欣欣向榮的中興新村), available at digitalarcives.tw 
(數位典藏聯合目錄), available at http://catalog.ndap.org.tw/?URN=3250995. 
Accessed 25 January 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Left: the administrative district; right: the community central district and the Jhong-
Sing Assembly Hall (1959). Source: Yu (1984) © 
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Fig. 5: Aerial photo of the JSNV taken in 1976 shows the range of the two-phrase 
construction © Forestry Bureau, Taiwan Provincial Government 1976 
 
   Perhaps surprisingly, several typical morphological features of British suburban 
towns were recognizable in the layout of the JSNV. The strap-shaped site was set 
in a green belt, with a stretch of forest on the mountainside in the east and a vast 
tract of rice fields to the west. Land-use zoning, neighbourhood division and a 
wide range of modern facilities were all integrated into the plan; houses standing 
on large sites with front and rear gardens, tree-lined boulevards and picturesque 
vistas of winding streets created pleasant views. As to the provision of 
employment, it would never be a matter of concern in this purpose-built complex 
that exclusively accommodated government employees. Based on the concept of 
decentralizing an urban population into a self-contained settlement, an all-
inclusive environment with amenities for daily living was created. As one of the 
planners proudly stated, ‘[a]t that time, Jhong-Sing New Village was arguably a 
model of planning’ in Taiwan (Words of Liu Yung-Mao, the Vice-Director of the 
Construction Department and also the chairman of the ad hoc construction 
committee. Quoted in Lu and Institute of Modern History 2000: 87). 
   In the creation of this new government seat, the planners’ reference to the 
British postwar New Town Programme – or its antecedent, the Garden City 
movement – was rather casual and not remotely conscientious. It goes beyond 
the scope of this essay to give an account tracing the historical background, 
professional milieus, and the importation of planning practices from Britain to 
Taiwan. Likewise, in view of the fact that the origin of the Garden City Movement, 
the subsequent experiments of the concept in the UK and the evolution of 
worldwide emulations and derivatives in the twentieth century have been popular 
topics addressed by a significant volume of literature, they are not intended to be 
encompassed in this essay (Buder 1990; Ward 1992; Hall and Ward 1998; 
Meacham 1998; Miller 2002). Yet it may be worth noting that, from its outset, the 
advent of the Garden City Movement at the turn of the twenieth century was for 
the purpose of social and economic reform, and it drew inspiration from Ebenezer 
Howard’s seminal texts, especially a reprinted version of his 1902 work Garden 
Cities of To-Morrow. Howard’s vision of a planned city set in the beautiful, 
unspoiled countryside, was of a self-contained settlement that enabled the 
nourishment of a self-governing community with residents from all social classes 
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communally holding property ownership. It was genuinely believed that, by means 
of decentralizing urban development, the dreadful living conditions and urban 
problems in the overpopulated industrial cities would be resolved. The subsequent 
UK government initiatives – the interwar municipalization of housing supply, 
‘Homes for Heroes’, and in the post-war nationalization of housing estate 
schemes, New Towns – were all intended to tackle the issues of affordable 
housing and demography (Swenarton 1981; Hardy 1991). The transplantation of 
the British New Town model into early post-war Taiwan, nonetheless, had very 
little to do with such reformist ideology but more with architectural and planning 
morphology. 
 
 1st stage of construction 2nd stage of construction 
Year 1956-1957 1962-1970  
Consists of an administrative district 
a community centre district 
2 neighbourhood units 
an administrative district 
a neighbourhood unit 
Area 105 hectares (260 acres)  74 hectares (183 acres) 
Population 1,000 dwelling units (4,500 people) 720 dwelling units (3,600 people) 
Density 100 people/hectare 
(100 m2/person)  
125 people/hectare  
(80 m2/person) 
Height one-storey houses 
 
one- or two-storey houses 
 
 
Table 1: Briefs of the two phase construction. 
(Construction Department 1960; Y.W. Wang 2003) 
 
   There appear to be two factors that explain why the government seat was 
envisaged as a ‘New Town’ – or in the words of the pioneer planners of post-war 
Taiwan, a ‘Garden City’. The first factor can be deduced from the remote location 
of the new political ‘centre’. As the new TPG headquarters would be set up in a 
far-off and unexploited area, a self-contained model intertwining the functions of 
working and living was the most suitable. The second and probably the foremost 
explanation is that, in the post-war years, while the experiences of new town 
development in Western Europe and North America were widely exported to 
developing countries, the significance of this planning model had become 
internationally renowned and appeared to be a worldwide trend (Blair 1983). 
Since the model had been widely adopted in various countries and proven 
influential, the novice planners in Taiwan were driven by both necessity and 
enthusiasm to be part of this international movement (P.H. Wang 1989; Y.W. 
Wang 2003). Their remarks about the JSNV reveal that it was the success and 
prestige of the New Towns in the UK that inspired emulation. The remote location 
was justified by the authorities with the excuses of air-defence concern and 
administrative efficiency, and the employment of English suburban morphology 
seemed to be the dilettante planners’ longing for keeping pace with international 
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trends. However, an underlying factor that crucially conditioned the establishment 
of JSNV but was not made explicit by the authorities was the nationalist 
government’s political orientation and ambivalence towards Taiwan. 
   As one of the 1950s political slogans goes, ‘Construct Taiwan as a model 
province of the Three Principles of the People’ – the ‘Three Principles’ being 
nationalism, democracy, and social well-being. Thus one of the most noticeable 
political orientations was to modernize Taiwan as a model province of China. It 
was intended to make a perceivable contrast in living conditions between the 
capitalist and communist societies on both sides of the straits (Y.W. Wang 2003). 
With financial aid and technological support from the United States, the 
construction campaign was stepped up and first was aimed at the improvement of 
sanitation, transport infrastructure and public services. Consequently, the JSNV, 
was built under the banner of ‘Set an exemplary model demonstrating the town-
country construction and planning in our country advancing into a new epoch’ 
(Construction Department 1960); this was ‘an official model of modern community’ 
(P.H. Wang 1989). Although the building of this modern community was neither 
effectual enough to create a better society for all nor conducive to the emergence  
 
 
Fig. 6: The main office building of the TPG. Source: Construction Department (1960) © 
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of other new towns for ordinary people, it certainly was capable of serving as a 
sample, a visible vision of the living environment that the populace in Taiwan, or 
even mainland China, would have in the foreseeable future – provided that the 
regions were under nationalist government rule. 
   As the representative governing body of the Republic, the TPG presented itself 
as a modern government organization and its new seat also exhibited a modern 
image, as a clear marker of the Republic's desire for modernity. The Western 
Paradigms – the International Style in architecture and the New Town 
development in planning – were imported and employed in the new government 
seat. Office buildings were designed in a modern idiom and excluded the use of 
traditional expressions. However monotonous and expressionless they looked, 
the simplified form, the absence of ornamentation, and, most importantly, the 
solidity of reinforced concrete and the whiteness of painted walls represented the 
rational, efficient, economical, and thus the modern. 
   The proposed masterplan of the provincial ‘DC’ – an interchangeable term with 
‘government district’ in Taiwan – was a model that responded pragmatically to the 
residential needs of the government employee community as well as symbolically 
to the ‘Model Taiwan’ policy. Replacing the imperialistic expressions and high-
minded characteristics of the traditional political centres in the past was the 
Garden City model – which resonated with the legitimization of the relocation of 
the TPG seat in two ways: de-centralization and de-symbolization. 
   De-centralization, the main component of both Garden City and New Town 
concepts, can be interpreted literally and metaphorically in the case of the JSNV. 
In addition to its original interpretation – de-centralizing the rapid urban 
development from large cities by the building of new satellite towns – de-
centralization was liberally interpreted, or incompletely understood, by the JSNV 
planners as the creating of a seminal urban core to engender the formation of a 
new metropolitan area. The planners believed the JSNV would facilitate the 
development of a new conurbation and that the new government seat would join 
together the nearby towns and grow to a size equivalent to the city of Taichung in 
three decades (Construction Department 1960). Metaphorically, de-centralization 
can also be referred to the division of the sole political pivot into the twin-cored 
configuration that, on the one hand, geographically differentiated the provincial 
government from the central and, on the other, to disperse the prime targets of 
communist attack and reduce the possible risk. Whereas it was contended that ‘a 
new administrative district accommodating all agencies of the TPG should be 
established at the centre point of Taiwan’ in order to ‘increase convenience and 
efficiency to the government operation’ (Construction Department 1960), the new 
seat was located virtually in the middle of nowhere. Following numerous 
precedents in history and abroad, a neutral site untainted by any previous regime 
and not encumbered with any political identity was selected. There were 
optimistic expectations that a better government leadership would dwell and the 
spirit of the ‘nation’ would renew itself while the nationalist government was 
‘temporarily’ confined to the island. 
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Fig. 7: The upper marked area was the central city area and the extent of the administrative 
area of Taichung City, while the lower was the anticipated area of the conurbation with the 
JSNV as the core joined by Caotun and Nantou. Source: Y.W. Wang (2003) © 
 
   De-symbolizing the existence of authoritarianism and totalitarianism may also 
serve as an explanation as to why the so-called ‘Garden City’ model was utilized 
in the layout of a new political centre. As the nationalist government imposed 
martial law upon the island, the building of the new TPG seat appeared to be an 
opportunity to dilute the image of the nationalists as a totalitarian regime. While 
the nationalist government, as the minority regime on the former Japanese 
colony, needed to consolidate the validity of its rule, the TPG, as the 
representative governing body of the nationalists, played the key role in gaining 
support from the populace at a time when conflict between mainlanders and 
Taiwanese was on-going. Although the needs of employee housing was 
essential, it was not necessarily accomplished by an English residential model. A 
few alternatives of planned cities, such as the Modernist projects exemplified in 
Chandigarh and Brasilia could have been the templates for the building of a new 
government complex in Taiwan. As likely as not, the English suburban 
morphological characteristics were applied to the JSNV since the provincial 
government, as such, was a local authority and the atmosphere in its seat should, 
therefore, be charged with harmony and amiability rather than majesty and 
grandeur. The Garden City model, with its genial yet distinctive character, was 
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employed to replace the conventional expressions of colonial architecture and to 
de-symbolize the existence of a totalitarian regime. At the time that the nationalist 
government aspired to renew itself and present images of prosperity to dilute the 
depression and poverty of post-war reality, the JSNV, as the seat of the local 
government, was an emblematic site performing the ritual of the ‘autonomy of a 
local self-government entity (地方自治)’ and, as a demonstration of modern town 
planning, was an embodiment of the ideal vision of the future the nationalists 
pledged to offer. 
   Yet there is a discernable ambiguity in the interpretation of de-symbolism, since 
every act of de-symbolization inevitably ends with a certain enhancement to 
symbolization. De-symbolization, indeed, is not an end in itself but a process of 
re-signifying practices, in which existing codified signs are reformatted, given new 
interpretations and re-codified into a new signification system. In other words, de-
symbolism inescapably involves re-codification and, in the case of the JSNV, its 
modernist architecture and mundane morphological layout had become the new 
mask of the modern state – that played a role in codifying new signs, destabilizing 
original meanings, and ultimately constructing a new signification structure. 
Moulded by a planning paradigm derived from the West, the JSNV was created 
and embedded in both the social and political landscape of Taiwan. This quasi-
national capital was established as an icon of the Republic, ostensibly 
representing an advanced, progressive, capitalist society, justly dressing up the 
realities of political authoritarianism and socioeconomic totalitarianism. Yet from 
the moment the symbolic status of the JSNV was established, its ultimate fate 
was simultaneously sealed. Western Modernist architectural expressions in 
1950s Taiwan were utilized as a symbol of the modern state, a tool taken up 
strategically, yet soon forsaken once it had served its purpose. Moving on to the 
second decade of post-independence, state representative modernism took on a 
new look totally contrary to the previous one.  
 
Imaged Homeland, Nostalgic National Capital 
 
In contrast to the Taichung Region gaining considerable impetus for development 
from the relocation of the TPG, the capital Taipei as the age-old political and 
economic centre of the island maintained its exuberant vitality and momentum 
after the move. Following the massive political refugee flow in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s – that added almost 2 million mainlanders to Taiwan’s population, 
which stood at just more than 6 million in 1945 after the Japanese retreated – 
Taipei sustained constant and considerable population growth in the 1960s as a 
result of rural-to-urban migration. The population of the capital was originally 
around 200,000 after the war and then rapidly increased and exceeded one 
million in 1966. The city, accordingly, in 1967 was elevated to the status of Direct-
Controlled Municipality under the jurisdiction of the Central Government. This 
status was the highest level of local authority in government organization and 
equal to that of the provinces. In other words, Taipei henceforth was centrally 
administered by the Executive Yuan and no longer by the provincial government 
(Hsu 1989; Lo 1996; Li 1999). The rise of Taipei in status, consequently, was 
visually materialized and visibly reflected in its cityscape. To be worthy of the 
name of the ‘national’ capital of the ROC, impressive edifices capped with 
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Chinese palace-like roofs – exhibiting a kind of regional modernism with 
distinctive expressions that greatly differed from modernist approaches in the 
1950s – began to appear in Taipei. 
   From the late 1950s to the 1960s, there appeared a change of tendency in the 
ways the nationalist government exerted its autocratic authority and visual control 
over the capital Taipei: from de-Japanization to Sinicization (Yang 1993). In the 
early years after the nationalists’ takeover of Taiwan, most of the colonial public 
buildings with European classical styles – the Japanese interpretation of 
European architecture – were retained and used as office buildings by the TPG 
agencies. Some buildings with distinctive Japanese roofs or at eye-catching sites 
were demolished. Examples of these are the Taiwan Shrine (臺灣神社) and the 
Chien-Kung Shrine (建功神社), which were built for the enshrinement and worship 
of the spirits of the Japanese state religion, Shintō, and were destroyed in 1944 
and 1945 respectively. The Taiwan Huguo Shrine (臺灣護國神社 ) and the 
Commodity Exhibit Hall of the Governor's Office (總督府商品陳列館), situated at a 
prominent location in the street plan of the capital, were respectively 
reconstructed and converted in the mid-1960s and both given a style resembling 
traditional Chinese architecture (L.F. Wang et al. 1985; Lo 1996). 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: The National Science Education Centre (1959), Grand Hotel (1961), Chinese 
Cultural University (1962), National Historical Museum (1964), National Palace Museum 
(1965), and Chung-Shan Hall (1966) © Kuo Choa-Lee 
 
At a time when the possibility of retrieving the mainland became more and more 
remote, Sinicization gradually took the place of de-Japanization and became 
predominant. As the economy remained in recession and private property 
developers and contractors barely existed, most building projects were launched 
by the public sector. From the early 1960s onwards, the newly-built structures 
tended towards monolithic ostentatious palace forms, such as the National 
Central Library (中央圖書館, 1955; the former site of the Chien-Kung Shrine), the 
National Science Education Centre (國立科學館, 1959), the Grand Hotel (圓山大
飯店, 1961; the former site of the Taiwan Shine), the Chinese Cultural University (
中國文化大學, 1962), the National Historical Museum (國家歷史博物館, 1964; 
converted from the Commodity Exhibit Hall), the National Palace Museum (故宮博
物院, 1965) and the Chung-Shan Hall (中山樓, 1966) (L.F. Wang et al.. 1985; Fu 
36   YI-WEN WANG AND TIM HEATH 
 
1995). These magnificent buildings erected in the capital were titled with the word 
‘National’, in complete contrast to the 1950s public buildings built by the provincial 
government that were all given a modern look and the word ‘Provincial’ in their 
naming. 
   Sharing some typical characteristics, this batch of buildings all exhibited the 
intent to imitate Chinese architectural formalism, mimicking forms and motifs of 
traditional timber-framed structures with reinforced concrete. They also showed 
the ambition to integrate the character of Chinese architecture with the 
distinguishing features of Beaux Arts architecture; for instance, the perfect 
symmetry, hierarchical space, and maximized mass with the insertion of void 
spaces, such as courtyards. The architectural historian Kuo Chao-Lee contends 
the language used in these buildings was highly conservative and monumental 
and expressed a stylistic confusion between Chinese tradition and Western 
modernity (Kuo 1985; 1992). Indeed, apart from the visual incongruity between 
the formalism of timber structures and the materiality of reinforced concrete, these 
traditional-looking buildings incorporated Western fittings and fixtures and spatial 
layout, and most of them were also given a ‘modern’ function – such as science 
education centres, museums, libraries, universities, and hotels. (L.F. Wang et al. 
1985; Kuo 1992; Lo 1996). 
   The trend of the Sinic Revival reached its climax in the mid-1960s as a result of 
a series of ‘national’ events propagandized by the nationalist government and, 
most crucially, the launch of the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in mainland China 
(1966-1976). In 1965, the centenary of the national father Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s 
birthday was celebrated in a grand manner and, in the following year, the new 
National Assembly Building, an elaborate structure of impressive size and rich in 
motifs signifying Chinese classical architecture, was completed and named after 
his pseudonym as the Chung-Shan Hall (中山樓). In 1967, the Committee for the 
Promotion of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance (中華文化復興委員會 ) was 
established. As its name plainly indicated, this committee was set up to revive 
Chinese culture as an official statement to counteract the Cultural Revolution 
initiated by the Chinese communists on 16 May 1966 (Fu 1995; Lo 1996). 
Henceforth, the nationalist government took a dramatic turn in its cultural policy 
and deliberately promoted the Cultural Renaissance Movement. Ancient Chinese 
literature, society and ethics, citizenship and morality, and Chinese philosophical 
concepts and personalities such as Confucianism and Taoism, were added into 
the curricula of schools at various levels. Artefacts and artworks of ancient China 
were enthusiastically collected and preserved in the national museums. 
Architectural practices also responded to this trend and shared no less degree of 
enthusiasm. Exemplary cases are the Taipei Martyrs Shrine (臺北忠烈祠, 1969), 
the Taichung Martyrs Shrine (台中忠烈祠, 1970), the high-rise addition to the 
Grand Hotel (圓山大飯店第二期工程 , 1971), the National Dr. Sun Yat-Sen 
Memorial Hall (國父紀念館, 1972), the Confucian Temples in Taipei (臺北孔廟, 
1972), Taichung (台中孔廟, 1975), and Koahsiung (高雄孔廟, 1976), the National 
Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (中正紀念堂, 1976) and the National Theater and 
Concert Hall (國家歌劇院及音樂廳, 1980). These projects, which were mostly 
competition winners, authentically reflected the nationalist government’s intention 
to create cultural symbols of the nation-state, in terms of both the style and 
function (L.F. Wang et al. 1985; Fu 1995). 
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Fig. 9: Taipei Martyrs Shrine (1969), Grand Hotel Addition (1971), National Dr. Sun Yat-
Sen Memorial Hall (1972), National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (1976) and National 
Theater and Concert Hall (1980) © Kuo Choa-Lee. 
 
   The polychrome embellishment and colossal mass of these buildings were 
highly visible in the cityscape and therefore enhanced their would-be monumental 
qualities. Most of them were situated in an open space and responded very little 
to their immediate urban contexts. As Lo Shih-Wei points out (1996: 141), 
buildings in the Sinic Revival style were often ‘a loose composition…in a specific 
field, or in a condensed gathering into a single body, result[ing] in an 
“object”…located in an open space’, which was totally different from ‘the proché 
principle’ of the Japanese colonial architecture that was filled ‘with void space to 
obtain the maximum volume when seen from outside’. In terms of defining urban 
space, ‘[w]hat the Japanese built were more “urban moments”, while those built 
[in Sinic Revival] were just “monuments-in-urban-space”’. 
   The cultural policies of 1960s Taiwan were apparently a deliberate 
counterbalance to the Cultural Revolution in China. In his division of the post-war 
cultural policies into three periods – cultural reunification (1945-1967), cultural 
renaissances (1967-1977) and cultural reconstruction (from 1977 onwards) – 
Allen Chun (1996a) regards the Cultural Revolution as the decisive factor that 
drove Taiwan from the first period into the second. Before the outbreak of the 
Cultural Revolution, in the period of cultural reunification, ‘the need to 
reconsolidate Chinese culture by purging Japanese influences…and suppressing 
any movements towards local Taiwanese cultural expression’ characterized the 
Nationalists’ cultural policies during this period (Chun 1996a: 55). The most 
illustrative instance was the imposition of Standard Mandarin as the single 
permitted language for both daily conversation and mass communication; the use 
of Japanese and Taiwanese were strictly banned from mass media broadcasting 
and publishing. On the other hand, the focus of government policies was 
strategically put on modernization and industrial development, in tune with the 
‘Model Taiwan’ policies in the 1950s. Given the state of war and the sojourn 
mindset of the nationalist government, ‘culture here was never part of an explicit 
programme of political reconstruction’ (Chun 1996a: 56).  
   Following the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, the period of cultural 
renaissance saw Taiwan enter into a new era showing tremendous appreciation 
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of the cultural inheritance of Chinese tradition. The promotion of the Cultural 
Renaissance Movement was ‘a systematic effort to redefine the content’ and ‘to 
cultivate a large-scale societal consciousness’ of traditional Chinese culture 
(Chun 1996a: 56). In sharp contrast to its mainland counterpart, the nationalist 
government projected itself as the guardian of traditional Chinese culture, despite 
struggling to find iconic symbols to represent the nation-state with a sense of 
‘Chineseness’. The movement it propagandized and embarked on was essentially 
a programme to ‘(re)nationalize Taiwan’ by reviving traditional Chinese culture, 
i.e. ‘nationalize Chinese culture…where no such culture (of the nation) previously 
existed’ (Chun 1994: 54; Chun 1996a). Chun reiterates: 
 
In retrospect, the writing of culture by the state clearly went beyond the strategic 
deployment of master symbols and the rhetoric of nostalgia. (Chun 1996a: 57) 
 
By invoking ‘tradition’, the authorities appeared to resuscitate elements of the 
past, but they were clearly inventing tradition (by virtue of their selectivity). The 
government in effect played an active role (as author) in writing culture. (Chun 
1994: 54) 
 
Among various notions associated with the term culture, here it primarily refers to 
its political implications and/or pervasiveness as an embodiment of nationalist 
ideology through everyday life. In the political dimension, culture is not just 
constructed or imagined but often comes to be ‘authorized and institutionalized’ 
as its ‘factual substance’ is often much more insignificant than ‘the rhetorical 
forms it takes’ (Chun 1996b: 114-115). 
   It was in the period of ‘cultural renaissance’ in reaction to the Cultural 
Revolution that the Sinic Revival assumed supremacy in architectural production 
in Taiwan. However, such a revival of interest in traditional architecture can be 
traced back to the mainland in the 1920s-1930s when the nationalist government 
first enjoyed a short period of peace and prosperity after it overthrew the imperial 
Qing government and established the Republic in 1912. A few church-related 
hospitals and college buildings were built in this style. Kuo (1992) suggests the 
revival primarily was sparked by the 4 May Student Movement in 1919 when 
China encountered the invasion of Western imperialism and searched for its new 
identity in the ‘modern’ time. The term ‘Chinese Renaissance’ was often used to 
describe the search for Sinicism in all aspects of cultural productions and 
activities, including the search for modern Chinese architecture. In line with Kuo’s 
view, Chun (1994: 53) states: 
 
the struggle of nationalism which began with the collapse of the Chinese imperial 
system and has continued to be fought to the present day essentially involved 
the construction of a set of conscious ideological or mythological beliefs which 
could be used to cultivate a sense of societal self-esteem as a form of resistance 
to the West. 
 
In the 1920s, the first decade of the newly established ROC, the palace style 
enjoyed growing popularity with politicians and was utilized as a vehicle to 
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campaign against the assimilation of Western culture as well as for the 
formulation of an identity for the modern nation-state. A case in point was the 
Mausoleum of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen (中山陵, 1925-1929) in Nanjing, which integrated 
traditional imperial tombs into the materiality of modern architecture. Yet the most 
prominent case was arguably ‘the Reconstruction Project of the New Capital 
Nanjing’ (南京首都計畫, 1929), which was the nationalists’ unrealized capital-
building project conceived in its heyday on the mainland. The project included 
more than two hundred institutional buildings in the Sinic Revival style yet was 
only partially realized due to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 
1937. The Chinese Renaissance style on the 1920s-1930s mainland, as Kuo 
(1992: 217) contends, was ‘the metaphor of architectural formality from the new 
“Republic”’. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10: The Reconstruction Project of the New Capital Nanjing (1929) © 
 
   The use of culture to arouse a heightened sense of societal consciousness was 
the fundamental strategy of the nationalist government in the ideological battle 
with its chief opponents at two different points of time: Western imperialism from 
the 1920s to 1930s and the Chinese communists in the 1960s. In the interwar 
period, the use of culture and the revival of tradition were instigated to fight 
against the assimilation of Western culture and various invasions of foreign 
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countries. Yet in post-war Taiwan, they were ‘a specific response to the threat of 
communism posed by mainland China…[T]he invoking of tradition represented an 
ideologically conservative response to the radical visions of a Communist national 
polity…[The] changing constructions of traditional culture throughout the postwar 
period had to reflect, more importantly, changing utopian visions of a modern 
Nationalist polity’ (Chun 1994: 53). In fact, what had been constructed and 
manifested in the 1960s cityscape of Taipei was the very antithesis of the 
communist government’s construction of national identity in the 1960s. There 
were two key events: the Ten Great Constructions for the tenth anniversary of the 
PRC in 1959 and the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. 
   As part of Mao’s proposal for the ‘Great Leap Forward’ (1958-1960) into 
modernization through mass production, a grandiose construction project was 
launched in Beijing, in which ten majestic public buildings were swiftly erected 
within a time limit of ten months – by the deadline of 1 October 1959, the tenth 
national anniversary of the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Gong et al. 1989; 
Fu 1995; Macfarquhar et al. 1997). The ‘Ten Great Constructions’ exhibited a 
mixture of styles – modernist, traditionalist and Stalinist. The Chinese People's 
Revolutionary Military Museum (中國人民革命軍事博物館, 1959) featured some 
typical characteristics of Soviet architecture. The Great Hall of the People (人民大
會堂, 1959) and the Beijing Railway Station (北京火車站, 1959) were built in the 
so-called ‘Sino-Soviet’ style, in which the Stalinist style was refined by replacing 
Gothic steeples with Chinese ceramic roofs. Other buildings, such as the Ethnic 
Cultural Palace (民族文化宮, 1959) and the National Agriculture Exhibition Hall (全
國農業展覽館, 1959), incorporated expressions of Chinese traditional architecture 
with aspects of Western modernism. Despite the mixture of styles, the Ten Great 
Constructions, with the immense scale and commemorative expressions, 
transformed Beijing into the Chinese communist capital. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11: The Ten Great Constructions in Beijing. Clockwise from top left: Great Hall of the 
People (1959), National Museum of China (1959), Ethnic Cultural Palace (1959), Beijing 
Railway Station (1959), Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Museum (1959) © Kuo 
Choa-Lee 
 
   Following the large-scale capital building project in Beijing, the outbreak of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966 further fired the nationalist government with 
enthusiasm for the Sinic proper. During the decade-long unrest, intellectuals were 
attacked, sent to rural labor camps or killed in order to rid China of ‘bourgeois’ 
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influences; education was halted as schools were closed and university entrance 
exams were cancelled; ancient sites and historical buildings suffered devastating 
damage; antiques, books, paintings, and anything associated with ‘old ways of 
thinking’ were wiped out. To counteract the communist government’s attempt to 
eradicate traditional Chinese culture, the nationalist government vigorously 
upheld the traditional values of Chinese culture on the island. 
   The revival of Sinicism in architecture in Taiwan was employed as an official 
representation of the ideological construction of national identity in multiple ways. 
First, massive concrete Sinic edifices were erected to dilute the distinctive 
character of the colonial cityscape featuring stone architecture. Moreover, the 
reproduction of orthodox palace forms with traditional façades served different 
purposes for different subjects. For the Taiwanese natives, these buildings were 
potent showpieces to demonstrate how impressive the historic buildings were in 
the imperial cities on the mainland. For the mainlanders, they were a set of 
substitutes, comforting their nostalgia for their homeland across the straits. For all 
the people on the island, they served as a reminder that the mission of 
‘Counterattack the communists! Reconquer the mainland! Rescue China!’ had yet 
to be accomplished. More importantly, the employment of the imperial palace 
style, instead of vernacular dwelling types of the ordinary people, implied that the 
Sinic Revival had more to do with the ancient capital, Beijing. Lo (1996: 141) 
argues that: 
 
Through diverse interpretations and applications throughout history, [the palace 
style] had become a cultural icon employed in complicated constructions of large 
scale. And due to its being a fundamental schemata [sic] deeply embedded in the 
Chinese mind for generations, it became ritualized and symbolized, and then 
specially dedicated to the status of the empire of the nation. 
 
Palace styles were, therefore, subtly apprehended as metaphors for validating the 
orthodoxy of the nation in Taiwan or, as Yang Tsung-Rong (1993) contends, the 
cultural construction of the nation. It was a means for the nationalist government 
to re-appropriate the status of Taiwan – the temporarily centralized periphery – 
and ‘to symbolize the central status of Taipei as the capital of the nation rather 
than a center only on the local level’, however ‘provisional’ it would be (Lo 1996: 
67). 
 
Sites Depicting the Janus-Faced Visionary Nation-scapes 
 
Since ancient times, architectural representations have been conceived as an 
effective tool for the legitimization of new regimes and the consolidation of 
political power. Even in the last century, modern architecture exhibited no less 
capability to generate new symbolic representation. Its role in identity formation 
has always been recognized and utilized and, perhaps, will be ad infinitum. We 
have seen, and will continue to witness, a constant return to the belief that 
architectural representations can instill something more than just the visual into 
people. As Lawrence Vale states: 
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For many powerful regimes in the twentieth century as before…architectural 
and urbanistic authoritarianism has retained its appeal. Whatever the sweeping 
promise of architectural modernism, this century will also be remembered for 
its rearguard actions. Sponsors of new construction…have continued to lay 
claim to power through appropriating the image, metaphors, or ordering 
principles of past architectural styles. (Vale 1999: 392) 
 
As a symbolic landmark in the post-war reconstruction, the JSNV symbolized the 
commencement of a new epoch initiated by the nationalist government. It was 
also a perfect embodiment of the hasty assimilation of local elite intellectuals into 
Western cultures. With the arrival of the nationalist government and its 
geopolitical dependency on the US, the process of modernization in post-war 
Taiwan was driven and accelerated by both internal aspiration and external force. 
In the endeavour to create an image of an advanced, progressive capitalist 
society on the island, the new authority directed the development of Taiwan 
towards a model of ‘Modern Province’. While the nationalist government 
distanced itself from domestic affairs and devoted itself to making preparations for 
the civil war, the TPG was granted total supremacy to govern the island and 
‘province-wide’ matters. Propelled by fear of air raids and in the name of 
administrative efficiency, a new headquarters for the provincial government was 
established in the heart of the island. Built from scratch was the most modern, 
well-equipped ‘new village’ to date. This modern yet tranquil-looking ‘new village’, 
as a visible showpiece of modern habitation, was created to project a positive 
image of the nationalist government as a reformer and, also, to portray the 
provincial government as an incarnation of autonomy and modesty that a ‘local’ 
government was supposed to be. Certainly, here the word modern does not refer 
only to sheer newness but mainly denotes the Western, imported and foreign. 
The abstract language of modern architecture, which was supposed to be 
liberated from metaphorical expression and symbolization, was used as a 
rhetorical device and a propaganda vehicle to represent a prosperous future. The 
JSNV, the making of a quasi-national capital, reflected the tottering regime’s very 
desire to nourish a new identity of the ‘one-province’ state after its crushing defeat 
by the communists in China proper. 
   On the other hand, in the search for a new type of architecture that was modern 
yet distinctly Chinese, palace-style architecture was introduced to the island, 
translating the ambiguous and indistinct ‘national’ past into tangible forms and 
accessible places. In the quest for modern Chinese architecture, the necessity of 
reinterpreting Sinicism arose. Imitating, extracting or reinventing traditional forms 
were the typical approaches to stylizing modern buildings with rhetorical 
representations of Chineseness. However, to create contemporary edifices 
evoking majesty and grandeur for the ‘temporary’ national capital, it was the 
Chinese monumental tradition which was chosen to be incorporated into 
contemporary construction and technology in preference to the vernacular. These 
buildings became political emblems, enhancing the blurred image of the ‘nation’ 
when the in-exile nationalist government no longer had control over the mainland. 
In post-war Taiwan, palace-style architecture served triple purposes, functioning 
as a dilutent to counterbalance the Japanese colonial cityscape of stone 
buildings; as a declaration to legitimize the validity of the nationalist government’s 
TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE   43 
 
rule; and as an implement to counteract the effects of communist ideology. The 
introduction of the palace style to the island, nonetheless, accentuated the 
culturally and politically peripheral position of Taiwan and connoted its cultural 
impoverishment. The Sinic Revival can be charged with the promotion of a 
nostalgic national myth at the expense of the indigenous culture of Taiwanese 
natives and their societal self-awareness. As the adopted traditional styles were 
chosen from a variety of eras instead of a single period to glorify a particular 
regime, the expression of collective identity of the nation-state implies that the 
‘imagined community’ of the state was based on a homogeneous and harmonized 
cultural entity – whereby the visual presentation of orthodox Chinese culture 
could be consolidated and the problematic model of the one-province nation-state 
would be veiled. 
   Both the JSNV and Taipei were of strategic importance in the construction and 
promotion of national identity. While the former presented itself as a sort of 
pseudo-Western modern architecture that was rid of ornamentation and based on 
systemized techniques and standardized production, the latter reasserted 
tradition and communicated with the public by means of literal interpretations. 
Despite the use of different metaphors and symbolism, both were located fairly 
and squarely within the authorized schemata of national modernism. The intent to 
create highly legible expressions of national identity was explicit. If the 
expressions embodied in the two cases are related to a wider geographical and 
cultural context, the intention to vie with the communists, the nationalists’ old rival, 
was overt. 
   In a historical account mainly centred upon the contradictory visions of state 
representational modernism, some collateral information on these two dominant 
architectural trends was inevitably left out from this essay’s selective discussion. 
In the case of the JSNV, despite the modernist approaches and universal 
rhetoric, the constructional techniques and structural details of the buildings, as 
well as the morphological arrangement of street layouts, were hardly ‘genuinely 
modern’ and the links with traditional practices or customs were often 
omnipresent. Likewise, neither does this review intend to degrade the role of 
palace-style buildings and their surrounding fields as civil facilities and public 
spaces, although this aspect was barely addressed. The conception of modern 
Chinese architecture itself is a substantial topic, and the evolution of this concept, 
from symbolism and vernacularism in the past to regionalism or post-modernism 
nowadays, has also shown the tremendous complexity of the topic. On this 
account, this essay avoided talking in terms of these ‘isms’ and the various issues 
that go with them. Consequently, due credit may not be fairly given to the projects 
and the architects who pioneered the conception, such as Lu Yu-Jun (盧毓駿), 
Wang Da-Hong (王大閎), Chang Chao-Kang (張肇康), Yu Yueh-Chen (虞曰鎮), 
Yang Cho-Cheng (楊卓成) and Hsiu Tse-Lan (修澤蘭) to name but a few. 
   In the pursuit of a new monumentality to represent the Republic, the JSNV and 
the capital Taipei worked toward the same goal yet in opposite directions. 
Whereas the politically charged modernism and urbanism of the JSNV were 
interpreted in abstract terms, Sinic architecture in Taipei was either derived from 
or reinvented traditional styles. Whereas both were the imagined and invented 
space of the nation and important sites for the depiction of national unity, they 
also revealed the ambiguous and contradictory nature of modern nationalism. 
44   YI-WEN WANG AND TIM HEATH 
 
Perhaps, the two-faced god in Roman mythology, Janus, is in some way 
analogous to the paradox that was inherent in the nationalist government’s 
conflicting visions of national identity. As the god of gates and being presented 
with two faces looking in opposite directions, Janus was also known as a figure 
composed from two polarities or contrasts in the progression from the past to the 
future, or in the transition from one vision to another. The contradictory 
interpretations of national modernism in post-war Taiwan were successively, or 
even simultaneously, abstract and literal, imagined and material. ‘Especially 
subtle, powerful, and common are buildings that reinforce a belief that people’s 
ties to a heroic past or a promising future are their important identities’ (Murray 
Edelman 1995, quoted from Vale 1999: 392). The formation of national identity 
relied on the construction of visions of an idealized future as much as building 
politically strategic connections to a glorified past.  
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the post-war development of the women’s movement in Taiwan in 
terms of the changing relationship between the state and civil society. I will begin with an 
analysis of the shift in the nature of the state from a centralized and unified entity to policy 
networks including non-state actors. Concepts of governance and governmentality are 
presented to further explain the changing relationship between women’s organizations and 
the state. Gender mainstreaming policy developed in recent years is examined in this 
paper, in order to discuss the current state of the state-society relationship. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper attempts to explore the changing relationship between the state and 
civil society in Taiwan by using the women’s movement as a case study. My 
major empirical interest is in analyzing the apparent shift of feminist advocacy 
organizations from being a social movement into NGOs that form partnerships 
with the state to deliver services. This phenomenon will be described in terms of 
the relationship between civil society and the state, as well as in terms of 
governance. Literature around these two topics comes mainly from studies of 
management, public policy, political sciences, international relations, and 
sociology (Scharpf 1978; Rhodes 1997; Morgan et. al. 1999; Anheirer and 
Themundo 2002; Arts 2003). The phenomenon will then be interpreted through 
Foucault’s theoretical perspectives on governmentality and post-structural 
theories of the state. Foucauldian and post-structural perspectives emphasize the 
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Foucauldian perspectives. This paper was first presented, in January 2008, in the Taiwan 
Seminar organized by Taiwan Research Programme, Asia Research Center, LSE. I am 
most thankful to the organizers for inviting me. The trip to London was funded by the 
National Taiwan Normal University. The research was funded by the Chilin Foundation. 
Special thanks are offered to Mr. Lin Yee-Hsung and Mrs. Lin Fang Su-Ming for 
encouraging me to pursue this research. 
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processes of the operation and proliferation of power rather than the intention and 
agency of actors. At the empirical level, this paper shows the clear objectives of 
feminist groups to change the state. Does this contradict post-structural views? 
To what extent can agency be attributed to either citizens or to state 
representatives? I will deal with this question in the following sections, particularly 
the section on gender-mainstreaming policy and public-private partnership. 
   I begin with a discussion of the changing nature of the state. Conventionally, the 
state was regarded as a centralized, unified entity with constitutional sovereignty 
over a designated territory and with a core executive responsible for various 
aspects of administration. In recent decades, howver, the state has come to be 
described as networks of policy comprised of various actors across different 
sectors. The increasing participation of civil society actors in public policy has 
been lauded as an enhancement of democracy. On the other hand, the 
diminution of direct state influence is described as a ‘hollowing out’ of the state, 
while the state as networks of multifarious actors is described as a ‘fragmentation 
of the state’. In this paper, I echo the concept of the state as networks among 
various sectors. However, I will argue that while policy networks proliferate, the 
state has the ability to set up the rules and environment under which these 
networks operate. Parallel to the so-called fragmentation of the state, various 
strands of civil society have segmented and professionalized, each of them being 
sutured into particular network sets. 
   Readers of this paper may notice that women disappear in this paper, and even 
civil society barely exists. That is exactly the empirical and theoretical point I want 
to raise. When gender mainstreaming policy was introduced, administrative and 
procedural issues such as accountability format, performance indicators, budget 
analysis, and statistics dominated the terrain of policy-making regarding women’s 
rights. In the meantime, coalitions which were active in the 1980s and 1990s 
among different social movements – such as gender, environmentalism, labor, 
and human rights – disappeared. This is a paradox: as partnership between civil 
society and government were advocated and put into practice, the proliferation 
and expansion of policy networks absorbed social forces, with the result that 
coalitions of social movements seemed to decrease in public visibility (Hsiao 
2006). In the section below I will start with a theoretical introduction of the 
changing nature of the state and its relationship with civil society. The section 
following will present an outline of the relationship between the state and 
women’s organizations in different historical phases. The final part will discuss the 
gender mainstreaming policy that is the current framework of gender policy in 
Taiwan. 
 
Governance, Governmentality and Civil Society 
 
Before defining civil society, we need to keep in mind that civil society is often 
defined in a negative way by what it is not. Civil society is also defined in terms of 
the activities of non-governmental organizations. However, while defining civil 
society in distinction from government and business sectors does not do justice to 
the intrinsic importance of civil society, it should be noted that the logic of the 
same contemporary social and political theories means that the state can no 
longer exist on its own, either. The state has lost its monopoly on power to control 
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and regulate. The state has been conceptualized as a self-organized network of 
policy (governance), or as being constituted by an ensemble of institutions, 
discourses, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of diffused power 
(governmentality). The state and civil society thus define each other and 
complement each other. 
 
Civil Society 
 
In his book Civil Society (2004), Michael Edwards approaches civil society 
through three layers: first as associational life; second as good society; and finally 
as the public sphere. Civil society means voluntary associations of people for 
common interests and goals. However, there is a diversity of associations which 
may espouse contradictory assertions on the very same issue, for example, pro-
life and pro-choice regarding women’s reproductive rights and abortion. Edwards 
goes on to raise the principle of good society. Civil society exists to promote good 
society, on equal terms with the state and market. But what is ‘good’ society? 
How do various parts of society collaborate and pursue ‘good’ ends? Here we 
need the public sphere, a space for the emergence and expression of a diversity 
of opinions to engage with each other, to debate and disagree, and in the process 
citizens learn to concede to reach consensus. 
   In the pre-modern period, production, consumption, and human activities took 
place mostly in the family and the community. The roles of both the state and the 
market were limited. With the growth of industrial capitalist society, the state and 
the market expanded, and many of the traditional functions of the family were 
replaced by the state or market. Theories of civil society have gained ascendancy 
in recent decades due to several factors. First, ordinary citizens and academic 
researchers alike see the importance of enhancing the role of civil society to 
counter-balance overexpansion of the state and market; second, changes at the 
macro-level have led the very nature of the state to shift from being a top-down 
vertical authority into a series of horizontal networks of policy making and 
resource allocation (Marinetto 2007). 
   The women’s movement and other social movements such as labor, 
environmentalism, and consumer rights have played an important role in steering 
civil society towards an integration of associational life, ideals of good society, 
and practices of the public sphere by debates, discussion, and advocacy. Civil 
society includes religious organizations, charitable and philanthropic 
organizations, and self-help groups, the majority of which operate without 
explicitly seeking to influence public policy. The social movement aspects of civil 
society, on the contrary, contain a strong sense of mission for social reform and 
policy advocacy. Civil society as manifested and instantiated by social 
movements is independent from the state, and at the same time strongly wishes 
to participate in the process of policy-making and implementation. In the example 
of the women’s movement in Taiwan, it initially challenged the state from a 
marginal position; since the 1990s, mechanisms for coordinating women’s affairs 
across the public sector and the voluntary sector were set up. As these 
mechanisms grew larger in terms of budget, numbers of organizations involved, 
and stated objectives, the state as interface and ensemble of networks has 
absorbed and appropriated more and more energies from civil society. 
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   Although the state seems to have power over society, the state is not the 
source or foundation of power. If the state has dominant power, this is the effect 
of technologies of government. Foucault raises the concept of govern-mentality, 
which is meant to be the link between politics and the state on the one hand, and 
the formation of identity and subjectivity on the other hand.2 As Foucault has put 
it, technologies of government (or governmentality) provide the linkage between 
the state and the construction of subjectivity. Technologies of government refer to 
a wide range of apparatuses, mechanisms, procedures, and pedagogic methods 
for the management of the body, health, spiritual life, as well as the collective 
social body (Foucault 1991; Rose 1992; Lemke 2000). 
   Here we can reformulate Foucault’s idea about governmentality as linkages and 
articulations. We can note a linkage between the state and civil society, as well as 
between the state and the self. Disciplinary, pedagogic, and managerial 
technologies of power can be initiated and deployed by civil society. At the same 
time, civil society provides a forum for public dialogue and advocacy; this function 
is similar to what Rose and Miller (1990) describe as ‘political rationality’. Civil 
society is the privileged and trusted site for articulating moral visions and inspiring 
dreams. If the balance between political rationality and technologies of 
governmentality is tilted towards the latter, civil society, and in particular the social 
movement aspect of civil society, will be co-opted by the state via technologies of 
government, even though these technologies were first developed by social 
movements. I shall return to this with more empirical data in the section on 
gender-mainstreaming. 
 
The Changing Nature of the State: Governance and Governmentality 
 
While governance scholars stress horizontal networks of procedures, actors in the 
networks do not receive attention. The presumption that power is a centralized 
force, used intentionally to oppress and proscribe, is challenged by Foucault and 
post-structural scholars. Traditionally the state is regarded as a unified and 
centralized authority, but this kind of notion has been displaced by a more diffuse, 
random, and unintentional view of political power. As noted above, Foucault 
raises the concept of govern-mentality, which is meant to be the link between 
politics and the state on the one hand, and the formation of identity and 
subjectivity on the other hand. Foucault argues that the power apparatus of the 
state may be all-present but it is unable to dominate all power relations. The 
authority of the state is dependent on existing relations of power, forms of power 
that do not necessarily originate in the state. 
   In post-structural theories, government activity is multifarious and located 
throughout the state and society. The concept of governmentality embraces the 
idea of power as a multidimensional entity, infiltrating even the minutiae of 
everyday life, which is just as much able to be productive as to constrain. In 
Foucault’s words (1991: 102), governmentality is ‘the ensemble formed by the 
                                                 
2
 Foucault did not write a book entirely devoted to the issue of government and politics. He 
developed the idea of government rationality, or governmentality, in lectures and 
interviews. These ideas were published posthumously. Many scholars follow his ideas and 
explore them further. See Graham Burchell et.al. (1991), The Foucault Effect. 
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institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, 
that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power’. 
Governmentality also implies the notion of the decentered, fractured, disjointed 
state. 
   Foucault indicated that in political theories we need to ‘cut off the King’s head’ 
(1980: 121). The origins, forms, and exercise of power are multifarious and 
diffused to both large and small aspects of everyday life. The concept of 
governmentality serves as a link to connect government and politics on the one 
hand, and on the other hand the formation of self, identity, and subjectivity 
(Lemke 2000; Marinetto 2007). To govern, power begins with the individual level 
of self-governing, through pedagogical instruction of children, and finally, the 
conventional perception of governing as related to the activities of government is 
explored by Foucault through detailed analyses of surveillance, penal and 
medical institutions, and the production of knowledge. 
   These concepts of governmentality and the decentered state are relevant to the 
analysis of women’s organizations for the following reasons. First, the relations 
between feminist theory and Foucault have been ambiguous and provocative, 
and I would like to take advantage of this provocativeness to think about feminist 
identity and subjectivity. If the state is decentered, does this mean more 
opportunities for women’s participation? If the technologies of government 
manifest themselves through a wide range of programmes and activities, how is it 
possible to construct non-disciplinary and emancipatory identities and 
subjectivities? Second, with regard to the recent development of public-private 
partnership, does this mean the increased influence of women’s organizations, or 
rather that feminists are absorbed into the state machinery and that the cultural 
and discursive field is consequently be evacuated?  
   Rose and Miller (1990) elaborate Foucault’s idea of governmentality, stressing 
that political theory should also include political rationality. They define political 
rationality thus: 
 
Political discourse is a domain for the formulation and justification of idealised 
schemata for representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying it. Whilst it does not 
have the systematic and closed character of disciplined bodies of theoretical 
discourse it is, nonetheless, possible to discern regularities that we term political 
rationalities. First, political rationalities have a characteristically moral form. They 
elaborate upon the fitting powers and duties for authorities. They address the 
proper distribution of tasks and actions between authorities of different types - 
political, spiritual, military, pedagogic, familial. They consider the ideals or 
principles to which government should be directed - freedom, justice, equality, 
mutual responsibility, citizenship, common sense, economic efficiency, 
prosperity, growth, fairness, rationality and the like. (Rose and Miller 1990:175) 
 
Political rationality refers to moral claims regarding visions, missions, intentions, 
and purposes. It contains the discursive power of evoking citizens’ dreams, 
passions and ideals. Without political rationality, technologies of government 
would find no site of application. This highlights an important aspect that has 
been neglected by Foucault. Through the lens of Rose and Miller, we are able to 
adopt a Foucauldian concept of proliferation of power with no centers, no 
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foundations and sources, and at the same time we can admit that people’s stated 
purposes and plans of action sometimes do get noticed and achieved. As we 
shall see in the following section, feminists in the 1990s claimed they wanted to 
change the state and society, and they indeed changed them partially. Here I 
assign agency and authorial power to feminists, and by adopting Rose and 
Miller’s concept of political rationality, this does not contradict the use of 
Foucault’s ideas. Rose and Miller further explain that, the application of 
technologies may or may not solve the problems they are intended to deal with, 
and they also generate new problems that require new technologies. In addition, 
objectives may be achieved or not achieved; there will be convergence, or lack of 
it, between moral claims, intentions, technologies used, and results achieved. By 
adopting Foucault’s theory, I am not thereby obliged to say women have no 
agency according to the post-structural theory of the state. By following post-
structural perspectives, my paper seeks to explain under what kind of 
circumstances there will be convergence, or lack of convergence, among political 
rationality, technologies of government, and social actors’ intentions and goals. 
   Before we consider the gender mainstreaming policy developed in recent years, 
we need an overview of the changing relationship between the state and society 
in the case of women’s organizations. The following section will present the 
different phases of the state-society relationship. It should be re-emphasized that 
these changes can be seen as resulting from the varying composition of political 
rationality vis-à-vis technologies of government exercised with varying degree of 
success by the state and also by civil society. Thus, I will admit the role of 
intention and agency on the part of women’s organizations. However, whether or 
not their agency and intentions are achieved is another issue. 
   In recent decades, the state has faced challenges to its monopoly of power 
from two sides: on the one hand, the increasing salience of the global economy, 
and on the other, crises in electoral democracy which have led to increasing 
demands from grass-roots organizations and civil society for more participation. 
In this process, theorists of the state began to use the term ‘governance’ to 
describe new governmental functions. 
   Governance is often confused with government; these two terms are closely 
related, but governance as a process-oriented aspect can be applied also to 
business corporations, to non-profit organizations, to communities, or even to a 
single project (Arts 2003; 2007). There had been a traditional distinction between 
politics and governance: the former is about reaching a consensus from divergent 
opinions to reach common goals, and the latter is the administrative and process-
oriented methods of management. However, contemporary theorists began to 
question this distinction and point out that both involve the exercise of power. 
   There are three approaches to the exercise of power: (1) top-down, hierarchical 
methods; (2) market mechanism, constituted by supply and demand, using the 
principle of competition; and (3) public-private partnership (PPP), focusing on 
collaboration of government, business, and civil society. It is to the third approach 
that contemporary scholars turn to use the term ‘governance’. 
   According to Marinetto (2007: 58) and Rhodes (1997: 15), governance means 
self-organized networks. These inter-organizational networks enjoy a certain 
degree of autonomy from the state. Networks which used to be located around 
functional departments of the centralized state have expanded, with the 
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incorporation of new policy actors from the private and voluntary sectors. This has 
resulted in a decentered government, where the central state’s ability to steer and 
control policy has been weakened due to the growth, complexity, and relative 
autonomy of inter-organizational networks. New actors and agencies beyond 
government, rather than central departments, are integral to the policy network. 
   Studies informed by inter-organizational perspectives come to the conclusion 
that it is unlikely for policy to be strategically directed by a single agency located 
in a neat hierarchical system of authority. The processes involved in making and 
forming policy are inevitably the result of interactions among a plurality of 
separate actors with separate interests, goals, and strategies (Scharpf 1978: 
347). This does not necessarily mean that modern political processes are an 
uncoordinated free-for-all. State actors and non-state actors interact with each 
other through multilateral coordination. Such coordination occurs without 
deliberate steering on the part of a central authority or overarching power 
(Marinetto 2007: 56). 
   One of the implications of this development is that central government has 
become increasingly dependent upon governance to provide policy 
implementation and service delivery. Now actors and agencies beyond the state, 
rather than the central government, are integral to the policy network. This 
phenomenon has been termed by some scholars as the ‘hollowing out’ of the 
state, which is seen as having been eaten away and fragmented. Smith (1999) 
studies the British polity and points out internal and external factors leading to this 
process. Internal forces include market orientation such as privatization, the 
contracting out of services, and the setting-up of quangos and quasi-markets 
(Quangos are quasi-nongovernmental organizations financed by the government 
to perform public functions but which act independently of government). External 
forces include globalization, such as the international free-flowing of production 
and finance. 
   While some scholars describe the state as being thus ‘hollowed out’, others 
argue that the central state has lost the power of direct intervention, but retained 
the ability to manipulate the conditions under which policy networks operate 
(Taylor 1997: 451-452). In other words, the state continues to exercise influential 
power by structuring the policy environment and defining the rules under which 
actors of the networks interact (Morgan et.al. 1999). In spite of the importance of 
networks – or precisely because these networks that deal with cross-cutting public 
issues cannot be confined to a specific department – scholars have argued that 
the state was strengthened, not weakened. More civil servants or out-sourced 
project personnel were recruited to meet the new demands and expectations from 
various sectors, including civil society. 
 
Historical Developments Regarding State-Society Relationship 
 
Below, I summarize the state/society relationship in Taiwan across three historical 
periods. The first stage is from the 1940s to 1970s; this was the period 
characterized by the dominance of the KMT party, which adopted state 
corporatism to manage every walk of life, including women’s organizations, in 
terms of party organizations. The emergence of the feminist movement in Taiwan 
began in the 1970s and came to a zenith in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The 
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second half of 1990s witnessed a new partnership between the state and civil 
society, which was further enhanced after 2000. 
 
 
KMT party 
(1940s-1970s) 
Civil society 
(1980s-1990s) 
Partnership 
（since 1995） 
State/society  
Relationship 
Top-down 
corporatism 
Opposition Network partnership 
Actors Elite women in the 
Party mechanism  
Elite women in 
academic and 
cultural circles 
NGO chief 
executives 
Objectives Chinese 
nationalism: help 
building the nation 
to overthrow 
communism 
Gender equality Gender 
mainstreaming 
Field of actions KMT women’s unit Social movement; 
street protests; 
media; the 
Legislative Yuan 
Commission for the 
Promotion of 
Women’s Rights 
Political 
attitudes 
Openly express 
party affiliation 
 
Neutral; detached; 
critical 
 
Collaborate with 
state machinery 
 
 
Table 1: State-Society Relationship 
 
   We can see three major stages of the changing relationship between women’s 
organizations and the state: (1) state domination; (2) civil society as manifested 
through oppositional social and political movements; and (3) partnership between 
the state and civil society. As the late 1990s is a period of overlapping trends, I 
will further focus on the women’s movement in terms of four stages of changes in 
order to better understand the Janus-faced nature of the late 1990s. Women’s 
movement activists used the rhetoric of resistance, criticizing patriarchal 
state/culture/society/family structures but at the same time they began to have 
initial contacts with the Legislative Yuan and the city government of Taipei. 
   The first of the four periods (1945-1970) was dominated by the ruling KMT 
party. At this time, under authoritarian rule and martial law, the ruling party and 
the state were equivalent, and the party developed extensive networks of 
women’s organizations according to occupation and region. State and society 
worked closely during this period, with the former as the dominating and directive 
force. The second stage, 1970-1990, was the period of the feminist movement, 
which self-consciously attempted to develop autonomy and later developed a 
critical stance against the government. The third stage, in the 1990s, was the 
transitional stage, when the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won 
the municipal election of Taipei city. The Taipei city government then established 
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a women’s rights commission, inviting women’s movement activists to be 
commissioners. The fourth stage begins in 2000, when the DPP obtained national 
power and announced new policies for promoting civil society and partnership 
between the state and civil society. To what extent this partnership can balance 
equally dialogue and policy deliberation is still to be observed. Since the 1990s, 
the women’s movement in Taiwan has moved from resistance and protest to 
become part of the state machinery for policy-making and execution. The 
theoretical and practical implications of this transformation are surely critical. 
   The 1990s saw the convergence of different social, political, and economical 
forces which led to the high tide of various social movements, in particular the 
women’s movement. These forces included the liberalization of previously 
chartered industries, from banking, insurance, telecommunication, to media 
industries. Within a few years, there appeared a great increase in the number of 
newspapers, magazines, cable TV news programs, and TV talk shows. The 
changed environment and increased competition forced the well-established old 
media organizations to adopt new issues and perspectives. Gender issues 
became a hot topic during the 1990s, and the activities of the women’s 
movement, compared with 1980s and post-2000, received broad coverage. 
   In terms of political development, the then-oppositional DPP won several 
election campaigns, the most important being Chen Shui-Bian’s election as 
Mayor of Taipei City. As an opposition party, the DPP had aligned itself with 
various kinds of social movements and progressive agendas, including that of 
labor, the environment, and social welfare reform. The DPP was then supportive 
of the women’s movement. However, the women’s movement in Taiwan tended 
to remain neutral in terms of party affiliation. Many members personally supported 
the DDP, others favored the KMT or the New Party, which had split from the KMT 
in the 1990s and gained passionate support from the urban middle-class who 
were suspicious of the Taiwan nativist movement. In spite of the fact that many 
members had personal inclinations for a specific party, within women’s 
organizations, gender was regarded as the priority. Explicit and open interaction 
with specific parties was subtly avoided at that time. According to Fan Yuan, a 
sociologist investigating social movements in Taiwan, between labor, 
environment, and women’s organizations, women’s organizations were least 
politicized. Their politics was gender, not party and election campaigns. 
   Thus we can say that the women’s movement in the 1990s experienced a 
‘golden time’ of mobilizing protests on issues such as sexual harassment, rape, 
and family violence, and that it enjoyed considerable media coverage. Gender 
issues were also widely debated in terms of culture, and in the academic world 
women’s studies and gender studies also began to gain momentum. 
   Although members of women’s organizations tended to be reserved in the open 
endorsement of specific parties and politicians, there was, though, a small 
number who chose to provide staunch support. During the Taipei City mayoral 
election campaign of 1994, a few activists, led by Professor Lio Yu Xio, were put 
in charge of drafting policy proposals regarding women’s welfare. Lio advocated 
the ‘Scandinavian Model’, meaning partnership between civil society and the 
state. In particular, she advocated the establishment of a commission composed 
of both city government officials and representatives from women’s organizations. 
After Chen’s victory, Lio strongly advised him to initiate a commission as soon as 
56   FANG-MEI LIN 
 
 
possible. It was established in 1995, under the name of the Commission for the 
Promotion of Women’s Rights. This was the first time that women’s organizations 
had access to policy-planning at the level of municipal government. This was 
indeed a historical landmark in the development of the women’s movement. 
   So far we have seen the dual directions of the 1990s: protesting against gender 
bias among both the general public and government; and following the 
establishment of the Commission in 1995, collaboration between the city 
government and women’s organizations. 
   In addition to this committee, which was under the control of the Taipei City 
Government, the central government also set up a commission of similar nature, 
in response to great pressure from women’s organizations and the general public. 
In 1997, a nationally recognized body, also called the Commission for the 
Promotion of Women’s Rights, was formally established under the Executive 
Yuan and convened by the prime minister. At that time the central government 
was under KMT control. For the first few years, this commission remained 
dormant; in contrast, the commission of the Taipei City government was active. 
   Having overviewed these three phases, we should now apply theoretical issues 
of governmentality. Do these changes correspond to different notions of the state 
and the exercise of power? Before I explain the reasons why, I would like to offer 
the conclusion first. Technologies of government are themselves neutral. They 
could be deployed by the state or by civil society (and of course by business, too). 
Women’s organizations throughout different periods have been able to develop 
various kinds of technologies for different purposes: to conform with state 
expectations, to resist them, or to forge new partnerships. 
   In the first stage, the state had domination over society not simply because it 
adopted methods of coercion (such as Martial Law) but also because the state 
successfully deployed a delicate network of women’s organizations. Women’s 
organizations in this period used the resources given by the state to organize 
campaigns and activities to construct a model of the ‘good woman’: the 
combination of a good wife/mother/patriotic citizen. Women’s bodies and the 
social body were integrated through policies of birth control and population 
planning, work/education programs, etc. Many researchers of this period would 
hesitate to call these women feminists. Feminist or not, women’s organizations 
were indeed active in devising and exercising the technologies of government 
toward prostitutes, poor women, orphans, professional women, wives of high-
echelon officials, as well as towards themselves as elite women having access to 
party/state resources. 
   The second stage was the oppositional stage. In this period, the state’s 
technologies of government were increasingly losing their legitimacy, while newly-
founded feminist groups had relatively strong political rationality and weak 
technologies of government. In the 1970s, there were many external 
environmental changes, such as Taiwan’s expulsion from the UN, the termination 
of formal diplomatic relation between the USA and Taiwan, and the death of 
Chiang Kai Shek. The KMT regime was faced with challenges on many fronts. 
Political opposition movements developed both strong discursive power and 
mobilization tactics to resist the state. Western-style liberal feminism was 
introduced into Taiwan by both women feminists and male intellectuals. However, 
feminist groups communicated mainly through their own magazines, and their 
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ability to mobilize was relatively weak. In this sense, their technology of 
government was weak. 
   The third stage was the transitional stage of the late 1990s. Women’s 
organizations had been active writing articles to the press and were also capable 
of mobilizing tens of thousands of women for street protests or for lobbying 
legislators. At the same time, on the university campus young student feminists 
had been thinking and debating issues such as make-up, body and sexuality, and 
lifestyle in general. They wondered whether a ‘true’ feminist would wear high-
heels and make-up. Feminist groups developed arguments regarding the 
authenticity of being a feminist. In the Foucauldian sense, feminist groups in this 
period created ‘technologies of government’ not only to challenge and interact 
with the state, but also to administer their internal organizations and membership, 
and to examine constantly their own inner thinking, outward comportment, and 
conflicts among themselves. At the subjective level of feminists’ self-perception, 
they wanted to emancipate themselves from the oppression of the patriarchal 
state and society. Their openly expressed intentions and purposes have been 
largely realized through a series of legal amendments and new laws.3 
   In the current stage – that is, after the year 2000 – both the state and women’s 
organizations have consolidated technologies of governing gender issues. On the 
part of feminist organizations, as new political opportunities have opened up to 
them, they have been pre-occupied with learning about bureaucratic issues. 
Public feminist discourse remains the liberal view of equality and autonomy.4 In 
the following section, I will examine gender mainstreaming policy to illustrate the 
point of strong technology and weak political rationality. 
 
Gender Mainstreaming and the Growing Complexity of Policy Networks  
 
Gender mainstreaming is the policy approach adopted by the UN. In previous 
approaches regarding the advancement of women’s status, women were the 
target group, and programs for training, education, and protection from violence 
were set up to deal with women’s issues. In this approach, women became a 
problem that society and the state had to deal with. By contrast, gender 
mainstreaming advocates the idea that in all processes of policy formation, 
implementation, and assessment, gender perspectives should be integrated. 
Therefore gender mainstreaming does not target women as a specific group in 
                                                 
3
 Civil Codes regarding marriage, divorce and children’s custody had remained the same 
for decades. The women’s movement in the 1990s was able to mobilize mass support to 
change or replace these outdated laws. From the 1990s to 2006, there were major 
amendments of Civil Codes and Criminal Codes (for example, the new definition of rape as 
sexual assault and violence). New legislation such as Prevention of Family Violence, 
Gender Equality in the Workplace, and Gender Equality in Education were also established 
during this period. 
4
 This is can be explained in part by the fact that women’s movement has increased  its 
professionalization since the late 1990s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the recruitment of 
feminists came from professors, writers, lawyers and intellectuals. In recent years, activists 
are paid full-time workers, and academics are under mounting pressure to produce 
publications at the expense of volunteer work and social engagement. 
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need of supplementary resources from the public sector. Instead, all major policy 
areas that were once regarded as neutral – such as economics and trade, 
science and technology, agriculture, transportation, health, and education and 
training – are examined at the initial stage of policy planning in terms of gender 
analysis, and the historical and social conditions that contribute to gender 
inequality explored. The targets of gender mainstreaming policy are civil servants 
and workers in international development organizations. 
   Gender mainstreaming was first adopted by UN in the Third World Conference 
on Women, in Nairobi, 1985, and it developed into detailed guidelines and a 
Declaration at the following conference, held in Beijing in 1995. Women’s 
organizations in Taiwan attended these conferences, but did not bring what they 
had learned into the domestic lobbying efforts to pressure the government. In the 
1990s, Taiwanese feminists were preoccupied with consciousness-raising and 
the reform and amendment of old laws. The Commission on Women’s Rights 
Promotion, advocated by pro-DPP feminists and first established at the level of 
the Taipei city government in 1995,5 can be said to be the first body in Taiwan to 
have been guided by the principle of gender mainstreaming practice. However, at 
that time, feminists used the terminology of ‘participatory democracy’ and 
‘corporatism of state and society’ – or, to use one buzz word popular in the 1990s 
in Taiwan, ‘the Scandinavian Model’. 
   After the DPP won the presidential election in 2000, an increase in the number 
of female ministerial-level officials was evident, as a ‘one-quarter system’, in 
which women should occupy at least one-fourth of the high level positions, had 
been the DPP’s official party policy since 1997. Women’s movement activists 
served in a variety of positions, including as heads of ministerial-level 
organizations, and on various commissions, such as those set up to look at 
welfare policy (as well, of course, as serving on the Commission on Women’s 
Rights Promotion). Some of these activists began to introduce the concept of 
gender mainstreaming. However, this increase in scale with regard to gender 
mainstreaming reinforced and accelerated the very phenomena that the previous 
section of this paper has highlighted: governmentality and governance, and the 
segmentation and fragmentation of women’s interests – the ‘evaporation’ of 
women. 
 
Gender Mainstreaming 
 
As mentioned above, gender mainstreaming was formally adopted into a 
Declaration at the 1995 Beijing Conference. Responsibility for implementing the 
mainstreaming strategy is system-wide, and rests at the highest levels within 
each nation. There are several basic principles of mainstreaming which include 
the following points:6 
 
                                                 
5
 Taipei city government took the lead in establishing CWRP; CWRP at the level of the 
central government was established in 1997. 
6 See the website of UN/CSW: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/index.html, 
(Accessed on 2 February 2009). 
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• Adequate accountability mechanisms for monitoring progress. 
• The initial identification of issues and problems across all area(s) of 
activity should be such that gender differences and disparities can be 
diagnosed in the initial stage of policy planning. 
• Assumptions that issues or problems are gender neutral should never be 
made. 
• Clear political will and allocation of adequate resources for 
mainstreaming, including additional financial and human resources if 
necessary, are important for translation of the concept into practice. 
• Gender mainstreaming requires that efforts be made to broaden women's 
equitable participation at all levels of decision-making. 
• Mainstreaming does not replace the need for targeted, women-specific 
policies and positive legislation. 
 
The ruling party adopted the terms and concepts of gender mainstreaming in the 
2004 Presidential campaign and then formally moved towards implmentation in 
2005. Every ministry of the Executive Yuan was required to submit a plan. 
   In the last decade of the twentieth century, women’s organizations devoted their 
energies to substantive areas such as violence against women, education, etc., 
without using the buzz word ‘gender mainstreaming’. After the advocacy of 
women’s organizations and formal adoption by the central government in recent 
years (Lin and Cai 2003; Lin 2008), great efforts have been put into the 
infrastructure of administrative coordination networks, such as collecting sex-
disegregated data and statistics of budget growth. For the technical part of 
initiating gender mainstreaming policy, there are three administrative 
components: gender analysis, sex-disegregated data, and budget-analysis. We 
can see the statistical dimension is the prerequisite without which gender 
mainstreaming can proceed only very slowly, if at all. 
   These details show us the increasing significance of horizontal, network 
development of government and public policies. Substantive issues such as 
women and health, or violence against women, remain important, and programs 
about them are implemented with specific reference to gender mainstreaming – I 
raise this point here not as a criticism, as recipients and beneficiaries do not have 
to know the terminology. What I want to emphasize is that in the policy-advocacy 
area, when the term and concept of gender mainstreaming is used at the central 
executive level, it is largely related to bureaucratic procedures, accountability 
structure, performance criteria, assessment tools, and formats. 
   As we will see in the following discussion about the CSW and advocacy for a 
new governmental agency called the Gender Equality Council, power does not 
always originate from the state. The UN and international affairs can become 
cultural capital to be valourized by women’s organizations, with the result that 
women’s organizations take the lead, with the state as the follower. 
 
CSW and CEDAW 
 
The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) is the UN mechanism for policy-
making regarding women’s rights in the course of national development. The 
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CSW consists of 45 commissioners, appointed on a four-year term. There is an 
annual meeting in the first two weeks of March, during which there are official 
conferences, and formal delegations from member countries present country 
reports on the status of gender equality. UN officials and experts present the 
results of regional and country reviews, and drafts of declarations are discussed 
during the sessions. All sessions are open to NGO representatives who have 
applied in advance to attend. However, these NGOs are observers only, with no 
right to speak during the formal sessions. 
   In the meantime, there are a great number of parallel events and mini-
conferences organized by International NGOs (INGOs), and this has been a great 
opportunity for NGOs from all over the world to get to know each other and start 
networking for common concerns. 
   As Taiwan is not a UN member, women’s organizations in Taiwan were not fully 
aware of the importance of the UN until recent years. In the case of attending the 
CSW, there has been a rapid increase in the of number of participants: from six in 
2002, to 29 in 2005, and further to 37 in 2006. However, attendance at the annual 
meetings of the CSW has now become a platform for collective learning at the 
inter-organizational and inter-sectoral levels for Taiwanese delegates. The very 
nature of the Taiwan delegation facilitates and speeds up group learning about 
international affairs; it is not just that they physically will enter the headquarters of 
the UN building in New York and be overwhelmed by the diversity of issues. From 
2003, civil servants from different ministries of the central government and from 
bureaus of local government joined the delegation upon request from the 
Commission on the Promotion of Women’s Rights. Women’s organizations take 
the lead in forming the delegation, and various government agencies follow. This 
is a rare case in which the government is passive but compliant in meeting 
demands from NGOs. 
    Post-structural theory of the state emphasizes the fragmentation of state 
power. It seems logical to assert that under this principle, state sovereignty will be 
diminished. However, I will argue that post-structural theory also encourages us 
to pay attention to configurations of power. In the case of Taiwan women’s 
organizations attending UN conferences, they propose to the state their intention 
to attend UN events, and they get a prompt response. In the actual process of 
participating in the events, delegates are harassed by Chinese delegation 
members regarding the use of the word ‘Taiwan’. Taiwan feminists now have first-
hand experience of encountering the national sovereignty issue. However, they 
continue their original purpose of prioritizing gender issues, sidelining this issue. 
This has been their purpose as well as a survival tactic – i.e. the means by which 
they can assure continuing participation at UN events. Of course, Taiwan 
sovereignty remains a symbolic issue for the DPP government’s internal domestic 
campaign, yet what matters here is that, through the process of attending the UN 
and other international conferences, feminists form transnational networks of 
information-sharing and mutual learning that have global, national, and local 
reverberations. Weng and Fell’s claim (2006) that the Taiwan women’s movement 
is rootless can be understood in the context of these transnational networks 
which partially de-territorialize women’s movements, but at the same time the 
effects of the transnational networks are mainly manifested in domestic policy-
making. I will conclude that transnational networking is de-territorializing, but the 
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process and final result of allocating resources for labour, health, education, and 
so on are within the limits of national boundaries. 
 
The Commission on Gender Equality 
 
‘Organizational restructuring and down-sizing’ is an important issue that was 
vigorously planned soon after the DPP took control of central government. 
Restructuring includes both mergers which intend to down-size the central 
government, and establishing new organizations to meet the changing demands 
of public policies and management. Numerous meetings were convened by the 
prime minister, with a great number of further meetings following among different 
ministries and ministerial-level departments. News regarding the contents of 
these meetings was disseminated through the media. All this has been a long 
process, and even now the goal remains unrealized due to arguments in the 
Legislative Yuan. In spite of this lack of actual results, for civil society, the process 
itself opens up channels of thinking and debating about the role of the central 
government. 
   Women’s organizations were not aware of the importance of government 
restructuring until they were invited by the Ministry of the Interior to attend a 
meeting regarding the possibility of setting up a ‘bureau of children’s and 
women’s welfare’. They were infuriated with the familiar way that women and 
children had often been classified together by public policy and by the general 
public. After expressing their dissatisfaction, members of women’s organizations 
soon realized that instead of simply criticizing the current draft, it was better to 
adopt a pro-active approach by advocating an independent organization to take 
charge of enhancing women’s status. The ‘Ministry of Women’s Rights’ was 
floated as the initial idea, but many quickly suggested that ‘gender equality’ was 
more appropriate than ‘women’s rights’, and consensus was reached relatively 
quickly. 
   A diversity of opinions began to emerge regarding the position of the 
organization: is this a ministry – an organization which has full-fledged stipulated 
authority of policy making and implementation – or a commission, which is an 
organization at the ministerial level but in charge only of policy planning and inter-
ministerial coordination? Within women’s organizations this was hotly debated. 
   In terms of the case of government restructuring, what are the implications for 
the development of civil society in Taiwan? To begin with, this is the first time 
women’s organizations have had a formal and open opportunity to actually get 
involved in planning the administrative machinery of the central executive 
government. In the past they were mainly engaged in advocating for specific 
pieces of legislation, and their interactions with the executive branches were 
mainly about tendering bids to deliver services. Therefore getting involved in 
government restructuring was a fresh learning experience. Second, there is no 
coalition of various sectors of civil society. Women’s organizations were fully 
occupied with gender equality as a single issue. Third, civil society has not 
developed a solid discourse regarding the rationale of government restructuring. 
The government emphasizes ‘down-sizing’, indicating that a diminution of 
government size and the number of civil servants will enhance the efficiency of 
government. Few persons question the dilemma of the decreasing size of and the 
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increasing demands for public service. In the final draft of the restructuring bill, 
the central executive overall increased in size, budget, and personnel, while 
benefit packages for civil servants were cut, and contract workers were recruited. 
Whether we consider the central government or civil society, concerns with the 
political philosophy of the state have been minimal. Fourth, the existing 
Commission on the Promotion of Women’s Rights has played an important role of 
providing an interface between women’s organizations and bureaucrats to 
discuss details of establishing a new organization. This is a positive example 
where we see a partnership taking substantive shape through on-going and 
regular discussions. 
 
Conclusion: Rethinking the State and Civil Society 
 
From the previous discussion of gender mainstreaming policy, we can see the 
increasing salience of policy networks that have multiple actors inside and outside 
the state. There is indeed a decrease in the direct power of the state. However, 
the state is not therefore weakened or ‘hollowed out’. On the contrary, women’s 
movement activists rely heavily on the policy networks activated by the state. 
   The nature of the state has gone through three phases of change: first as the 
center of power and authority, second as a ‘hollowed out’ space due to the 
decentering of networks and ensembles of institutions, and finally, as examined in 
this paper, as the nodal point of networks that reasserts its strategic importance 
by setting up the conditions of operations, absorbing power that originates from 
outside the state to feedback into mechanisms for re-establishing the political 
legitimacy of state institutions. In all three phases, political rationality and 
technologies of government are both necessary. Even in the first phase, when the 
state is the center of power, this is possible only through manipulation of effective 
technologies of government and ideology. 
   In this process of proliferation of policy networks, civil society has segmented 
into professional social service organizations and advocacy organizations. While 
the conventional notion of the state as a unified entity has to be modified, the 
notion of civil society as a whole is also under revision. Both fragmented into 
pieces and were then re-sutured into highly professionalized networks of task-
forces or service-providers.  
   Governance, defined as the process of forming networks and leadership, is not 
only relevant to the government but also applicable to business, and to NGOs. In 
the case of the women’s movement in Taiwan, while criticism of patriarchy 
dominated the feminist discourses of the 1980s and 1990s, in recent years the 
term ‘patriarchy’ appeared less often. Instead, activists often talked about what 
the government should do to secure gender equality, or how they themselves had 
interacted with the government to initiate reforms. The state is a gendered state, 
while the identity of feminists at the same time inserts itself into the state as part 
of the state mechanism. In this sense, we can say gender mainstreaming has 
forged a new governmentality that serves as a link between the practical 
techniques of state operation and feminist identity. 
   Is it possible to construct an identity and subjectivity that are non-disciplinary 
and emancipatory? If we define feminists as those who are involved with the 
advocacy and implementation of gender policies, then I will give an ambivalent 
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answer to this question. However, there are also feminists who reside in the 
space of grassroots communities, religious organizations, and self-help groups 
that are beyond the scope of this paper. However, they may give us inspiration 
about what a positive answer of the question might be. This will be left for future 
research. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that narratives of Taiwan’s colonial experience promoted by the DPP 
regime between 2000 and 2008 and the version endorsed by the communist regime on the 
mainland both share a reluctance to recognize the status of China itself as a colonizing 
power, or (as in the case of Taiwan) of Chinese settlers as colonizers. While this article 
does not elaborate at great length as to how ‘Greater China’ might be integrated into 
comparative analyses of colonialism and imperialism, it reviews some of the existing 
literature (particularly Teng 2004), suggesting points of comparison that may merit further 
exploration. The discussion then turns to other recent work on Taiwan’s history, showing 
how the typical periodization of Taiwan studies, with its assumption that colonialism arrived 
on the island in 1895 with the invading Japanese, distorts narratives of the Taiwanese 
past. Some reference is also made to how exhibitions in Taiwanese historical and 
anthropological museums have been implicated in attempts over recent years to construct 
a narrative of multicultural ‘Taiwaneseness’. The article concludes with a discussion both 
of the reasons for this occlusion of Taiwan’s colonial past, and of the wider implications of 
such a posture of denial for Chinese identities on Taiwan and the mainland. 
 
Introduction 
 
This indifference to the only non-Western colonial experience in the general 
critique of imperialism and colonization underscores the West’s persisting 
obsession with its own authority to constitute itself as a body of knowledge and 
the author of its own criticism. It is as if the very thought of a non-Western, 
nonwhite perpetrator of an equally reprehensible colonial violence is 
unfathomable in the Eurocentric consciousness. Ironically, radical anti-
Eurocentrism turns out to be the ultimate consolidation of Eurocentrism. (Ching 
2001: 30-31) 
 
While the assumption is still widely made that ‘colonialism’ is a quintessentially 
Western practice, those – like Ching – who do discuss instances of non-Western 
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colonialism generally confine their attention to Japan.1 The Japanese set out in 
the late nineteenth century to compete with the imperialist West on its own terms, 
and the colonization of Taiwan in particular served to demonstrate to the 
Emperor’s subjects, and to a wider world, that theirs ranked among the 
‘advanced’ nations of the day. In addition, the spectacular brutality of the wars of 
aggression that brought about the demise of the Japanese imperium has etched 
in many East Asian minds the memory of an Oriental imperialism that in its 
violence and barbarity exceeded even its hateful Western precursors. As Mitter 
has shown (2007), in the contemporary People’s Republic of China, both popular 
and officially-sponsored discourse have conspired to keep fresh the memory of 
Chinese victimhood, especially at the hands of the Japanese. Taiwan slots neatly 
into this narrative of victimization, as the first major episode in the saga of 
Japanese aggression – the first of a clutch of offspring snatched by Japan from 
the bosom of the Chinese motherland, and the last to be received back into her 
warm embrace.2 Meanwhile, pro-independence groups on the island itself have in 
recent years sought to qualify accounts of the Japanese colonial experience as 
uniformly malign, instead portraying the period of Japanese rule, along with 
preceding periods of rule by the Qing dynasty, the Koxinga clan, and the Dutch, 
as patches in the quilt of a ‘multicultural Taiwan’.3 
   We can see a shared reluctance to recognize the status of China itself as a 
colonizing power; although, like early American patriots seeking to distance 
themselves from the ‘old country’, many in Taiwan’s ‘Green’ camp may 
acknowledge the ‘colonial’ character of the Chinese state, Chinese settlement on 
Taiwan is not itself so characterized. Colonialism is assumed to have arrived on 
the island in 1895 with the invading Japanese, and exhibitions in Taiwanese 
historical and anthropological museums have been implicated in recent years in 
constructing a narrative of multicultural ‘Taiwaneseness’ (a phenomenon I have 
discussed at greater length elsewhere, see Vickers 2007; 2009). While some of 
these exhibitions have sought to downplay or denigrate the role of the Chinese 
state in the island’s development, acknowledgement of the history of inter-ethnic 
conflict between Chinese settlers and aborigines has generally been minimal. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In this respect, a 2007 special issue of the journal Taiwan Shi Yanjiu (Journal of Taiwan 
History), published by the Academia Sinica in Taipei, is typical (Academia Sinica 2007). 
The special issue, on ‘colonial history’ (zhimindi shi), exclusively features articles on the 
period of Japanese rule in Taiwan and Korea. 
2
 The 2003 mainland docu-drama epic, Zou Xiang Gonghe (Towards the Republic) features 
a melodramatic portrayal of Li Hongzhang’s cession of Taiwan to Japan after the 1894-
1895 war – just one illustration of the prevalence of nationalist discourse in contemporary 
China, and the reinforcement of the memory of Taiwan’s loss as an unmitigated tragedy 
and shameful national humiliation. 
3
 In 2005, the National Museum of History in Taipei mounted a special exhibition on quilts 
as art objects, with the exhibition text making pointed allusions to the quilt as a metaphor 
for cultural identity. 
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Contemporary Narratives of Taiwan’s Past – A Brief Summary 
 
As an agrarian nation, China was essentially constructed not on the basis of 
military force or conquest; rather, [the Chinese state was founded] through trade 
based on the tribute system, [the spread of] rites and cultural enlightenment, 
‘softly embracing the four barbarians’ (huairou siyi), stabilizing the borders and 
fixing the territory (wenjiang gutu), and this system was established and 
sustained through several thousand years prior to the invasion of China by 
Western capitalists in the nineteenth century. (Zhu 2007: 156) 
 
In research on the history curriculum for Taiwan’s schools, and on the island’s 
museums, various scholars have discussed the portrayal of local history in official 
discourse, and the changes this has undergone during the transition from 
Kuomintang (KMT) martial law in the 1980s to multi-party democracy in the 
twenty-first century (Corcuff 2005; Liu et al. 2005; Vickers 2007; 2008). 
Interpretations of Taiwan’s history, and of the island’s colonization by various 
powers, have tended to divide along ‘Blue’/‘Green’ lines – the former indicating 
orthodox KMT nationalism, the latter the kind of pro-independence stance 
associated with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Before discussing in 
more depth the historiography of colonialism on Taiwan, it is necessary to briefly 
reacquaint ourselves with the dominant ‘Blue’ and ‘Green’ perspectives. 
   The old KMT account, which closely corresponds with that to which the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) still religiously adheres, holds that Taiwan was 
harmoniously united with the rest of China according to the process described 
above by Zhu (2007). This perspective assumes the cultural superiority of 
mainstream ‘Han’ China, and ascribes to Han civilization a magnetic power of 
attraction vis-à-vis the peoples and cultures on the periphery of the ancestral 
Chinese homeland on the Central Plains (zhongyuan).4 This nationalist account 
contends that it is this superiority that has enabled China gradually to expand 
over the course of millennia, absorbing and assimilating (ronghe) bordering 
peoples through what is represented as an essentially peaceful process. At the 
same time, this perspective, in both KMT and CCP versions, hails a fundamental 
pacificism, and the pursuit of assimilation through a harmonious process of 
natural cultural attraction, as reflections of essential Chinese values that both 
illustrate Chinese superiority (over violent and grasping Western imperialists) and 
explain why China, alone of all the civilizations of antiquity (Egypt, Babylon, 
Greece, Rome, Ashokan India) has survived down to the present day. Taiwan, 
though acknowledged as a relative latecomer to this programme of sinification, is 
nonetheless seen as subject to essentially the same inexorable civilizational logic. 
However, the KMT (or indeed the CCP) have tended to evince little interest in 
Taiwan’s history prior to the seventeenth century, or in the cultures of the island’s 
indigenous tribes. Rather, accounts of Taiwan’s historical development in general, 
and its relationship with China in particular, have tended to be left studiously 
vague – and were accorded very little space either in history textbooks or in 
museums under KMT rule prior to the 1990s. Under the KMT, the immemorial 
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 Wang Gungwu (1984) offers essentially the same vision of peaceable Chinese expansion, 
though expressed in sophisticated academic English. 
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‘Chineseness’ of the island was assumed rather than demonstrated, and only 
those episodes in Taiwan’s history that served to dramatize its role in China’s 
struggles against various foreign powers were highlighted. These included the 
ejection of Dutch colonialists by the Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong in the mid-
seventeenth century, the tragic loss of the island to Japanese imperialists 
following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, the recovery of the island by the 
KMT in 1945 following victory in the war against Japan and Taiwan’s subsequent 
development as an economic powerhouse and ‘base for recovery’ of the Chinese 
mainland. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s inhabitants were depicted as Chinese patriots 
who rejoiced at liberation from Japanese colonialism in 1945, and who longed for 
reunification with the Chinese motherland. 
   By contrast, the ‘Green’ perspective on Taiwan’s past that has increasingly 
come to the fore since the early 1990s, and enjoyed official sponsorship under 
the presidency of Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), has emphasized all those aspects 
of the island’s past that serve to diminish the significance of the Chinese 
connection. The beginnings of a rediscovery of indigenous and local history, and 
of official acknowledgement and support for this, can actually be dated to the 
presidency of Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s, when the historian Tu Cheng-sheng, 
later to become Education Minister under Chen Shui-bian, played a leading role 
in the development of the ‘Knowing Taiwan’ (‘Renshi Taiwan’) course for local 
high schools (Corcuff 2005).5 This interpretation of the island’s past has sought to 
play up the ‘multicultural’ nature of Taiwanese history and culture by representing 
the periods of Qing and KMT rule as just two episodes amongst many that have 
seen Taiwan influenced by a number of different powers. According to this 
narrative, prior to the seventeenth century the island remained almost entirely the 
preserve of its aboriginal inhabitants, who with their ‘Polynesian’ cultures and 
languages were perhaps more closely related to the islanders of the Pacific and 
Indonesian-Malay archipelagos than to Han Chinese. The first significant influx of 
Han Chinese occurred under Dutch rule in the early seventeenth century, when 
the Dutch won a contest with the Spanish for dominance over the island before 
being ousted by Zheng Chenggong, whose regime was in turn overthrown by the 
Qing. The ‘Green’ account typically traces the emergence of a ‘Taiwanese’ 
identity back at least to the Qing period, ascribing a ‘Taiwanese’ label to the Han 
settler population on the island. The Taiwanese are portrayed as having forged 
an independent life for themselves on the island, in a context of neglect, 
indifference or hostility on the part of the distant Qing imperial authorities, who 
eventually handed them over to the Japanese following the 1894-1895 war (an 
episode that witnessed a short-lived effort to establish an independent ‘Republic 
of Taiwan’ – ‘Taiwan Minzuguo’). The theme of betrayal at the hands of the 
mainland recurs in accounts of Taiwan’s experience following the retrocession to 
China in 1945, which witnessed the bloody suppression of local resistance to the 
KMT regime. The KMT are depicted as no better, and quite possibly worse, than 
the Japanese colonialists who preceded them – underlining the message that the 
Taiwanese neither can nor should trust anyone but themselves to run their own 
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 Tu’s appointment as Education Minister was preceded by a stint as Director of the 
National Palace Museum from 2000-2004, and both roles have provided him with excellent 
platforms for the  promotion of his (and the DPP’s) vision of a ‘multicultural’ Taiwan. 
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affairs. This perception informed one of the final acts of the Chen Shui-bian 
presidency, which was to redesignate the monumental Chiang Kai-shek Memorial 
Hall in central Taipei (built to commemorate the ruler who had sought to use the 
island as a base for a KMT recovery of the Chinese mainland) as the National 
Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall (Guoli Taiwan Minzhu Jinian Guan).6 
   In these very early days (summer 2008) of the KMT’s return to power under 
President Ma Ying-jeou, it is perhaps premature to talk of a ‘third way’ in 
Taiwanese official discourse on the island’s past. However, Ma’s record as Mayor 
of Taipei,7 as well as his early statements since his inauguration as president, 
suggests that his administration will adopt a far more nuanced and ambivalent 
line on pan-Chinese nationalism and reunification than the old KMT regime ever 
did prior to the mid-1990s. Ma’s stance on Taiwanese identity is nonetheless 
likely to prove rather more cautious than that articulated by the previous KMT 
President, Lee Teng-hui, in the late 1990s. Lee’s vision of the ‘New Taiwanese’ 
(‘xin Taiwanren’), and of ‘Taiwan-centric consciousness’ (‘Taiwan zhuti yishi’), 
acknowledged Taiwan’s Chinese cultural and historical legacy, but emphatically 
did not derive from this any acceptance of the inevitability of reabsorption into a 
unitary Chinese state, instead promoting a sense of ‘Taiwanese’ identity and of 
‘belonging to Taiwan’ (leaving vague the question of whether this constituted a 
full-blown ‘national’ identity) (Lynch 2008). It remains unclear precisely where the 
new KMT regime’s vision of Taiwan’s identity and destiny will be situated on the 
‘Taiwanese’/‘Chinese’ spectrum, and how this vision will be articulated through a 
narrative of the island’s history, including the history of its varied colonial 
experience. 
 
Chinese Colonialism in Comparative Perspective 
 
Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly 
imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions 
affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the 
colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. 
Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are 
convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule. 
(Osterhammel 2005: 16-17) 
 
This definition of colonialism distinguishes it from ‘imperialism’, defined as the 
pursuit of worldwide political and economic domination, which may or may not be 
associated with the pursuit of territorial expansion or the direct subjugation of 
indigenous populations. Osterhammel acknowledges that while only Britain and 
America have come close to being ‘imperialist’ powers according to his definition, 
others such as France, Germany, Russia (or the USSR) and Japan ‘functioned as 
imperialists at various times in a more limited sense’ (Osterhammel 2005: 22). 
                                                 
6
 The new KMT administration under Ma Ying-jeou looks set to reverse this move and 
restore the original name of the Hall, along with the ‘honorary guard performances’ 
originally held there in honour of Chiang Kai-shek (Wang 2009). 
7
 See Vickers (2007) for Ma’s comments in his official capacity as Mayor and patron of 
Taipei’s 228 Peace Memorial Museum. 
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Like Horvath (1972), Osterhammel sees the presence of significant numbers of 
settlers from the colonizing power as a key difference between ‘colonialism’ and 
‘imperialism’, but he further refines the definition of ‘colonialism’ by introducing the 
concept of ‘colonies without colonialism’. This practice, characterized by 
settlement of so-called ‘empty land’ (terra nullius) where settlers rapidly 
constituted the majority population (as in New England), is, he argues, to be 
distinguished from ‘colonialism without colonies’, where relations between a 
majority and minority population ‘within nation states or regionally integrated land 
empires’ come to resemble a form of ‘internal colonialism’ (as some argue has at 
some periods been the case in relations between England and areas of the 
British ‘periphery’ in Ireland, Scotland or Wales) (Osterhammel 2005: 17).8  
   One difficulty with the model posited by Osterhammel is its identification of the 
‘minority/majority’ relationship between occupier and occupied as central to the 
definition of colonialism. While colonialism must inevitably begin with the 
domination of an indigenous majority by an alien minority, it is often a central aim 
of the colonial project to reverse the terms of this population equation. Such has 
been the case in the various European ‘colonies of settlement’ in the Americas, 
Australasia, and parts of Africa. We may accept that the USA and Australia 
cannot accurately be described as colonial societies now, but this does not alter 
the fact that both clearly have colonial origins, and that these origins have 
influenced, and continue to influence, their development in significant ways. As 
the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has observed, ‘I am born with a past; and to 
try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my 
present relationships.’ (MacIntyre 1985: 205); in the case of colonial history, these 
relationships include those between the descendants of former colonizing and 
colonized populations, as well as relationships within and between societies and 
states more broadly, informed as they are by a collective sense of identity rooted 
in historical consciousness. Moreover, Osterhammel’s claim that colonizers ‘reject 
cultural compromises’ with the colonized population does not seem to hold for 
many of Britain’s colonies, where such compromises were central to the tactics 
deployed by the British to secure the collaboration of indigenous elites (Robinson 
1986; Cannadine 2001). In Africa and Asia, the British were seldom interested in 
the cultural transformation of the ‘natives’ into British subjects; by contrast, the 
French did seek to turn their African and Asian colonies into overseas extensions 
of France, through a combination of settlement and educational and cultural 
policy (Kelly 1998).  
   The validity of Osterhammel’s model is thus questionable, and his own analysis 
of colonialism belies his own attempt to posit such an overly-simplified definition 
                                                 
8
 It is worth pointing out that, if settlement is seen as a defining feature of colonialism, then 
in many cases the settler presence has been very small indeed as a proportion of the total 
population (as in most of Britain’s ‘colonial’ possessions outside the so-called ‘colonies of 
settlement’ or the ‘White Dominions’). Nonetheless, ‘colonial’ rule must involve the 
presence of at least a few ‘colonizers’ (in the form of soldiers and administrators) on the 
ground in the colony, whereas ‘imperial’ domination may involve the exercise of dominance 
in more indirect or informal ways – though with the threat of force always waiting in the 
wings. Seen in this way, the overlapping natures of ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’, and the 
ease with which one may shade into the other, becomes obvious. 
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of the phenomenon. However, since this definition is representative of much 
mainstream scholarship in the West (and the East) on the phenomenon of 
‘colonialism’, the remainder of this essay will discuss whether and, if so, how the 
case of China in general (and Taiwan in particular) might be accommodated 
within it. Osterhammel draws a contrast between the ‘missionary rhetoric’ of 
European, American, and Japanese colonizers, and ‘traditional cultures’ such as 
the Chinese who, he argues, ‘proceeded on the assumption of the exemplary 
status and supremacy of their own civilization as if this were self-evident, without, 
however, imposing it on neighbouring civilizations. Only in modern colonialism did 
this kind of ethnocentric arrogance take an aggressive expansionist turn, only 
here were the many bent by the few under a “spiritual yoke”’ (Osterhammel 2005: 
16). However, strategies pursued by the current regime in regions such as Tibet, 
and justifications routinely advanced for Chinese control in terms of benefits 
bestowed (material progress and ‘spiritual civilization’), suggest that any contrast 
between effortless Chinese civilizational superiority and aggressive Western 
expansionism, is, at least nowadays, somewhat wide of the mark. But was such a 
contrast ever valid at all? 
   When discussing the characteristics of Chinese colonialism, as with any aspect 
of culture, it is important to be specific as to time and place. Notwithstanding 
important continuities in governmental practices as in other aspects of the culture, 
‘traditional China’ – all three thousand years and thousands of square miles of it – 
is often treated as possessing a homogeneity and uniformity that reflects more 
the wishful thinking of the imperial authorities (and their in-house historians) than 
actual reality on the ground. Thus regions of ‘China proper’, such as Guangdong, 
now generally regarded as unquestionably ‘Chinese’, at one time formed the 
restive periphery of an expanding empire. Wright’s account of the unification of 
China under the Sui Dynasty (581-617 CE) depicts Guangdong as a region of 
fortified Chinese settlements frequently besieged by the indigenous forest-
dwelling tribespeople (Wright 1978).9 Military conquest and less bloody, more 
cost-effective strategies of assimilation (through commercial and cultural 
exchange, and the cultivation of local tribal chiefs with gifts and honours) were not 
regarded as mutually exclusive approaches by Chinese proconsuls; like the 
Romans in Germania, the Chinese in the lands of the Northern and Southern Yue 
(i.e. Guangdong and Vietnam) garrisoned and fortified their borders, while also 
seeking to soothe and civilize the ‘savages’. While Vietnam eventually broke 
                                                 
9
 Wright writes of Guangdong in the early Sui dynasty: ‘The scattered inhabitants of this 
immense area were largely aborigines of varied racial types and equally varied ways of life. 
In the fertile valleys and along the coast were walled towns and scattered settlements of 
Chinese colonists who would over the centuries bring the land and most but not all of the 
aboriginal peoples into the Chinese cultural sphere. Sui forces, moving into the far south, 
had limited objectives at this time. First, they wished to restore that measure of stability 
among the native tribes which formal submission to the Chinese dynasties at Nanking had 
brought. This meant persuading and winning over important chiefs who often dominated, 
through their own chiefs, a number of lesser tribes. Such important chieftains were the 
instruments of Chinese “indirect rule” in the southern hinterlands, and they had to be won 
over if the route to Canton was to be opened, the Chinese occupied towns protected, and 
the conditions for further colonization assured’ (Wright 1978: 150-151). 
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away to form an independent kingdom, in Guangdong occupation and 
colonization led over centuries to cultural assimilation – though not to an 
eradication of Cantonese cultural distinctiveness. The pattern of China’s 
expansion on the frontiers forms the subject of one notable recent work by a 
Taiwanese historian, but his analysis emphasizes the fluid and plural nature of 
‘Chinese’ identities, rather than addressing the issue of whether dominance over 
various frontier peoples can accurately be characterized as ‘colonial’ (Wang 
1997). 
   Guangdong and other southern provinces – Guangxi and Yunnan – thus 
arguably constitute examples of outright colonization shading, over time, into 
‘colonialism without colonies’, and finally to fuller integration into ‘China proper’. 
However, regions on the Northern and Western frontiers of the Qing Empire 
(1644-1912) present Chinese colonialism in different guises. Use of the term 
‘Chinese’ with respect to an empire ruled by a conquest dynasty (the Manchus) is 
perhaps problematic, but Han Chinese officials were intimately involved in the 
running of the state, and by the second half of the nineteenth century were at the 
forefront of efforts to bolster Qing control of regions such as Xinjiang, and to 
justify their continued subjection to Qing rule. Different dynasties had at various 
times claimed some form of suzerainty over parts of Mongolia, Xinjiang, and 
Tibet; the Qing, however, embarked on an unprecedentedly ambitious series of 
campaigns which progressively incorporated these regions within their Empire.  
   A number of recent studies have emphasized that the phenomenon of Qing 
imperialism needs to be understood not only, or even primarily, as the culmination 
of a millennial tradition of Chinese imperial governance, but more importantly 
within a context of competitive state formation, technological development, and 
the exchange of ideas across the early modern world. Thus Hostetler argues that 
‘the Qing use of both cartography and ethnography to define its territory and its 
peoples reveals an interconnectedness with the early modern world that has too 
long been overlooked’, and that ‘their use in defining Qing China as an emergent 
world force in the eighteenth century has parallels to the use of these types of 
visual representation in other parts of the world’ (Hostetler 2001: 208). According 
to Perdue (2005), the Qing imperial enterprise was, at least initially, far from 
rejecting cultural compromises with the indigenous populations – rather, the Qing 
emperors drew on Mongolian precedents for the governance of the conquered 
territories in Central Eurasia, combining the ruthless suppression of opposition 
with the assiduous cultivation of collaborators amongst existing local elites – 
khans and tribal chieftans in Mongolia, lamas or local kings in Tibetan areas, and 
Uighur begs in Altishahr and Ili. In this reliance on local collaborators, the Qing 
strategy bore similarities with British practice in many of the areas of India that 
came under their control during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; 
and the construction of rigidly-demarcated ethnic ‘constituencies’ under the 
Qianlong emperor (analysed by Crossley 1999) in some respects foreshadows 
the kind of ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy adopted by India’s rulers in the Victorian era. 
Indeed, Perdue emphasizes the importance of seeing the Qing conquest of 
Central Eurasia in the broader context of imperial expansion and rivalry across 
the Western half of the Asian continent from the late seventeenth century 
onwards. While the British were, until the nineteenth century, relatively peripheral 
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to Qing concerns, the contest with Russia for dominance of Zungharia was crucial 
to driving the dynasty forward in its career of conquest. 
   It was in the context of a worldwide intensification of imperialist competition in 
the nineteenth century that the Qing state experienced multiple crises that 
threatened its continuing integrity and viability, and faced threats to its control 
over the border regions of the empire constructed over the preceding two 
centuries. Han Chinese officials and literati were at the forefront of efforts to shore 
up the Qing state against both internal rebellion and foreign depredation. Wei 
Yuan and Gong Zizhen proposed large-scale Han settlement of frontier territories 
such as Xinjiang, partly through encouraging civilian migration, and partly through 
granting land to soldiers sent to garrison these areas. As Perdue (2005: 501) 
notes, ‘just like imperialists in the New World and elsewhere, [Wei and Gong] 
promoted the filling up of “virgin lands” with immigrants from the core, and the 
tighter links to the interior, as “manifest destiny” for this large continental state’. It 
was in representing the conquest of Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet as the 
fulfillment of a Heaven-mandated destiny that Wei Yuan helped provide the basis 
for the standard nationalist narrative that speaks of the ‘unification’ (tongyi) rather 
than conquest (zhengfu) of territories that were somehow rightfully Chinese. 
However, Wei committed heresy in the eyes of later nationalists by writing that 
‘much of the territory of China defined by the Nerchinsk treaty [of 1689] was 
“wasteland” newly entered on the registers’, while also noting that Taiwan ‘from 
ancient times was not part of China’ (Perdue 2005: 509).10 For Wei and Gong, the 
fixing of the borders of the Qing state, the fuller integration of conquered areas, 
and the elaboration of an ideology to justify all of this, were elements in a strategy 
consciously designed to consolidate and defend an empire newly threatened by 
rival imperialisms. 
   It was the next generation of ‘self-strengthening’ Han Chinese officials that 
attempted to put the ideas of Wei and Gong into practice. Millward (2007) argues 
that the eventual decisions in the 1880s to ‘provincialise’ both Xinjiang and 
Taiwan (in 1884 and 1887 respectively) reflected a fundamental shift in the 
governance structures of the Qing Empire, and of their underlying ideology. 
Whereas previously the Qing had adopted different models of governance in the 
‘ecologically and culturally different regions of the periphery’, following rebellion 
and partial Russian occupation in Xinjiang during the 1870s, growing threats from 
Japan to its control over Taiwan, and the suppression – led by Han Chinese 
officials such as Zeng Guofan – of the Taiping and Nian revolts of mid-century, by 
the 1880s the court was more susceptible to arguments that ‘a Xinjiang that was 
demographically and culturally more like China proper would be both easier and 
cheaper to govern’ (Millward 2007: 138). The new programme for governing 
Xinjiang pursued by Zuo Zongtang saw Sinicization of the local population as 
central to the strategy for integrating the region and preventing future rebellion; 
                                                 
10
 However, this heresy was also bravely indulged in by Ge Jian-xiong, director of the 
Institute of Chinese Historical Geography and the Research Centre for Historical 
Geographic Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. In an article for the magazine China 
Review, ‘How big really was “Ancient China”?’ (Gudai ‘Zhongguo’ jiujing duoda), 19 
February 2007, he argues that it is wrong to say that Tibet was part of China during the 
Tang dynasty, although this is what school history textbooks assert. 
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Zuo wrote, ‘If we wish to change their peculiar customs and assimilate them to 
our Chinese ways (huafeng), we must found free schools (yishu) and make the 
Muslim children read [Chinese] books, recognize characters and understand 
spoken language’ (quoted in Millward 2007: 142). 
   By the late nineteenth century, therefore, Qing China was pursuing a strategy 
for reinforcing its control over Xinjiang that on paper at least appears to conform 
precisely to Osterhammel’s definition of colonialism – domination of an 
indigenous majority by foreign invaders deriving their authority from a distant 
metropolis, with the latter convinced of their superiority and mandate to rule, and 
rejecting cultural compromise with the local population. Moreover, like their 
European colonialist contemporaries in parts of Eastern and South-Central Africa 
and elsewhere, the Chinese in late nineteenth-century Xinjiang also saw 
substantial immigration from the imperial metropolis as key to the consolidation of 
control, and to integration with the rest of the empire. In the short term, the 
capacity of Chinese administrators actually to implement this programme was 
severely limited, but massive Han settlement and a programme of secularization 
(and more qualified Sinicization) were to be vigorously promoted by their 
communist successors after 1949.11  
 
Chinese colonialism on Taiwan 
 
In 1662, at the height of their strength as a naval power, even the Dutch were 
driven from the island of Taiwan, not by the Chinese emperor, but by the regional 
warlord Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga). Taiwan remained uncolonized by non-
Chinese until 1895. (Osterhammel 2005: 42) 
 
There is here at least a tacit acknowledgement by Osterhammel that the fact that 
Taiwan remained ‘uncolonized by non-Chinese’ until the end of the nineteenth 
century did not mean that it remained uncolonized at all (he does not elaborate). 
However, studies that explicitly address Taiwan’s experience under Chinese (or 
Qing) rule as an instance of colonialism are few and far between – the most 
notable being Emma Jinhua Teng’s 2004 monograph, Taiwan’s Imagined 
Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895. 
   Teng draws parallels between the practices and ideology developed by 
Taiwan’s Chinese colonizers, and those of their European contemporaries, 
particularly in the Americas. Moreover, she notes that a number of Qing-era 
Chinese colonialists made similar comparisons themselves, quoting for example 
the nineteenth-century travel writer Ding Shaoyi: 
 
The savagery of the native barbarians of the newly opened frontiers of North 
America is no different from that of the savages of Taiwan. In the past, they were 
                                                 
11
 In May 2008, the Dalai Lama claimed that the Chinese government was planning to 
settle up to a million Han Chinese in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, with the programme 
to begin only after the conclusion of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. See Julian Borger 
(2008), ‘Tibet Could be Swamped by Mass Chinese Settlement after Olympics’, Guardian 
Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/24/tibet.china (accessed 3 June 2008). 
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extremely ferocious, yet Europeans have managed to guide them with their 
senseless, confused religion and have finally changed the native customs. So it 
is a real injustice to say that the raw savages of Taiwan have absolutely no 
human morals despite their human appearance and that they cannot be civilized 
with our Kingly Governance (wangzheng)! (Teng 2004: 11) 
 
As this quotation indicates, China’s colonial strategy in Taiwan remained a matter 
of fierce debate amongst literati throughout the Qing period. The Qing occupation 
of Taiwan represented a new departure for the imperial Chinese state; previously, 
the sea had been regarded as the definitive Eastern boundary of the Chinese 
realm, and Taiwan as a savage island beyond the pale of civilization. Chinese 
migration to the island during the period of Dutch rule (1624-1662), and then its 
occupation by forces of the Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong, compelled the Qing 
court to interest itself in Taiwanese affairs. Nevertheless, the expedition launched 
to quash Zheng’s forces in the 1680s was tasked with pacifying a rebel 
stronghold, not with adding new territories to the empire. It was only after a 
heated discussion at court that Shi Lang, the admiral who had headed the 
invasion fleet, persuaded other officials that Taiwan should be brought within the 
imperial realm (or ‘enter the maps’, ‘ru bantu’), on the grounds that it was ‘truly a 
bountifully fertile piece of land and a strategic territory’ (quoted in Teng 2004: 35). 
   As with the Qing conquest of Western Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, the 
extension of imperial control was thus largely motivated by a desire to eliminate 
threats along the frontiers of the new empire, if necessary by encompassing and 
securing new territories that could be defended against foreign competitors (or 
vagrant rebels). However, Taiwan was a different sort of ‘colony’ from Xinjiang or 
Tibet: for one thing, the indigenous inhabitants were, to Chinese eyes, more 
primitive and savage than the Uighurs or Tibetans; for another, the island had 
experienced substantial settlement by Han Chinese even before the assumption 
of control by the Qing. As in colonial North America under the British, 
administrators tasked with maintaining order and stability on the frontier found 
themselves engaged in a constant struggle to rein in settlers who threatened to 
provoke conflict by encroaching on native territories – until the late nineteenth 
century, when the policy in Taiwan, as in Xinjiang, shifted to the encouragement 
of unrestrained Han settlement and all-out sinification of the natives. 
   In reviewing the early reports of this exotic island colony circulated amongst 
literati on the Chinese mainland, Teng shows how these travelogues diverged in 
their portrayal of the natives. Distinguishing between what she terms a ‘rhetoric of 
privation’ and a ‘rhetoric of primitivism’, she shows how depictions of the 
Taiwanese aborigines ranged from demonization to idealization. In a famous 
debate convened in 1550-1551 by King Carlos I at Valladolid, the scholastic 
theologians Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepúlveda famously 
debated whether the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas should be accorded 
the same rights as all Spanish subjects, or regarded as barbarous beings 
possessing what Aristotle had termed a ‘slavish’ nature and thus destined by 
Providence for domination and tutelage by superior, civilized, Christian 
Europeans. Chinese literati similarly struggled to accommodate their observations 
of the Taiwan indigenes within a traditional cosmology which, despite its 
fundamental differences from the worldview of Thomistic Catholicism, likewise 
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encompassed a spectrum of views regarding the fundamental nature of humanity, 
distinctions between the ‘savage’ and the ‘civlized’, and their implications for 
colonial governance. Chen Di, who visited Taiwan in 1603 (before even the 
period of Dutch colonization), made the earliest statement of the ‘primitivist’ view 
of the indigenes, portraying them as having preserved an earlier, and morally 
superior, form of society (close to the harmonious, primitive utopia depicted in the 
classics), unsullied by the decadence and depravity that had overtaken 
contemporary civilization. For Chen and other early Chinese observers of 
indigenous society, Taiwan was – as Teng puts it – like a ‘living museum’, 
exhibiting social models long since extinct on the Chinese mainland. However, 
while Chen viewed the natives’ ‘primitivism’ positively, in terms reminiscent of the 
Enlightenment European discourse of the ‘noble savage’, others evaluated the 
Taiwan indigenes’ lack of the attributes of civilization more negatively. Thus Lin 
Qianguang, visiting the island between 1687 and 1691 (shortly after the Qing 
conquest) opined: 
 
The native savages (tufan)…are a stupid people. They have no family names, no 
ancestral worship, and apart from their own father and mother, they do not 
recognize [kin such as] paternal or maternal uncles. They are unfamiliar with the 
calendar. Moreover, they do not know their own ages. By nature they like to kill 
people. (quoted in Teng 2004: 68) 
 
Besides disagreement over whether the natives should be civilized, there was 
also disagreement over whether they could be, with some echoing Ding Shaoyi in 
arguing for their civilizability and others urging that their inherent savagery meant 
that they should be kept segregated and, when necessary, ruthlessly suppressed. 
Those, like Ding, who took the former position argued very much in terms of a 
Chinese civilizing mission vis-à-vis the indigenous Taiwanese. However, most 
recognized a distinction between the more civilizable ‘cooked’ (shu) tribes of the 
plains, and the more savage and hostile ‘raw’ (sheng) mountain tribes. After a 
period of aggressive colonization under the Yongzheng Emperor in the early 
eighteenth century, until the late nineteenth century the policy of the Qing regime 
in Taiwan was, by and large, to attempt to confine the ‘raw’ tribes to their 
mountain fastnesses, also keeping Chinese settlers as far as possible away from 
these regions while encouraging the cultural assimilation of all aborigines. 12 
Meanwhile, as Teng shows, both written and pictorial portrayals of Taiwan’s 
indigenous tribes – raw and cooked – pandered to a taste amongst Chinese 
readers for the shocking and exotic. Chinese audiences were presented with 
images of bloodthirsty headhunters, quaint native farmers, and exotically-attired, 
alluringly uninhibited native females (though scope for the expression of female 
                                                 
12
 Teng argues that the continuation of efforts to assimilate the Taiwanese aborigines 
indicates that their case does not entirely fit the model of multinational governance 
developed by the Qing during the Qianlong period whereby the regime sought both to 
codify rigid ethno-cultural boundaries between its various key ‘constituencies’ (Manchu, 
Han, Uygur, Mongol, Tibetan) in pursuit of a divide-and-rule strategy, and an ideal of 
universal emperorship (Crossley 1999). In Teng’s view, Taiwan was simply peripheral to 
this project. 
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sexuality was regarded, in Victorian style, as inversely proportional to the ‘level’ of 
civilization achieved by any society). 
   Nonetheless, Taiwan remained relatively peripheral to official and popular 
consciousness under the Qing until the late nineteenth century when, as in other 
frontier regions, foreign threats, internal disorder, and population pressure in 
‘China proper’ led to increased Han immigration and programmes of Sinicization; 
what Millward (1998) has termed the ‘domestication of empire’ ( quoted in Teng 
2004: 246). Ironically, Taiwan’s loss to Japan in the 1890s came as the island 
was only just beginning to be regarded as an integral part of Chinese territory. 
During the 1870s, an early ‘self-strengthening’ official, Shen Baozhen, had 
initiated a campaign to ‘Open the Mountains and Pacify the Savages’ (kaishan 
fufan) – an initiative prompted by tensions with the Japanese over an incident in 
which aborigines had massacred Japanese mariners shipwrecked on the 
southeastern coast of Taiwan. Another self-strengthener, Liu Mingchuan, was 
sent to Taiwan during the French naval blockade of 1884-1885 in order to bolster 
the island’s defenses (he began a modernization of the infrastructure and the 
economy, and a sweeping reform of the administrative structure); this crisis led to 
Taiwan’s promotion to provincial status in 1887. The Qing had realized that 
unless it reinforced its control over Taiwan, and its claim to the entire island 
(including those areas inhabited by the ‘raw’ indigenous tribes), then other powers 
would seek to challenge its jurisdiction. 
   On the frontiers of their empire, the Qing were thus energetic participants in the 
late nineteenth-century global scramble for colonies – though in their case this 
involved a drive to fend off ‘scrambling’ foreign powers by ‘domesticating’ 
previously conquered but not fully assimilated territories. Given the creaking state 
of the Qing regime by this period, the success of the ‘self-strengthening’ 
colonialists is remarkable, though the continuing integrity of the Empire was, as in 
the case of Ottoman Turkey (before its disastrous alliance with the Central 
Powers in the Great War), largely due to a stand-off amongst the stronger, 
primarily European, imperial powers. Taiwan was one of very few Qing territories 
lost to the post-imperial Chinese state (the other being Outer Mongolia). 
However, as Teng indicates in the title to her study, perhaps the most significant 
shift in Taiwan’s status occurred in the imaginative rather than the administrative 
or even demographic realms; the loss of Taiwan in the 1890s assumed a 
symbolic importance for a generation of modernizing intellectuals who were just 
beginning to define a ‘Chinese’ nation. This importance was hugely reinforced 
after 1949 when the Kuomintang made the island its ‘base for the recovery of the 
mainland’ (fuxing jidi), since both sides in the Chinese Civil War ‘promoted the 
historically inaccurate contention that Taiwan has been “a part of China” since 
antiquity and effectively erased the rich history of the Qing colonization of the 
island’ (Teng 2004: 248). Chinese nationalist discourse has effectively 
‘naturalized the idea that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s sovereign 
territory’, and the success of this discourse, Teng argues, ‘can be measured by 
the disappearance from the Chinese collective memory of the pre-Qing conviction 
that Taiwan was “beyond the pale”’ (2004: 248). 
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Japanese Rule and the Definition of Taiwan’s Colonial Experience  
 
The weakness of any collective memory of the experience of Qing colonization is 
evident in much of the scholarship that deals with Taiwan’s colonization by the 
Japanese. It isn’t that those who write about Japanese colonialism are unaware 
of the previous history of Taiwan, or of the fact that Chinese settlers had been 
gradually displacing the aboriginal population over the three hundred years prior 
to the arrival of the Japanese. It is that this process is implicitly deemed irrelevant 
to any account of ‘colonialism’ in Taiwan, and the idea that it should be 
incorporated into analyses of the colonial experience on the island simply does 
not occur to many historians – whether Western, Japanese, Taiwanese, or 
Chinese. 
   Why is this? Assumptions that colonialism is a primarily ‘Western’ phenomenon 
have undoubtedly helped to blind many to the possibility of a Chinese variant. As 
noted above, nationalist assertions of Taiwan’s immemorial inseparability from 
the ‘motherland’ preclude any acknowledgement of Chinese colonialism, and the 
crucial role of the national struggle against Japan in forging a modern Chinese 
identity has contributed to a focus on Japanese colonialism. Meanwhile, many 
who assert a distinct identity for the island and its inhabitants have portrayed ‘the 
Taiwanese’ as a people oppressed by a succession of essentially alien regimes 
(Qing, Japanese, KMT and – so far remotely – the CCP); to them, any suggestion 
of a historical role for the Taiwanese themselves as practitioners as well as 
victims of ‘colonialism’ seems grotesque. Moreover, while there has been 
considerable discussion of the history of Japanese colonialism, many Japanese 
scholars engaged in critical research in this field have tended to hail from a 
somewhat ‘leftist’ political position, and have been motivated in part by a desire to 
heighten consciousness of the iniquities of Japan’s imperial past. Relativizing 
Japanese colonialism in Taiwan by pointing to the previous record of Chinese 
colonialism could potentially undermine this agenda – there may be an element of 
‘Japanocentric’ thinking in operation, whereby, to paraphrase Ching, radical anti-
Japanocentrism turns out to be the ultimate consolidation of Japanocentrism. The 
sort of Western anti-colonial (or post-colonial) discourse criticized by Ching thus 
ends up being reflected or ‘refracted’ by Japanese scholars as they come to 
terms with their nations own colonial legacy. 
   One fascinating recent contribution to the literature on Taiwan’s experience 
under Japanese colonial rule is Refracted Modernity, edited by Yuko Kikuchi 
(2007), in which a number of Taiwanese and Japanese scholars analyze various 
aspects of the relationship between ‘visual culture’ and identity. The contributors 
to this volume are interested in the ways in which Taiwan’s initial encounter with 
(Western) modernity was ‘refracted’ through a Japanese prism, as Japan tried to 
reinvent itself as an ‘advanced’ nation in an era when a key indicator of 
‘advancement’ was the possession of a colonial empire. The work of Chen Pei-
feng (2006) on language policy on Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period 
likewise explores the role of Japanese colonialism in ‘modernizing’ Taiwan and 
the ‘Taiwanese’, the complex responses (from collaboration through to outright 
resistance) that this project elicited amongst the Han Chinese population of the 
island, and the implications for both Taiwanese and Japanese identities. If Japan 
was the key vector for modernity in early twentieth-century Taiwan, the project of 
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modernizing the island was itself part of the process of constructing a new 
Japanese identity. Shao-li Lu’s 2005 study of the portrayal of Taiwan and the 
Taiwanese in Japanese exhibitions during the colonial period, Exhibiting Taiwan 
(Zhanshi Taiwan) reinforces this point, showing how particularly the aborigines, 
but to some extent also the Han Taiwanese, were exoticised and displayed as 
beneficiaries of Japan’s civilizing mission. A number of propagandists for Japan’s 
colonial mission preferred to overlook or ignore the very presence of the Chinese 
population, uncomfortably similar as they were to the Japanese in their culture 
and ‘level’ of development, finding instead in the aborigines the primitive ‘Other’ in 
juxtaposition to which images of Japanese modernity could be constructed 
(Shimazu 2007)13 Japanese anthropologists studied and classified the aborigines, 
and the colonial museum established in Taipei devoted itself almost exclusively to 
the collection and study of artifacts relating to the indigenous tribes and the 
Japanese settler community. In addition to assisting in the construction of a 
discourse of Japanese modernity, the depiction of Taiwan as an island inhabited 
by a scattering of ‘savage’ hunter-gatherers implicitly bolstered the legitimacy of 
Japan’s claims to the island, constructing an image of the territory as essentially 
terra nullius prior to the Japanese colonization. 
   However, as we have seen, the arrival of ‘modern’ Japanese colonialism on 
Taiwan was in fact preceded by what looks very like a Chinese form of ‘early 
modern’ colonialism, and it was on the foundations left by the Qing that the edifice 
of Japan’s ‘model colony’ was constructed. In the 1890s, the father of Japanese 
anthropology in Taiwan, Inō Kanori, ‘compared the conquest of the Japanese 
northeast by the Yamato people [a term used to represent the ethnic Japanese] 
with the conquest of Taiwan by the Han Chinese’ (Wu 2001: 48). In Taiwan, the 
Japanese took up where the Qing had left off; Inō, for example, applied the Qing 
distinction between the ‘raw’ and the ‘cooked’ aborigines in his analysis of the 
indigenous tribes. The sort of stereotypical depictions of Taiwan’s inhabitants 
highlighted by Lu in his examination of Japan’s exhibitionary practices had clear 
precursors in the exoticization of the aborigines by Qing travel writers. As Ching 
notes (2001), the Japanese even adapted a classic parable of the Qing civilizing 
mission for the purposes of their own colonial propaganda: ‘The Story of Gohō’ 
(or of ‘Wu Fang’), which tells how an upright Qing official persuaded an aboriginal 
tribe to abandon headhunting (in some versions of the tale, he does so by 
adopting a disguise and allowing himself to by martyred at the hands of the 
aborigines, who then abandon their savage practice in shame upon discovering 
the identity of their victim). For Ching, though, it is the Japanese retelling of this 
story, rather than the Qing original, that is significant as an instance of colonial 
political socialization. The ‘colonial’ nature of Qing rule is acknowledged in 
                                                 
13
 Shimazu notes how the journalist Tokutomi Sohō focused on the Japanese settlers 
(naichijin) in Taiwan as well as the aborigines (banjin), but practically ignored the existence 
of the Hoklo population (hontojin). Like a number of contemporary Japanese writers and 
artists, Tokutomi saw the colonial enterprise as both symbolic of, and tonic for, the national 
virility – but (partly for this very reason) he was ambivalent about efforts to ‘civilize’ the 
banjin, depicting them as noble savages whose way of life ought to be respected and 
preserved (whereas, one presumes, he attached little value to the effete lifestyle of the 
hontojin). 
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passing, but Taiwan’s early modern history of ‘becoming Chinese’ is otherwise 
almost entirely ignored as the spotlight is turned on its modern history of 
‘Becoming Japanese’. 
 
Remembering Colonialism and Oppression in Contemporary Taiwan  
 
As noted above, the period since the mid-1990s, and especially since the DPP 
victory in the presidential election of 2000, has witnessed a huge increase in the 
curricular and exhibitionary space accorded to Taiwanese history and culture. The 
history of both Japanese and – particularly – Dutch colonial rule has been 
appropriated by the ‘Green’ camp as part of their efforts to distinguish Taiwan 
from China (see Vickers 2007; 2008). In DPP rhetoric, the KMT have also been 
ranked alongside other oppressors of the ‘native’ Taiwanese (meaning the Hoklo 
majority) through the memorialization of the 28 February Incident of 1947 and the 
White Terror of the following years. 14  Great emphasis has been placed on 
Taiwan’s aboriginal heritage, and on anthropological research that suggests 
strong links between the indigenous tribes and the ‘Malay-Polynesian’ indigenes 
of the South Pacific and parts of South-east Asia. However, the history of tension 
and conflict between Taiwan’s aborigines and the Hoklo majority, let alone any 
depiction of the latter as colonizers, has been as absent from officially-sponsored 
‘Green’ discourse on the Taiwanese past as it was from KMT narratives that 
represented Taiwan as an inseparable part of China from time immemorial. 
   The shift in official discourse from portraying Taiwan as a peripheral segment of 
a unified Chinese polity (as under the KMT) to constructing a Taiwanese identity 
distinct from China (as the DPP regime sought to do) has contributed to, and 
reflected, changes in society and culture at the popular level.15 However, while a 
political gulf separates the Chinese nationalist and Taiwanese nationalist visions 
of the island’s history and identity, the ‘Blue’ (or deep Blue) and ‘Green’ 
conceptions of history and identity underlying these visions are in some respects 
rather similar.16 Both view history as a moralizing narrative reflecting the essential 
characteristics of the nation; characteristics that can be traced back into the mists 
of time. The histories of both China and Taiwan have been depicted in official 
school textbooks as manifesting the morally superior ‘essences’ of these nations 
(e.g. China has always been peace-loving in its relations with its neighbours; 
                                                 
14
 The 28 February Incident of 1947 refers to a brutal crackdown on the part of KMT 
authorities on the island, following riots against the oppressive and corrupt nature of KMT 
rule sparked by the beating of a female cigarette seller in Taipei by KMT officials. 
15
 These include demographic changes, such as the evolution of mainlander identities that 
has accompanied the dying off of the post-war generation of immigrants from the mainland, 
and the rise of two generations of mainlanders who acknowledge both ‘Taiwanese’ and 
‘Chinese’ roots (see Corcuff 2004). In the late 1990s, Lee Teng-hui argued for an inclusive 
‘New Taiwanese’ identity based on a sense of belonging to the island – though such an 
approach arguably seeks to raze the historical foundations of Taiwanese identity – rather 
than actually engaging with the rival historical narratives. 
16
 ‘Blue’ here refers to the Kuomintang or Chinese nationalist camp, and ‘Green’ refers to 
the Democratic Progressive Party and other pro-independence political forces. 
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Taiwan has always been an open and tolerant society). 17  Having staked a 
historical claim to the moral high ground, both the old Chinese and the new 
Taiwanese nationalist narratives go on to portray the nation as an innocent 
outrageously violated by, in the former case, Western and Japanese imperialists 
(or, further back, by ‘barbarians’ of other descriptions) and, in the latter case, by 
various alien rulers, from the Dutch and the Qing to the Japanese and the KMT. 
One historian sympathetic to the Green camp, commenting on the way in which 
some pro-independence figures distort history to serve their cause, has remarked 
that ‘They take the word Zhongguo and replace it with the word Taiwan’ (quoted in 
Vickers 2009: 96). 
   The protagonists – or the violated innocents – of the ‘Green’ narrative of Taiwan 
history are, first and foremost, the Hoklo settlers and their descendants; this is the 
group generally referenced by the phrase ‘native Taiwanese’ (benturen, or the old 
Japanese hontojin). The aborigines and their culture and symbols, largely ignored 
under the KMT up to the 1990s, have been given particular prominence in DPP 
representations of Taiwan, as produced both for domestic and overseas 
consumption. For Taiwanese nationalists, as for Japanese colonialists, emphasis 
on the island’s aboriginal heritage serves the purpose of distancing Taiwan 
historically, culturally, and racially from ‘China’; moreover, the persistence of a 
fundamentally biological conception of nationhood has been reflected in some 
attempts to emphasize or exaggerate the degree of miscegenation between the 
aboriginal and bentu communities (Vickers 2009). Depictions of the aborigines in 
Taiwanese museums, school textbooks and official publications have focused on 
culture and ethnography rather than history, thus almost entirely omitting any 
account of past conflict between Chinese settlers and indigenous tribespeople. 
Some museum curators have explained this on the grounds that aboriginal 
records (particularly written records) from which such a history could be 
reconstructed simply do not exist (Vickers 2009) – a line of argument that echoes 
Margery Perham’s assertion in 1951 that Africa was ‘without writing and so 
without history’ (Youe 2007). As Teng’s work demonstrates, however, the Chinese 
records do supply ample material with which to reconstruct the history of Qing 
colonization. 
 
Conclusion 
 
However much the use – or abuse – of history in contemporary Taiwanese 
politics may be criticized, it should be borne in mind that in Taiwan, in contrast to 
mainland China, debate over history and identity can be conducted in relative 
freedom, and views critical of official discourse can be openly expressed. This 
very freedom means that there exists an opportunity for Taiwan to contribute to 
an important rebalancing of perceptions of the Chinese past, and of the role of 
colonialism in the formation of the modern Chinese polity (or polities). In 
                                                 
17
 Both narratives – though most obviously the Taiwanese one – involve an anachronistic 
projection backwards of present identities. Thus the term ‘Taiwanese’ is often used in 
accounts of society or culture on the island relating to times when any consciousness of a 
distinctively  ‘Taiwanese’ identity was weak or absent. One example of this is the chapter 
by Chao-ching Fu on ‘Taiwanese’ architecture under Japanese colonial rule (Fu 2007). 
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reassessing this legacy, it may be worth bearing in mind Osterhammel’s (2005: 
28) contention that ‘the history of colonialisms is…not only – perhaps not even 
chiefly – a history of conquest, acquisition and flag-hoisting. It is a history of the 
gradual emergence of state structures and societal forms and their geographic 
expansion or contraction within nominally claimed regions’. 
   Taiwan sits on the eastern boundary of a Chinese state that, in the early twenty-
first century, occupies a larger proportion of those regions to which it asserts a 
‘nominal claim’ than almost any of its predecessors. Taiwanese politicians keen to 
demonstrate their determination to preserve the island’s autonomy from China’s 
communist regime have been quick to draw comparisons between their situation 
and that of other regions on the Chinese periphery. The March 2008 presidential 
election in Taiwan coincided with mass protests by Tibetans across Western 
China, prompting the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, to declare, ‘Taiwan is not 
Tibet…we are an independent country’ (CNN.com 2008). Ma’s comment aimed to 
reassure voters that he and the KMT could be trusted to protect Taiwan’s 
autonomy from Beijing. However, looked at historically, Taiwan and Tibet do have 
this in common: their links with China are products of the unprecedented 
expansion of the Qing era, and both can be represented as instances of Chinese 
colonialism, albeit in rather different forms. Whereas Tibet resembles a classic 
colony of conquest, Taiwan appears much more similar to a colony of settlement 
of the kind established by the British in North America or Australia. Meanwhile, 
the sorts of assmilationist policies pursued by the Chinese authorities in Taiwan 
and elsewhere on China’s Qing-bequeathed periphery, through education and 
cultural policy, are reminiscent more of the very self-conscious French and Soviet 
missions civilatrices. 
   Pointing to this record of colonialism in Taiwan or Tibet does not imply a 
demand that China simply drop all claims to sovereignty over either region. Nor, 
though, is recognition of China’s colonial record of purely academic significance – 
as one more example of colonialism to file in the historical catalogue, thus helping 
to further our understanding of this phenomenon. This academic contribution is 
undoubtedly important, but, as Teng argues, more so is the way in which the 
study of Qing imperialism/colonialism ‘destabilizes the dichotomy between the 
West/colonizers and the non-West/colonized, a dichotomy that has largely 
continued to structure our commonsense perception of global power 
configurations and cultural differences well past the end of formal imperial rule’ 
(Teng 2004: 258). Ching’s analysis of Japanese efforts to ‘Japanize’ Taiwan 
espouses a similar objective, but in studies of colonialism Japan has widely been 
treated as the exception that proves the rule regarding the ‘Western’ nature of 
colonialism. Teng’s study, and those of Perdue and Millward, undermine this 
assumption far more radically and fundamentally, and remind us that in the case 
of Taiwan, colonization has been a drama in which the ‘native Taiwanese’ of 
Hoklo and Hakka descent have played the role of ‘oppressor’ as well as that of 
‘oppressed’. 
   This undermining is important in its turn not simply because it may make guilt-
ridden Western (ex-) colonialists feel a bit better about themselves. Its greatest 
contribution would be if it were to prompt a move in Chinese – and to a lesser 
extent Taiwanese – nationalist discourse away from a relentless dwelling upon 
victimhood that tends to feed a chauvinist and sometimes hysterically xenophobic 
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worldview (as witnessed most recently in the popular reaction amongst many 
Chinese to demonstrations in several Western countries against the global torch 
relay for the Beijing Olympics). The depiction of Han Chinese in general, or 
Taiwan’s Chinese settlers in particular, as a ‘subaltern’ category in studies of East 
Asian colonialism has fed a mythology of victimhood that distorts identities and 
relationships in the present.18 It is perhaps salutary to remind ourselves that this 
critique of the construction of such mythologies around idealized ethnic groups, 
defined in a totalizing and homogenous manner, could be extended – as 
Sautman (2008) suggests – even to groups such as Tibetan independence 
campaigners.19 However, Sautman’s derision of the latter, along with advocates 
of Kosovan or Taiwanese independence, simply as ‘ethnic political 
entrepreneurs’, appears somewhat excessive. Chauvinism tends to breed 
chauvinism; when dominant majorities in diverse states seek to define the nation 
in terms of their particular community’s unique civilizational attributes, then 
minorities that do not choose to identify with such definitions of ‘civilization’ may 
seek to challenge the majority on its own terms, by asserting or inventing 
identities of their own.20 There is much talk in the contemporary People’s Republic 
of ‘multiculturalism’, and a longstanding discourse that attempts to depict China 
as an egalitarian community of ethnic groups. However, a sense of Han identity 
premised on assumptions of superiority (moral and cultural), a deeply-ingrained 
sense of ‘manifest destiny’ and civilizing mission in relation to non-Han regions, 
along with a conviction of colonial victimhood on the part of the Han that blinds 
them to the very colonial nature of their own civilizing mission, continue to poison 
relations between key communities within the modern Chinese state. As Perdue 
(2005: 565) suggests, a more balanced and clear-eyed view of the Qing record of 
conquest and colonization ‘may offer some guidance to Chinese interested in 
negotiating a new identity for their nation in the twenty-first century’. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 The broader point could be made that distinctions between a colonial elite and the 
‘subaltern’ colonized, while valid up to a point, are almost always overly simplistic – even 
within colonial societies, hegemonic or exploitative relationships almost always exist not 
only between an ‘alien’ elite and the ‘indigenous’ population, but across and within both the 
‘colonizing’ and ‘colonized’ communities. 
19
 However, to argue, as Sautman does, that China’s rule of Tibet is not an instance of 
colonialism, because it has produced winners as well as losers amongst the indigenous 
community, is patently absurd. As Ronald Robinson has argued, colonial rule is essentially 
a collaborative enterprise that relies for its sustainability on precisely on its capacity to 
provide indigenous elites with reasons for working with the colonial regime, rather than 
against it. 
20
 As Harrison (2001, 51) points out, the ‘colonized’ aboriginal population in Taiwan, like 
colonial peoples elsewhere, were not simply passive victims of the colonization process, 
but were also ‘protagonists in the drama of their own identity’, just as the Taiwanese 
‘benturen’ have so emphatically shown themselves to be in recent years. 
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Margaret Hillenbrand (2007) Literature, Modernity, and the Practice of 
Resistance: Japanese and Taiwanese Fiction, 1960-1990. Leiden and Boston: 
Brill, 357pp, ISBN 978-9-0041-5478-0 
 
Western scholarship on East Asian literature tends to fall into two categories: 
nation-specific literary studies that focus on literature that is written in a single, 
‘national’ language, and comparative studies that tend to examine a given East 
Asian national literature in conjunction with that of Western literatures, particularly 
English, French, or German. There may be some exceptions to this rule, but, as 
Margaret Hillenbrand writes in her pioneering treatment of East Asian literature as 
an ‘intraregional’ phenomenon, they are hard to find,  and the intellectual terrain is 
deeply impoverished as a result. Hillenbrand bills her book as ‘the first extended 
attempt to apply notions of an intraregional episteme to the discipline of 
contemporary East Asian comparative literature” (299) (in English, at least), and it 
is difficult to argue with her. Her study focuses on contemporary literary events in 
Taiwan and Japan and, undeniably, there is no other book thus far in English that 
does that. In addition to her overarching analysis of these contemporary literary 
phenomena, Hillenbrand makes no bones about her critique both of ‘Eurocentric’ 
comparative literature, which she argues subjugates the simple case studies of 
East Asian literature to universal theories that never venture beyond the 
theory/application paradigm, and Sinological or Japanological approaches, which 
remain ensconced within the tight confines of the nation-state. She also observes 
that other academic fields, such as political science, history, and sociology, have 
already tended toward more regionalist models; it is literary studies that remains 
within the ‘sealed off’ (15) spaces of the nation-state. Thus, her book, if the 
argument stands the test of scrutiny (and I believe with some qualifications it 
does), is a challenge to conventional approaches as we know and practice them. 
   By asserting that geographical parameters transcend those typical of a study 
narrowly focused on Chinese or Japanese literature, Hillenbrand promises to 
chart a new ‘porous’ cultural field (16) which exhibits an easy commerce of 
cultural artifacts such as music, film, and, indeed, literature across borders. She 
also sees the East Asian crescent as emblematic of some general historical 
trends, the most important of which is the post-war emergence of economic 
prowess that constitutes Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. But unlike contemporary 
thinkers such as Tu Wei-ming, who have argued the beneficial sides of a 
modernity informed by what he terms New Confucianism, the results of 
Hillenbrand’s research indicate that contemporary intellectuals in Japan and 
Taiwan generally cast a jaundiced eye upon this new-found wealth and 
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consumerism in their societies. The texts she deals with tend to be ‘dystopian’ 
(54) visions of highly suspect state orthodoxies. The authors generally disparage 
what they consider overbearing and self-perpetuating regimes that do not 
necessarily have the best interests of ordinary individuals at heart. Furthermore, 
she identifies a broad resentment toward sinocentrism in East Asia that has had 
the ironic effect of a backlash leading to such things as the search for a 
Taiwanese identity, resistance to Kuomintang (KMT) efforts at re-Sinicization 
(80), the Japanese ‘obsession’ with cultural purity (74), and a ‘natural’ affinity 
developing between Japan and Taiwan. She takes the period of roughly 1960-
1990 for her historical frame, a time during which the ‘Pax Americana’ (a period of 
relative peace under the umbrella of US military and diplomatic protection) 
reigned high and economic development burned more furiously with each passing 
year. The 30-year span is a manageable ‘generational’ delimitation, she argues, 
and the cut-off date of 1990 coincides fairly closely with the ‘great divide’ (a term 
borrowed from Yvonne Chang) caused by the 1987 lifting of martial law in Taiwan 
and the bursting of the Japanese economic bubble and defeat of the country’s 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the early 1990s. 
   Three themes structure the more substantive chapters of Hillenbrand’s book: 
US geopolitical hegemony, the breakdown of traditional kinship patterns, and the 
emergence of commodified society. In addition, she perceives two leitmotifs – or 
tropes, as she occasionally calls them – pervading all the works under 
consideration: the image of the city and the fascination with sexuality. The city 
becomes, in some cases, more than a mere tableau on which social issues are 
worked out among characters, but a character itself in the texts. Sexuality, the 
second trope, is seldom portrayed in alluring ways. What is most remarkable 
about human relations, she shows, is the profound lack of affect, the disavowal of 
reproductive sexuality, the rarity of desire, and the combination, in some cases, of 
sexuality with suffering, violence and death that is prevalent in different ways in a 
broad range of texts. The selection of authors and texts is reasonably broad: in 
addition to the passing mention of two dozen major authors, Hillenbrand centers 
her treatment on the analysis of twelve authors, six each from Japan and from 
Taiwan: Mishima Yukio, Nosaka Akiyuki, Oe Kenzaburo, Murakami Ryu, 
Murakami Haruki, Yoshimoto Banana, Bai Xianyong, Wang Wenxing, Huang 
Chunming, Wang Zhenhe, Li Ang, and Zhu Tianwen. Hillenbrand takes pains to 
note that this group of authors is not monolithic and that they are sufficiently 
diverse and distinguishable from one another in a variety of ways, so that they 
form a useful cross-section of literary expression during the period under 
discussion. The Japanese authors do in fact vary greatly in age, and the authors 
from Taiwan are ethnically diverse (ie. benshengren ‘native Taiwanese’ and 
waishengren ‘mainlanders’ are both represented), but she does not believe there 
is as large a generational gap between the Taiwanese authors. I would tend to 
disagree with that. 
   The articulation of her approach and the outline of the scope of her inquiry 
occupy fully the first third of the book. This is followed by three chapters which 
each delve into the specific investigation of a few select literary works. These 
chapters are, respectively, ‘Rest and Recreation in the City’, ‘Discord at Home: 
The Ruptured Family in Postwar Fiction’, and ‘Sex and the City: Commodities of 
Choice’. A short conclusion ends the book. Chapter Two (‘Rest and Recreation’) 
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looks at five works that use perversions of sexuality, themes of miscegenation, 
and various forms of fetishization to subject the US’s relationship with East Asian 
client states to harsh scrutiny. Marukami Ryu’s narratives of ‘base-town fiction’, 
for example, suggest how someone young and impressionable who has grown up 
in such an environment would naturally acquire a rather perverted view of 
relations with the opposite sex, and, for that matter, the role of one’s own country 
in connection to them. His work uses pimping as a metaphor for the geopolitics of 
post-war Japan and often contains sexual humbling of the Japanese male. The 
theme of interracial relations in Oe Kenzaburo’s work allows for certain ironies, 
such as the physically overbearing American GI coaching the diminutive 
Japanese in the art of how to be a good patriot. Nosaka Akiyuki’s depiction of 
Toshio, and his family’s welcoming of the Higginses into their home, conceives of 
Tokyo as the body of a prostitute where the Higgins patriarch out-drinks and out-
whores Toshio on his own turf. The elision of collusion with the semi-colonial 
power and pimping is echoed in the work of Huang Chunming who adds to it the 
fetishization of traditional Chinese culture in the attempt to attract American GIs 
on leave from the Vietnam War. Wang Zhenhe fixes his gaze on rural Taiwan and 
its harlotization, as the native characters are depicted as mouthing a patois of 
gibberish that includes Mandarin, English, and Taiwanese. 
   The third chapter relates for the reader several representations of the 
disintegrating family in East Asia and in the process examines how the city is set 
up as a portmanteau for this disintegration. In comparing texts from Japan and 
Taiwan, Hillenbrand is careful not to be too schematic or unreflective in the 
associations she makes. For instance, she notes that the background theme of 
Confucianism works to a point in Japan but cannot be taken to an extreme, given 
historical permutations. Nevertheless, she simultaneously demonstrates how the 
‘miracle’ growth of Japan and Taiwan has an underside, which is the destructive 
effect that unchecked economic expansion has had on these two societies. In 
Wang Wenxing’s short story ‘Mother’, for example, the entire affective bond 
between mother and son has evaporated and been replaced by an eroticization 
clearly unwelcome to the son. In Bai Xianyong’s novel The Outcasts (better 
known in English as Crystal Boys), the city is portrayed as the dumping ground of 
modernity in which the characters search for new surrogate forms of kinship 
bonds. Bai Xianyong, she argues, has dealt a death blow to the KMT’s attempt to 
revive traditionalism as a cohesive social bond. The image of the city in Murakami 
Ryu’s bizarre ‘Coin Locker Babies’ is depicted as beyond anthropomorphic and in 
fact borderline supernatural. And Yoshimoto Banana’s equally alienating text 
concocts an uncanny mixture of ‘estranged otherness’ and ‘sugary optimism’ 
(219). In the midst of all this urban malaise, the image of the child as victim is 
etched for the reader in a wide array of texts as a symbol of the nation’s failings 
and thus operates both on the private and the public levels. 
   Hillenbrand’s final chapter, on the commodification of sex in Japan and 
Taiwan’s urban culture, provides copious examples of how escalating commodity 
fetishism and hyper-consumption is combined with an equally virulent depletion of 
normal libidinal forces. Sex in the city does exist, but not in the form one might 
care to imagine. Rather, it is more often than not portrayed as another dimension 
to the obsession with material products and their possession. She begins her 
discussion of texts in this chapter with an analysis of Mishima Yukio’s ‘The Million 
90   BOOK REVIEWS 
 
 
Yen Rice Crackers’. Few authors can as poignantly dissect the parvenus or 
‘crossbreeds’ (261) of consumer culture as Mishima. She continues her argument 
with an important re-reading of Murakami Haruki’s Dance, Dance, Dance. Her 
interpretation is far more cognizant of the way the invasion of capital is inevitable 
and all-consuming than Murakami’s critics have given him credit for. In fact, one 
of the valuable insights of Hillenbrand’s book for someone who is not an expert 
on Japan is the way she reads against the established receptions of some of the 
most contemporary of Japanese authors such as the two Murakamis and 
Yoshimoto Banana. Sexuality itself has become nothing more than a commodity 
in these works, and Hillenbrand demonstrates this in her reading of Li Ang’s Dark 
Nights and Zhu Tianwen’s ‘Red Rose is Paging You’. The former takes the dark 
metropolis of Taipei as its protagonist as much as any individual person; the latter 
exposes the vagaries of KTV (karaoke) and consumer culture, the ironic 
successors to soft totalitarianism. The majority of these works, with their tales of 
sexual trophies and the evaporation of desire, are deliberately de-eroticized. 
   Hillenbrand concludes her book by reminding us of its status as a path-breaking 
contribution, a work that moves beyond Western epistemological dominance. In 
quoting Rey Chow, one of her important forebears on this mission, Hillenbrand 
rightfully interrogates the presumption that nation-states with a national language 
are the only context in which one can set the parameters of a literary study. But 
she also distances herself from the authors under investigation and notes the 
most current trend of an all too complacent ‘habituation’ with a ‘fixed ontology of 
opposition’ (312). Authors will clearly need to continue to explore new terrains of 
dispossession if they are to hold her attention. 
   Literature, Modernity, and the Practice of Resistance is an important 
contribution to transnational studies of East Asian literatures and to the respective 
bodies of English-language scholarship on the literatures of Taiwan and Japan. 
Unquestionably, the nation-state has been an oppressive prism through which 
scholars have attempted to understand East Asian literatures, and comparative 
literature as a discipline to date has offered tepid relief from this predicament 
given the fact that little to none of it is, as Hillenbrand terms it, ‘intraregional’. 
Having said that, I am not convinced that those who focus on one nation or a 
group of authors or a movement within one national language, or a single author 
for that matter, are the avatars of myopia that Hillenbrand perhaps would have us 
believe. The example of Taiwan is a propos of this: it is perfectly legitimate, and I 
believe I do this in my own scholarship, to focus on one milieu and simultaneously 
raise serious questions about the notion of national identity. Indeed, one could 
assert, as I would, that the various regional Chinese languages themselves 
(which are often referred to as ‘dialects’, thus illustrating the intellectual anxiety 
directed at subregional cultures within a larger cultural Chinese umbrella) 
destabilize the notion of a monolithic national culture. One could work entirely 
within the Chinese discursive frame without embracing the view that China itself 
is a cohesive nation-state, let alone considering it in combination with Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. In other words, while Hillenbrand’s general point that the insight one 
can garner through intraregional comparative study is illuminating in 
unprecedented ways is well taken, it is not as absolutist as she would seem to 
argue. In fact, there are certain ways in which a focus on a single milieu can 
reveal things that the comparative study necessarily must gloss over. For 
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example, I am not an authority on Japanese fiction and thus cannot comment on 
it, but in the case of the Taiwanese examples, Hillenbrand fairly conventionally 
follows a canonical selection of authors. None of the authors she chooses to 
center on can be said to not be well-known in Western scholarship. To put it 
another way, the study could have been even more path-breaking had it 
highlighted some authors obscured by the forces that drive the canon – an author 
such as Ye Shitao or Zhong Zhaozheng would have sufficed. Conversely, the 
eschewal of national literatures, and particularly not pursuing connections with 
Chinese literature, can lead one to miss some important points. To wit, 
Hillenbrand quotes an interesting passage from Oe Kenzaburo depicting 
Japanese who mutely watch American GIs kill one of their own, but she fails to 
note that it is eerily similar to an infamous incident that Lu Xun relates in which 
Chinese watch the execution of compatriots by Japanese while staring blankly 
nearby (142). Finally, to take the radical extreme, the production of single author 
studies is also a field, especially in studies of contemporary Chinese literature, 
that generally has been avoided. To focus on such an inquiry would also help 
remove the shackles of intellectual discrimination placed upon East Asian cultural 
studies. For only with such detailed micro studies can we finally be placed on an 
equal footing with Western scholarship wherein single author treatments are 
taken for granted. 
   If we are to press Hillenbrand’s thesis to its logical conclusion, then a book such 
as this cannot be complete without a section on contemporary Korean literature. 
Korean literature is the gaping absence in a study of this magnitude. Now, to be 
fair, how easy is it for a Western scholar to master not two but three East Asian 
languages? Not easy to be sure. By the same token, there would be far more 
intraregional comparative literary studies if it were easier or less time consuming 
for one to even learn two East Asian languages, leaving aside the possibility of 
mastering a regional Chinese language or two. Other disciplines are different, 
because most do not require the highly advanced linguistic proficiency that 
literary studies do, given the fact that our primary data are found precisely in 
language itself, and often the most challenging of linguistic media. In other words, 
I am persuaded by Hillenbrand that there are some serious problems with the 
ways Sinology and Japanology (not to mention comparative literature) are set up, 
problems that militate against the kind of expansive study that she has produced. 
But hopefully beginning with Hillenbrand and her generation there will be more 
support in the West for those who would like to pursue this sort of comparative 
research. This support must necessarily include efforts to train scholars in two or 
even three Asian languages. But this will never spell the end of scholars who 
focus solely on one East Asian tradition. 
   Finally, a few small points. It is wonderful that the book includes a Chinese 
character and kanji glossary. I was a bit mystified as to why there was no subject 
index. That does make it difficult to locate the occurrence of similar themes in 
different texts. I also wondered why the book title used the word ‘resistance’ when 
this was not actually addressed in the book. Resistance implies direct 
confrontation but the book presents the literary examples in it as enacting 
something more akin to subversion or impugnment rather than resistance. I 
commend the attention that Hillenbrand pays to the theme of filial piety, especially 
in the texts from Taiwan. What I wish she had done, since her references are 
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generally so thorough, is to have cited the important articles by James Shu and 
me that address the theme of filial piety in the work of Wang Wenxing, an integral 
author to her study. Finally, I would like to point out that the book is extremely well 
written and articulate. Hillenbrand has a way of finding the precise word or 
expression for any situation. Structurally speaking, however, I found the vast first 
chapter that lays out the scope of the rest of the volume to be stultifying in length 
and shaped much more like a dissertation than a book. These criticisms aside, 
Margaret Hillenbrand has given us here a very important book that indeed is path 
breaking in its comparison of Taiwan and Japanese literary practice. In allowing 
us to examine the works of each tradition in conjunction with those of the other, it 
offers insights unavailable to us when we are solely immersed in one of those 
traditions. Her mastery of the material is impressive and her conclusions are 
enriching. 
 
Christopher Lupke 
Washington State University 
 
 
David Wang and Carlos Rojas (eds) (2006) Writing Taiwan: A New Literary 
History. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 424pp, 978-0-8223-3851-2 
 
 
Writing Taiwan, edited by David Wang and Carlos Rojas, is a very worthy addition 
to the former’s impressive bibliography of work on literature in Chinese and a 
most valuable contribution to scholarship and criticism of modern writing in his 
native Taiwan. It includes chapters by the editors as well as by Yomi Braester, 
Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, Fangming Chen, Xiaobing Tang, Michelle Yeh, 
Fenghuang Ying and others on a range of literature – mainly fiction – in twentieth 
century Taiwan (mostly since 1949). The chapters are arranged under the 
headings ‘1. The limits of Taiwan literature’, ‘2. Cultural politics’, ‘3. History, truth 
and textual artifice’ and ‘4. Spectral topographies and circuits of desire’ and 
preceded by a Preface and Introduction by the editors which define the major 
themes and methodologies. The glossary of Chinese characters and the index 
are well done; the former uses Hanyu Pinyin romanization, as does the entire 
text, with rather few mistakes. Rojas’ translations of original Chinese language 
chapters are very good. 
   The authors of the diverse chapters are united in presenting thoughtful 
treatments of Taiwan writing as literature, with little unnecessary reference to 
political concerns which do not impinge directly and objectively on literary 
production and consumption. The overall result is a book which illuminates culture 
in Taiwan and issues of global human culture in a way that is of huge value not 
only to students and scholars of literature in Chinese but also, potentially, to 
understanding of literature and culture across human cultures. 
   There are some minor mistakes: Fenghuang Ying would have us believe that 
Zhong Lihe ‘spent eight years wandering about mainland China’ (142). In fact he 
spent about three years in Mukden (Shenyang) and five in Peking, including 
some travels around Hebei as an interpreter for the (Japanese-controlled) North 
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China Economic Inspectorate. Ying also states in error that Lishan Nongchang 
was ‘Zhong’s only work set against…[the] backdrop [of Japanese colonial rule]’ 
(146). Indeed, Zhong wrote only a very few other works (short stories and essays) 
with that time setting and the extent to which he excludes the colonial experience 
from his opus is certainly remarkable, but the detail here is inaccurate. In this 
essay there is also one little problem in the translation from the Chinese: the title 
of the important story ‘Zhutouzhuang’ should be ‘Bamboo Village’ – ‘zhutou’ is 
Hakka for bamboo (147). In the Index, Zhong Lihe’s given name appears as Lei. 
   I must quibble with the book’s title and subtitle. I might have suggested Writing 
Modern Taiwan: Towards a New Literary History. The volume acknowledges here 
and there its own scant treatment of the colonial period, 1895-1945 (e.g. Lai He is 
mentioned in passing on page 69 only), but does not explain why the literature of 
Ming-Qing Taiwan is completely excluded. Essentially Writing Taiwan is a 
collection of essays almost exclusively on post-WWII Taiwan fiction; to justify the 
title it would need to include scholarship on the greater range of Taiwan literature 
from pre-Han settlement to the twenty-first century included in Wang Dewei’s 
(David Der-wei Wang) Chinese language anthology Taiwan: cong wenxue kan 
lishi (Taiwan: a history through literature, Taibei: Maitian, 2005). As to the subtitle, 
‘a history’ surely should be a monographic or comprehensive work, but the 
present volume makes no real pretence other than in this phrase on the front 
cover, and in the rather grandiloquent Preface and Introduction, to present a 
unified, definitive interpretation of a period or field. The subtitle tends to obscure 
the fact that the book arises out of a conference, a very fruitful meeting of minds 
in this instance, but falls some way short of a distillation of an entire branch of 
literature, showing some quite major omissions. Whether or not any such 
distillation is desirable is another question. For now, let us celebrate this 
important contribution to Taiwan literature studies. 
 
Tommy McClellan 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
Michael Rudolph (2003) Taiwans multi-ethnische Gesellschaft und die Bewegung 
der Ureinwohner: Assimilation oder kulturelle Revitalisierung? Münster, Hamburg 
and London: LIT Verlag. 477pp, ISBN: 978-3-8258-6828-4 
 
Peter Kulchyski (2007) The Red Indians: an Episodic, Informal Collection of Tales 
from the History of Aboriginal People’s Struggles in Canada. Winnipeg: Arbeiter 
Ring Publishing. 158pp, ISBN: 978-1-8940-3725-9 
 
In the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company 
established trading posts on Formosa and Manhattan. It was part of a historical 
process in which European countries expanded their influence throughout the 
world, built up trade networks, exploited natural resources, and established 
various types of colonial regimes. To some observers, such as Wallerstein, 
European expansionism gave birth to global capitalism, a new world system, or a 
process by which Europeans entered as new players into previously existing 
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trade networks (see Eric Wolf’s 1982 Europe and the People without History). In 
all continents, these actions changed local social relations and brought previously 
unrelated peoples into new relations with one another. These relations were often 
characterized by exploitation and inequality. The Austronesian peoples of 
Formosa subsequently lost their territory to the Dutch, the Manchurians, the 
Japanese, and eventually to the Republic of China. The Iroquois of Manhattan 
and beyond lost territory to the Dutch, the English, the French, and eventually to 
the United States and Canada.  
   In the second half of the twentieth century, after a war fought against the Nazi 
variant of racism, a global process of de-colonization took place. New countries 
were formed out of former colonies, but often one ethnic group continued to 
dominate other marginalized groups. This was the case on Formosa, where the 
Austronesians remained subaltern in relationship to the Chinese. In long-
independent settler colonies such as Canada, ‘Indians’ started demanding greater 
recognition of their sovereignty and rights. In the last two decades of the century, 
a global social movement united these disparate peoples under the identity of 
‘indigenous peoples’ (a process described in Ronald Niezen’s 2003 The Origins 
of Indigenism). With growing international recognition of collective human rights, 
new conventions were adapted, national laws were revised, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were established to promote indigenous 
rights. On 13 September 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples with 143 votes in favour, 4 against, 
and 11 abstentions. Amidst this global Zeitgeist, indigeneity has also become a 
new field of social scientific inquiry.  
   To date, the most detailed scholarly work in a European language on this global 
social movement on Formosa is Michael Rudolph’s (2003) Taiwans multi-
ethnische Gesellschaft und die Bewegung der Ureinwohner. This book stands out 
because of its focus on indigeneity as a social movement. The bibliography is 
impressive, and Rudolph deals seriously with the ideas of both Taiwanese and 
western scholars. He provides a strong, detailed history of the indigenous 
movement and a good ethnography of both Shuiyuan (水源) and Sandimen (三地
門). Without a doubt, this book should be in the library of all serious scholars of 
indigenous Formosa. Those who don’t read German can get the main theoretical 
argument from Rudolph’s many book chapters, but will miss out on a rich 
ethnography.  
   Strongly influenced by Taiwanese anthropologist Hsieh Shih-chung and his 
concept of Taiwan’s indigenous leaders as ‘elites without people’, Rudolph looks 
at the movement, its supporters, and the ‘ordinary people’ in Taroko and Paiwan 
villages. His argument is based on that of political scientist Paul Brass, who in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (Sage Publications, 1991) 
hypothesized that ‘ethnic self-consciousness, ethnically-based demands, and 
ethnic conflict can occur only if there is some conflict between indigenous and 
external elites and authorities or between indigenous elites’. Throughout the 
book, Taiwan’s indigenous peoples are referred to by the acronym YZM, for 
yuanzhumin (原住民 ). The ‘elites’ are the ‘KMT-loyal political YZM-elites’ 
(primarily public servants and elected officials) and ‘oppositional YZM-elites’ 
mostly affiliated with the Presbyterian Church. This choice of words draws 
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attention to the local dynamics of the movement rather than legitimizing their 
place in a global social movement. 
   Rudolph places these struggles in the context of Taiwan in the 1990s, when 
Taiwan was developing multi-cultural politics, Gemeinschaft and Taiwanese 
subjectivity (400). During this time, KMT-loyal elites and oppositional elites 
competed for resources in struggles over such issues as use of ethnic names, 
inclusion of indigenous rights in the constitution, legal autonomy, and language 
instruction. The KMT-elite were more inclined toward assimilation if they could get 
good positions for themselves (403), whereas the oppositional elite sought a new 
essentialist identity in the international discourse of aboriginality (405). The 
ordinary people, however, saw little use for (and even disadvantages to) such 
goals as linguistic preservation and the creation of autonomous zones (427). 
Rudolph claims that ordinary people perceive autonomous zones as making them 
‘like apes in a zoo’, whereas opening reserves up to a free land market would 
make them free and equal to others (351); an argument which also appears in his 
2004 English article ‘The Pan-Ethnic Movement of Taiwanese Aborigines and the 
Role of Elites in the Process of Ethnicity Formation’.1 
   This approach could hardly be more different from the usual approach in 
Canada, where anthropologists often emerge as advocates for indigenous rights 
(e.g. the works of Michael Asch, Richard Salisbury, and Colin Scott) or write 
sensitive ethnographies from as close to the native perspective as possible (e.g. 
Toby Morantz’s The White Man’s Gonna Getcha), all without looking at 
indigenous demands as social movements. In Canada, the usual assumption is 
that indigenous peoples have inherent rights to sovereignty because of their 
presence on territories before European and other forms of colonial expansion. 
The only exception is Thomas Flanagan’s First Nations? Second Thoughts, which 
exposes the ‘fiction’ of aboriginal sovereignty and argues that only a small elite of 
activists, politicians, and well-connected entrepreneurs benefit from the political 
agenda of indigenous rights. As a European scholar in a country with no 
indigenous peoples, Rudolph has no ongoing relationship with his research 
partners and can afford to be more distanced. 
   Peter Kulchyski’s slim new pocket book Red Indians (2007), published by a left-
wing press in Manitoba, stands in stark contrast with Rudolph’s tome. The most 
obvious contrast is that Rudolph capitalizes all of his nouns, since he writes in 
German; whereas Kulchyski refuses to use a single capital letter for the entire 
book. By doing so, he encourages readers to rethink history and avoids the tricky 
problems in indigenous studies of which words to capitalize – Indian? Aboriginal? 
Indigenous? (7). Defining economic development as ‘raping the land for the 
benefit of the rich’ (135), he weaves together a fable in which Canada’s 
indigenous people have resisted capitalism since the beginning; hence the title. 
He takes a historical jab at the US, saying that their fight against the British ‘was 
also a revolution against aboriginal rights’ (24). Canada, of course, emerges as 
morally superior, but only slightly so. This book lacks the footnotes and detailed 
scholarship of Rudolph’s work, yet for that reason would make a good 
undergraduate text. It tells a good story and is a fun read.  
                                                 
1
 Availble here: http://www.taiwanfirstnations.org/movement.html. 
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   These two books can best be contrasted in terms of opposing political ideology. 
Rudolph’s book is informed by liberal assumptions that nationalism is dangerous 
and individual rights the best path toward liberation. His views on the common 
people wishing to mortgage their land rather than live on ghetto-like reserves are 
similar to those of Thomas Flanagan, who advocates giving individual land 
ownership to Canadian Natives so that they can freely sell their land or use it as 
collateral for loans. Kulchyski’s book is a leftist Canadian pamphlet – financed by 
none other than the Canadian government. These books illustrate that research 
on indigenous issues always involves some kind of political positioning. One book 
is more in line with the Enlightenment ideals of neo-liberalism; the other with the 
collectivist demands of the UN Declaration and local nationalisms. In Taiwan as in 
Canada, these opposing ideologies are still struggling for ascendancy. Indigenous 
communities, and the communities of scholars who study them, are all 
battlegrounds in a struggle that is far from finished. 
 
Scott Simon 
Ottawa University 
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This brief review focuses on a recent issue - Vol. 3 (2), 2007 – of the Taiwan 
Journal of Democracy. The journal’s stated brief is to provide ‘an open forum, free 
of cultural and partisan bias’ for the publication and dissemination of ‘articles 
comparing the experiences of new democracies’. The editorial and advisory 
boards of the journal indicate the international scope and ambition of the journal, 
as do the articles themselves. Indeed, in this particular issue there are essays on 
Mexico (Hsiao-Yun Yu), Latin America more generally (Michael Coppedge, and 
Peter H. Smith with Melissa R. Ziegler), the Post-Soviet region (Mark B. 
Beissinger) and Taiwan (Laurence Whitehead) as well as on issues including 
political leadership (John Kane), so-called ‘Presidentialism’ (Robert Elgie) and a 
review essay on theories of democratization (Guillermo O’Donnell). 
   As academics are increasingly encouraged to specialise and to develop 
regional expertise two dangers are apparent: the first is that scholars will come to 
accept regions, nations and cultural areas as ‘natural’ objects of enquiry – they 
will, in other words, become voluntarily blind to the historically formed and 
politically and economically conditioned logic of area categories that shape and 
condition the production of academic knowledge. Secondly, the possibility of 
theory – of universal theory – will slide into the background as scholarly 
endeavour fragments into a series of domains of expertise defined by specific 
skill-sets, with each domain increasingly myopic to the fact that ‘we’ live not in 
neatly defined nations, regions or cultural areas but rather in an increasingly inter-
connected, globalizing world. 
   Thankfully, journals like this one offer a welcome and indeed valuable platform 
for thinking differently and, indeed, for thinking comparatively. According to 
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Yengoyan, ‘comparison creates new and unique insights’ (Yengoyan 2006: 3) 
and can enable ‘discoveries through different ways of seeing things – by drawing 
forth new, unique and possibly odd implications that bear on what is being 
compared – and to direct our attention to other contexts which on their surface 
might appear to have no connection’ (Yengoyan 2006: 4). Comparison is, then, ‘a 
form of thought experiment’ (Yengoyan 2006: 6) that invokes Benedict 
Anderson’s ‘spectre of comparisons’ through which phenomena are no longer 
experienced ‘matter-of factly’ but are rather seen ‘simultaneously close up and 
from afar’ (Anderson 2002: 2) as if looking through a telescope from both ends at 
the same time.2  This journal, then, provides a platform for informed (and in-
forming) scholarly debate about democracy and democratic politics and for an 
explicitly comparative or bi-focal optics and vision. Clearly, a cluster of pro-
democratic values are implied here despite the editorial disclaimer about the 
journal offering ‘an open forum, free of cultural and partisan bias’. Given the 
otherwise originality of the journal’s vision, it is a pity that neo-Kantian thinking 
continues to rule the roost: why is it still so difficult to argue that there are no facts 
without the values that structure them and offer them up for interpretation? 
   I want to focus for the remainder of this review on Guillermo O’Donnell’s essay, 
‘Democratic Theories after the Third Wave: A Historical Retrospection’ and 
Laurence Whitehead’s ‘Taiwan’s Democratization: A Critical Test for the 
International Dimensions Perspective’. Both of these papers offer useful points of 
departure for thinking through questions of method and theory (respectively) for 
the study of democracy and democratic politics in Taiwan and elsewhere. 
   O’Donnell begins with a pointed critique of political-science arguments that 
claimed that Confucian and Iberian cultures were ‘naturally’ indisposed to 
democracy. It surely goes without saying that cultures are not static objects that 
can be defined in terms of essential characteristics and traits. O’Donnell is correct 
to point out that this kind of argument has geo-political consequences and, 
moreover, that it presents ‘culture’ as something timeless and unchanging rather 
than as a plurality of dynamic and shifting morally inflected relations and 
articulations between individuals, groups, and the state (O’Donnell notes that the 
same kinds of arguments are being used today about Islamic countries and 
cultures). In other words, scholarship must move beyond these kinds of 
unnecessary and unhelpful ethno-centric essentialisms. 
   O’Donnell’s next point is to critique the notion of democratic ‘consolidation’ 
which, he argues, encourages ‘us’ to think about democracy as a ‘stabilized point 
of arrival’ rather than as an ‘ongoing process’ (2). In other words, democracy 
does not stand, static, at the end of some evolutionary or teleological line of 
development towards which all societies must aim. Rather, democracy is always 
incomplete, always indeed fragile, and is not guaranteed by elections but rather 
rests on rights enshrined in law, autonomous institutions, open media, multiple 
forms of belonging and citizenship and so forth. Indeed, O’Donnell suggests that 
                                                 
2
 Yengoyan, A. (2006) Modes of Comparison: Theory and Practice, Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press and Anderson, B. R. O’G. (2002) The Spectre of Comparisons: 
Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World. London and New York: Verso. 
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while there have been many important studies of political parties, elections, and 
government offices, too little attention has been paid to the every-day and 
perhaps seemingly banal aspects of democratic belonging. As O’Donnell points 
out, ‘democracy also entails crucial dimensions of civil, social, and cultural 
citizenship[s]’ (4). Here, O’Donnell appears to be making a case for an 
ethnographic or micro-level approach to democracy and democratic politics, an 
approach that works not only from the top-down but also from the bottom-up and 
which explores not only ‘meso- and micro-institutional arrangements’ but also 
‘informal institutions and practices’ (5).  
   O’Donnell places particular emphasis on citizenship and he argues that 
‘democracy is the only political arrangement that construes all of us as agents’ 
and also that ‘democracy is hospitable to different conceptions of the human 
being’ (7). He rightly argues that human beings are born into pre-existing webs of 
language, culture, and history; citizens are as such not isolated ‘monads’ (6) but 
rather the bearers and makers of diverse meanings and identifications that 
include familial, religious, institutional, and national affiliations that do not 
inevitably preclude the right to pursue individualistic and egoistic desires and 
wants: 
 
I insist that the citizens of political democracy are socially preconstituted beings. 
They enter into the public arenas of a democratic regime carrying a dense 
network of social relations – many of them legally defined and backed – as well 
as identities, collective affiliations, and cultures that usually are strong and 
meaningful for them. This fact and the beneficial diversity it entails is not a 
hindrance but the reason that underlies the positive value that we should attach 
to the contemporary existence of various kinds of democracy and, with them, of 
various paths for further democratisation. (8) 
 
   O’Donnell’s essay seems to me to suggest certain important methodological 
points for the study of democracy and democratic politics both specifically in 
Taiwan but which are equally salient to any elsewhere. Firstly, analysis must 
include a comparative perspective; secondly, analysis must be self-consciously 
reflexive in order to overcome the various species of orientalism that underpin 
much of Western social theory and political science discourse; thirdly, democracy 
is not a static state or a destination but is rather a process that is always 
vulnerable; fourthly, the study of democracy must not rest with the study of 
government offices, political parties, and elections but must include a cultural 
dimension that assumes that ‘we’ are not isolated, rational, individuals but are 
rather embedded, socially and historically pre-constituted beings; and fifthly, that 
the study of democracy and democratic politics can itself contribute to processes 
of democratization. 
   O’Donnell’s essay offers some extremely useful methodological pointers 
towards the study of democracy and democratic politics in Taiwan (and, 
obviously, elsewhere as well). Whitehead’s essay, by contrast, is concerned not 
so much with methodological questions but with testing theoretical assumptions, 
in particular those that belong to what he calls the ‘international dimensions 
perspective’. Whitehead argues that ‘the Taiwanese case constitutes a critical 
test for several key assumptions about the role of international factors’ in 
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processes of democratization (11) and, as such, Whitehead ‘tests’ a number of 
these key theoretical presuppositions of the international dimensions perspective 
including ‘wave theory’, ‘snowballing’, ‘decolonization’, ‘external conditionality’, 
‘contagion’, ‘modernization theory’, and ‘popular sovereignty and consent’, 
against the Taiwan case. 
   According to Whitehead, wave theory ‘privileges variations in great power 
‘control’ as the major explanatory variable’ (15) and links democratization to the 
collapse of the bi-polar logic of international relations that characterized  the so-
called Cold War. But although this so-called ‘wave’ – like the ‘snowballing’ 
metaphor – picks up on the fact that democratization has, in recent decades, 
occurred in groups or clusters of countries, it does not explain why some 
countries do not democratize and, moreover, these metaphors render democracy 
not as ‘freely chosen or negotiated’ at the local level but rather as being ‘heavily 
determined by the prior choices of great powers or influential neighbours’ (17). In 
other words, one tendency of the international dimensions perspective is to locate 
the agency ‘behind’ democratic change in an anonymous elsewhere rather than 
in the (likely conflicting) hopes, anxieties, and struggles of local peoples. 
   As Whitehead ‘tests’ each assumption against the case of democratization in 
Taiwan, Taiwan emerges as ‘highly atypical’ (22) and as an ‘extremely deviant 
“limit case”’ (29). Whitehead’s ‘test’ or ‘experiment’ does not so much refute these 
theories and their predictions but rather sets up a case for Taiwanese uniqueness 
or exceptionalism. There are surely consequences that follow from this kind of 
argument; perhaps it means that grand theory needs to attend to the local in more 
detail in order to for that theory to attain a level of greater nuance and subtlety, 
ideally without any resulting loss of explanatory power. Or perhaps it simply 
means that more political scientists need to study Taiwan, because it is such a 
special case. Or, again, perhaps it means that the example of Taiwan requires an 
alternative theory of democratization to account for its unique and irreducible 
characteristics and features. However, constituting Taiwan as ‘atypical’, ‘deviant’, 
and as a ‘limit case’ may encourage the further isolation of Taiwan; perhaps after-
all, a comparative perspective serves only to obscure the key elements of 
Taiwan’s recent political history. 
   In fact, Whitehead privileges what he calls ‘regional “clusters”’ because ‘the 
history and culture…of each large region matters, as it selects and refracts the 
way global tendencies feed into local practices’ (31). He is, of course, absolutely 
right, and the argument unfolds in such a way as to refute the causal models of 
political change detailed by the international dimensions perspective. Instead, 
Whitehead emphasizes democratization ‘as a complex, under-determined, long-
run, relatively open-ended, and even reversible historical process’ (32). Yet, the 
context for interpretation that Whitehead himself privileges – namely, that of the 
China-Taiwan nexus – is hardly neutral or indeed naturally given, but is itself the 
product of global and regional political and economic relations of power.3 
                                                 
3
 For a social science perspective on this question, see Hong, K. and Murray, S. O. (2005) 
Looking Through Taiwan: American Anthropologists’ Collusion with Ethnic Domination. 
Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. 
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   The Taiwan Journal of Democracy offers a valuable forum for thinking carefully 
about questions of democracy and democratic politics in Taiwan and elsewhere. 
Methodologically and theoretically sophisticated, the journal offers an important 
space for critical reflection and it should be close to hand for all those interested 
in Taiwan, regardless of their disciplinary background or theoretical predilections. 
 
Paul-François Tremlett 
SOAS, University of London  
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